Question 430
During production incident triage, engineers observe: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added.
- Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change.
- Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance.
- Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. It monitors the mechanism that Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: ABRs have the intended area 0 connectivity and inter-area routes are present with correct next hops.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added. This control addresses the distinct OSPF passive interface operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
C:Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. This control addresses the distinct Point-to-point OSPF network type operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
D:Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks. This control addresses the distinct OSPF authentication key mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
Question 431
During production incident triage, engineers observe: PE-72 has IP reachability across a link but no LDP adjacency; the IGP runs over the link while LDP was enabled on another interface. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes.
- Sample FEC label bindings and forwarding resolution after prefix or IGP changes.
- Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence.
- Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: PE-72 has IP reachability across a link but no LDP adjacency; the IGP runs over the link while LDP was enabled on another interface. It monitors the mechanism that LDP distributes labels over protocol sessions built on top of an IGP-reachable core and needs proper interface participation. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Expected LDP discovery packets and TCP session are present on the correct link, and relevant FEC labels are learned.
Incorrect Answers
B:Sample FEC label bindings and forwarding resolution after prefix or IGP changes. This control addresses the distinct Missing LDP FEC label mapping operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-72 has IP reachability across a link but no LDP adjacency; the IGP runs over the link while LDP was enabled on another interface. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. The governing mechanism is: LDP distributes labels over protocol sessions built on top of an IGP-reachable core and needs proper interface participation.
C:Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. This control addresses the distinct Incoming label missing in LFIB operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-72 has IP reachability across a link but no LDP adjacency; the IGP runs over the link while LDP was enabled on another interface. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. The governing mechanism is: LDP distributes labels over protocol sessions built on top of an IGP-reachable core and needs proper interface participation.
D:Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. This control addresses the distinct Penultimate hop popping operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-72 has IP reachability across a link but no LDP adjacency; the IGP runs over the link while LDP was enabled on another interface. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. The governing mechanism is: LDP distributes labels over protocol sessions built on top of an IGP-reachable core and needs proper interface participation.
Question 432
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two routers have interface-based GRE tunnels, but the source address on one end does not match the destination configured on the remote end. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests.
- Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements.
- Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups.
- Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two routers have interface-based GRE tunnels, but the source address on one end does not match the destination configured on the remote end. It monitors the mechanism that GRE encapsulation uses configured outer source and destination IP addresses, which must align with the underlay endpoints of the intended tunnel. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Packet captures show the expected outer GRE addresses and matching decapsulation counts on the peer.
Incorrect Answers
A:Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests. This control addresses the distinct GRE encapsulation MTU overhead operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers have interface-based GRE tunnels, but the source address on one end does not match the destination configured on the remote end. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulation uses configured outer source and destination IP addresses, which must align with the underlay endpoints of the intended tunnel.
B:Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. This control addresses the distinct GRE confidentiality misconception operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers have interface-based GRE tunnels, but the source address on one end does not match the destination configured on the remote end. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulation uses configured outer source and destination IP addresses, which must align with the underlay endpoints of the intended tunnel.
D:Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. This control addresses the distinct GRE underlay recursive loss operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers have interface-based GRE tunnels, but the source address on one end does not match the destination configured on the remote end. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulation uses configured outer source and destination IP addresses, which must align with the underlay endpoints of the intended tunnel.
Question 433
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A provider virtual-switch routing instance is configured but one interface remains attached to the default switching context, so tenant MAC learning is fragmented. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review instance-to-interface memberships during virtual switching changes.
- Include native VLAN agreement and negative isolation tests in trunk turn-up procedures.
- Verify logical-unit VLAN IDs and encapsulation during each additional service turn-up.
- Monitor unknown-unicast rate together with MAC-table learning and churn.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Review instance-to-interface memberships during virtual switching changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A provider virtual-switch routing instance is configured but one interface remains attached to the default switching context, so tenant MAC learning is fragmented. It monitors the mechanism that Virtual switch instances maintain separate Layer 2 forwarding contexts; interface membership determines where MACs and VLANs are learned. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The customer MAC and VLAN appear in the correct virtual-switch instance with no leakage into default bridging context.
Incorrect Answers
B:Include native VLAN agreement and negative isolation tests in trunk turn-up procedures. This control addresses the distinct Native VLAN mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider virtual-switch routing instance is configured but one interface remains attached to the default switching context, so tenant MAC learning is fragmented. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review instance-to-interface memberships during virtual switching changes. The governing mechanism is: Virtual switch instances maintain separate Layer 2 forwarding contexts; interface membership determines where MACs and VLANs are learned.
C:Verify logical-unit VLAN IDs and encapsulation during each additional service turn-up. This control addresses the distinct Flexible VLAN tagging logical units operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider virtual-switch routing instance is configured but one interface remains attached to the default switching context, so tenant MAC learning is fragmented. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review instance-to-interface memberships during virtual switching changes. The governing mechanism is: Virtual switch instances maintain separate Layer 2 forwarding contexts; interface membership determines where MACs and VLANs are learned.
D:Monitor unknown-unicast rate together with MAC-table learning and churn. This control addresses the distinct Unknown unicast flooding behavior operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider virtual-switch routing instance is configured but one interface remains attached to the default switching context, so tenant MAC learning is fragmented. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review instance-to-interface memberships during virtual switching changes. The governing mechanism is: Virtual switch instances maintain separate Layer 2 forwarding contexts; interface membership determines where MACs and VLANs are learned.
Question 434
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two IPv6-only customer islands must communicate across an IPv4 underlay, but no tunnel endpoints have been configured for their routed IPv6 traffic. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Check IPv6 static routes for proper next-hop scope after link renumbering.
- Monitor OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 neighbor health independently on dual-stack links.
- Check BGP families, IPv6 route filters and next-hop resolution on each dual-stack peer.
- Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two IPv6-only customer islands must communicate across an IPv4 underlay, but no tunnel endpoints have been configured for their routed IPv6 traffic. It monitors the mechanism that An encapsulating tunnel can transport IPv6 payload packets over an IPv4 underlay when endpoint and route mapping are correct. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: An IPv6 trace crosses the intended tunnel, while outer IPv4 packets reach the peer endpoints and encapsulation counters increment.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check IPv6 static routes for proper next-hop scope after link renumbering. This control addresses the distinct IPv6 static link-local next hop operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IPv6-only customer islands must communicate across an IPv4 underlay, but no tunnel endpoints have been configured for their routed IPv6 traffic. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance. The governing mechanism is: An encapsulating tunnel can transport IPv6 payload packets over an IPv4 underlay when endpoint and route mapping are correct.
B:Monitor OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 neighbor health independently on dual-stack links. This control addresses the distinct OSPFv3 neighbor uses link-local operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IPv6-only customer islands must communicate across an IPv4 underlay, but no tunnel endpoints have been configured for their routed IPv6 traffic. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance. The governing mechanism is: An encapsulating tunnel can transport IPv6 payload packets over an IPv4 underlay when endpoint and route mapping are correct.
C:Check BGP families, IPv6 route filters and next-hop resolution on each dual-stack peer. This control addresses the distinct IPv6 BGP NLRI family omitted operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IPv6-only customer islands must communicate across an IPv4 underlay, but no tunnel endpoints have been configured for their routed IPv6 traffic. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance. The governing mechanism is: An encapsulating tunnel can transport IPv6 payload packets over an IPv4 underlay when endpoint and route mapping are correct.
Question 435
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A provider calls a GRE tunnel secure against eavesdropping merely because customers cannot see its inner packet headers on the underlay. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups.
- Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements.
- Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state.
- Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A provider calls a GRE tunnel secure against eavesdropping merely because customers cannot see its inner packet headers on the underlay. It monitors the mechanism that GRE encapsulates packets but does not inherently encrypt payloads or authenticate peers; security needs separate controls. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: A validated encryption layer protects inner payload on the monitored underlay while GRE routing still functions as designed.
Incorrect Answers
A:Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. This control addresses the distinct GRE tunnel endpoint mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider calls a GRE tunnel secure against eavesdropping merely because customers cannot see its inner packet headers on the underlay. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulates packets but does not inherently encrypt payloads or authenticate peers; security needs separate controls.
C:Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. This control addresses the distinct GRE underlay recursive loss operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider calls a GRE tunnel secure against eavesdropping merely because customers cannot see its inner packet headers on the underlay. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulates packets but does not inherently encrypt payloads or authenticate peers; security needs separate controls.
D:Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests. This control addresses the distinct GRE encapsulation MTU overhead operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A provider calls a GRE tunnel secure against eavesdropping merely because customers cannot see its inner packet headers on the underlay. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. The governing mechanism is: GRE encapsulates packets but does not inherently encrypt payloads or authenticate peers; security needs separate controls.
Question 436
During production incident triage, engineers observe: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout.
- Document intended MED comparison scope and test different-neighbor-AS cases.
- Verify prefix-level export allowlists during customer peering acceptance.
- Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. It monitors the mechanism that IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The session establishes using the intended loopback source and destination and stays up after a physical link fails.
Incorrect Answers
B:Document intended MED comparison scope and test different-neighbor-AS cases. This control addresses the distinct BGP MED comparison scope operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout. The governing mechanism is: IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
C:Verify prefix-level export allowlists during customer peering acceptance. This control addresses the distinct BGP export policy omission operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout. The governing mechanism is: IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
D:Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. This control addresses the distinct BGP import policy leak operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout. The governing mechanism is: IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
Question 437
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two switches intended to operate in the same MSTP region treat each other as a boundary because their VLAN-to-instance mapping digests differ. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests.
- Audit edge-port BPDU protection and alerts during customer endpoint changes.
- Monitor root-protection violations and keep the intended root location documented.
- Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two switches intended to operate in the same MSTP region treat each other as a boundary because their VLAN-to-instance mapping digests differ. It monitors the mechanism that MSTP region membership depends on matching region configuration identifiers, including VLAN-to-instance mapping. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Both switches report the same region digest and expected instance-specific spanning-tree paths.
Incorrect Answers
A:Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. This control addresses the distinct RSTP alternate port activation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two switches intended to operate in the same MSTP region treat each other as a boundary because their VLAN-to-instance mapping digests differ. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change. The governing mechanism is: MSTP region membership depends on matching region configuration identifiers, including VLAN-to-instance mapping.
B:Audit edge-port BPDU protection and alerts during customer endpoint changes. This control addresses the distinct Unexpected BPDU on edge port operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two switches intended to operate in the same MSTP region treat each other as a boundary because their VLAN-to-instance mapping digests differ. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change. The governing mechanism is: MSTP region membership depends on matching region configuration identifiers, including VLAN-to-instance mapping.
C:Monitor root-protection violations and keep the intended root location documented. This control addresses the distinct Root protection against rogue core operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two switches intended to operate in the same MSTP region treat each other as a boundary because their VLAN-to-instance mapping digests differ. The directly relevant continuing check is: Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change. The governing mechanism is: MSTP region membership depends on matching region configuration identifiers, including VLAN-to-instance mapping.
Question 438
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A dual-Routing-Engine chassis sustains packet forwarding during a switchover with GRES but some routing adjacencies reset; operators expected GRES alone to preserve protocol state. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Audit LACP partner identity and collecting/distributing state during bundle maintenance.
- Monitor member count, error rate and utilization separately from AE state.
- Test control-plane and data-plane continuity separately under planned RE switchovers.
- Validate planned VRRP priorities and failover behavior after router maintenance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Test control-plane and data-plane continuity separately under planned RE switchovers. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A dual-Routing-Engine chassis sustains packet forwarding during a switchover with GRES but some routing adjacencies reset; operators expected GRES alone to preserve protocol state. It monitors the mechanism that GRES preserves interface and kernel forwarding state across Routing Engine switchover but does not by itself preserve routing protocol sessions. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: A controlled RE switchover maintains data-plane forwarding and routing neighbor continuity according to the selected supported feature set.
Incorrect Answers
A:Audit LACP partner identity and collecting/distributing state during bundle maintenance. This control addresses the distinct LACP partner mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A dual-Routing-Engine chassis sustains packet forwarding during a switchover with GRES but some routing adjacencies reset; operators expected GRES alone to preserve protocol state. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test control-plane and data-plane continuity separately under planned RE switchovers. The governing mechanism is: GRES preserves interface and kernel forwarding state across Routing Engine switchover but does not by itself preserve routing protocol sessions.
B:Monitor member count, error rate and utilization separately from AE state. This control addresses the distinct LAG member imbalance after failure operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A dual-Routing-Engine chassis sustains packet forwarding during a switchover with GRES but some routing adjacencies reset; operators expected GRES alone to preserve protocol state. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test control-plane and data-plane continuity separately under planned RE switchovers. The governing mechanism is: GRES preserves interface and kernel forwarding state across Routing Engine switchover but does not by itself preserve routing protocol sessions.
D:Validate planned VRRP priorities and failover behavior after router maintenance. This control addresses the distinct VRRP master priority failover operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A dual-Routing-Engine chassis sustains packet forwarding during a switchover with GRES but some routing adjacencies reset; operators expected GRES alone to preserve protocol state. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test control-plane and data-plane continuity separately under planned RE switchovers. The governing mechanism is: GRES preserves interface and kernel forwarding state across Routing Engine switchover but does not by itself preserve routing protocol sessions.
Question 439
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A designed IS-IS path cost is too large for the old narrow metric scheme, causing metrics to be interpreted incorrectly after an upgrade. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
- Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency.
- Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers.
- Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A designed IS-IS path cost is too large for the old narrow metric scheme, causing metrics to be interpreted incorrectly after an upgrade. It monitors the mechanism that IS-IS TLVs and metric styles affect the expressible path costs; wide metrics support modern larger costs and traffic engineering. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The LSDB advertises compatible wide metrics and SPF selects the intended path across the upgraded links.
Incorrect Answers
B:Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS level-one area mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A designed IS-IS path cost is too large for the old narrow metric scheme, causing metrics to be interpreted incorrectly after an upgrade. The directly relevant continuing check is: Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS TLVs and metric styles affect the expressible path costs; wide metrics support modern larger costs and traffic engineering.
C:Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS level capability mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A designed IS-IS path cost is too large for the old narrow metric scheme, causing metrics to be interpreted incorrectly after an upgrade. The directly relevant continuing check is: Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS TLVs and metric styles affect the expressible path costs; wide metrics support modern larger costs and traffic engineering.
D:Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS ISO family missing operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A designed IS-IS path cost is too large for the old narrow metric scheme, causing metrics to be interpreted incorrectly after an upgrade. The directly relevant continuing check is: Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS TLVs and metric styles affect the expressible path costs; wide metrics support modern larger costs and traffic engineering.
Question 440
During production incident triage, engineers observe: PE-13 is configured to advertise 203.0.113.0/22 as an aggregate, but no eligible more-specific contributing prefix is active and the summary is absent. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Use multi-flow telemetry and documented hashing expectations when evaluating ECMP efficiency.
- Monitor aggregate active state and contributor counts before each upstream announcement change.
- Check classifier counters, filter attachment and target-table availability after changes.
- Review first-match precedence with representative negative and positive traffic tests.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Monitor aggregate active state and contributor counts before each upstream announcement change. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: PE-13 is configured to advertise 203.0.113.0/22 as an aggregate, but no eligible more-specific contributing prefix is active and the summary is absent. It monitors the mechanism that A Junos aggregate route is derived from contributing more-specific routes; an aggregate configured without a valid contributor may not become active. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The aggregate appears as an active route with contributing prefixes shown, and the permitted summary is advertised to the intended peer.
Incorrect Answers
A:Use multi-flow telemetry and documented hashing expectations when evaluating ECMP efficiency. This control addresses the distinct Per-flow hash expectation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-13 is configured to advertise 203.0.113.0/22 as an aggregate, but no eligible more-specific contributing prefix is active and the summary is absent. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor aggregate active state and contributor counts before each upstream announcement change. The governing mechanism is: A Junos aggregate route is derived from contributing more-specific routes; an aggregate configured without a valid contributor may not become active.
C:Check classifier counters, filter attachment and target-table availability after changes. This control addresses the distinct Filter-based forwarding classification operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-13 is configured to advertise 203.0.113.0/22 as an aggregate, but no eligible more-specific contributing prefix is active and the summary is absent. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor aggregate active state and contributor counts before each upstream announcement change. The governing mechanism is: A Junos aggregate route is derived from contributing more-specific routes; an aggregate configured without a valid contributor may not become active.
D:Review first-match precedence with representative negative and positive traffic tests. This control addresses the distinct Filter policy overmatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-13 is configured to advertise 203.0.113.0/22 as an aggregate, but no eligible more-specific contributing prefix is active and the summary is absent. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor aggregate active state and contributor counts before each upstream announcement change. The governing mechanism is: A Junos aggregate route is derived from contributing more-specific routes; an aggregate configured without a valid contributor may not become active.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests