Question 450
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two Junos routers on the same LAN are configured for Level 1 IS-IS but use different area addresses and never establish an L1 adjacency. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates.
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
- Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency.
- Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two Junos routers on the same LAN are configured for Level 1 IS-IS but use different area addresses and never establish an L1 adjacency. It monitors the mechanism that IS-IS Level 1 adjacencies require matching area addresses, whereas Level 2 provides backbone connectivity across areas. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The two devices show an up adjacency at the intended level and their Level 1 link-state databases exchange reachability.
Incorrect Answers
A:Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS ISO family missing operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two Junos routers on the same LAN are configured for Level 1 IS-IS but use different area addresses and never establish an L1 adjacency. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS Level 1 adjacencies require matching area addresses, whereas Level 2 provides backbone connectivity across areas.
B:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS narrow metric ceiling operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two Junos routers on the same LAN are configured for Level 1 IS-IS but use different area addresses and never establish an L1 adjacency. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS Level 1 adjacencies require matching area addresses, whereas Level 2 provides backbone connectivity across areas.
D:Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS DIS election surprise operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two Junos routers on the same LAN are configured for Level 1 IS-IS but use different area addresses and never establish an L1 adjacency. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS Level 1 adjacencies require matching area addresses, whereas Level 2 provides backbone connectivity across areas.
Question 451
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change.
- Audit peer AS numbers during carrier handoffs and AS migration work.
- Check peer-specific TCP reachability and filtering during peering change control.
- Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. It monitors the mechanism that BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The rejected prefix does not appear as an eligible route while approved advertised prefixes remain available.
Incorrect Answers
B:Audit peer AS numbers during carrier handoffs and AS migration work. This control addresses the distinct BGP peer autonomous system mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. The governing mechanism is: BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
C:Check peer-specific TCP reachability and filtering during peering change control. This control addresses the distinct BGP TCP transport blocked operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. The governing mechanism is: BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
D:Validate loopback reachability, source address and peer configuration during IBGP rollout. This control addresses the distinct IBGP loopback source resolution operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. The governing mechanism is: BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
Question 452
During production incident triage, engineers observe: An SR-MPLS headend expects node-SID traffic to follow the IGP shortest path, but an operator assumes a node SID can force an arbitrary link sequence without further segments. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews.
- Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence.
- Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services.
- Validate actual SR paths and segment lists after core metric or policy changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Validate actual SR paths and segment lists after core metric or policy changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: An SR-MPLS headend expects node-SID traffic to follow the IGP shortest path, but an operator assumes a node SID can force an arbitrary link sequence without further segments. It monitors the mechanism that A node SID typically steers toward its destination using shortest-path IGP forwarding, while explicit adjacency segments can add finer path constraints. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The observed label stack and forwarding path match the documented shortest path or the specified explicit segment list.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews. This control addresses the distinct LDP TCP 646 establishment operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An SR-MPLS headend expects node-SID traffic to follow the IGP shortest path, but an operator assumes a node SID can force an arbitrary link sequence without further segments. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate actual SR paths and segment lists after core metric or policy changes. The governing mechanism is: A node SID typically steers toward its destination using shortest-path IGP forwarding, while explicit adjacency segments can add finer path constraints.
B:Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. This control addresses the distinct Incoming label missing in LFIB operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An SR-MPLS headend expects node-SID traffic to follow the IGP shortest path, but an operator assumes a node SID can force an arbitrary link sequence without further segments. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate actual SR paths and segment lists after core metric or policy changes. The governing mechanism is: A node SID typically steers toward its destination using shortest-path IGP forwarding, while explicit adjacency segments can add finer path constraints.
C:Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. This control addresses the distinct Penultimate hop popping operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An SR-MPLS headend expects node-SID traffic to follow the IGP shortest path, but an operator assumes a node SID can force an arbitrary link sequence without further segments. The directly relevant continuing check is: Validate actual SR paths and segment lists after core metric or policy changes. The governing mechanism is: A node SID typically steers toward its destination using shortest-path IGP forwarding, while explicit adjacency segments can add finer path constraints.
Question 453
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A labeled packet reaches a transit router, but its advertised incoming label has no valid forwarding action in the label forwarding table. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence.
- Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes.
- Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews.
- Track reserved and unreserved bandwidth on TE links before new LSP provisioning.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A labeled packet reaches a transit router, but its advertised incoming label has no valid forwarding action in the label forwarding table. It monitors the mechanism that MPLS forwarding depends on matching the incoming label against label-switching entries that specify swap, pop or forwarding actions. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: A lookup for the affected incoming label shows the expected output label and interface, and an MPLS trace reaches the egress.
Incorrect Answers
B:Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. This control addresses the distinct LDP discovery and IGP mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A labeled packet reaches a transit router, but its advertised incoming label has no valid forwarding action in the label forwarding table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. The governing mechanism is: MPLS forwarding depends on matching the incoming label against label-switching entries that specify swap, pop or forwarding actions.
C:Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews. This control addresses the distinct LDP TCP 646 establishment operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A labeled packet reaches a transit router, but its advertised incoming label has no valid forwarding action in the label forwarding table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. The governing mechanism is: MPLS forwarding depends on matching the incoming label against label-switching entries that specify swap, pop or forwarding actions.
D:Track reserved and unreserved bandwidth on TE links before new LSP provisioning. This control addresses the distinct RSVP reservable bandwidth shortage operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A labeled packet reaches a transit router, but its advertised incoming label has no valid forwarding action in the label forwarding table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor LFIB consistency with advertised label bindings after topology convergence. The governing mechanism is: MPLS forwarding depends on matching the incoming label against label-switching entries that specify swap, pop or forwarding actions.
Question 454
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change.
- Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes.
- Monitor root-protection violations and keep the intended root location documented.
- Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. It monitors the mechanism that RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: A controlled root-port failure causes the expected alternate port to forward without creating a bridging loop.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare MSTP region configuration and digests on each addition or VLAN change. This control addresses the distinct MSTP region mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. The directly relevant continuing check is: Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. The governing mechanism is: RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
B:Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes. This control addresses the distinct Root bridge election priority operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. The directly relevant continuing check is: Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. The governing mechanism is: RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
C:Monitor root-protection violations and keep the intended root location documented. This control addresses the distinct Root protection against rogue core operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. The directly relevant continuing check is: Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. The governing mechanism is: RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
Question 455
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two IBGP-learned transit exits have equal basic attributes but the operator wants a designated egress router to be selected throughout the AS. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Audit peer AS numbers during carrier handoffs and AS migration work.
- Verify prefix-level export allowlists during customer peering acceptance.
- Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change.
- Audit local-preference policy for consistency across ingress points.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Audit local-preference policy for consistency across ingress points. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two IBGP-learned transit exits have equal basic attributes but the operator wants a designated egress router to be selected throughout the AS. It monitors the mechanism that Within an AS, a BGP path with higher local preference is preferred over one with lower local preference, subject to route eligibility. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The designated BGP exit wins best-path selection for the intended prefixes and backup behavior remains correct.
Incorrect Answers
A:Audit peer AS numbers during carrier handoffs and AS migration work. This control addresses the distinct BGP peer autonomous system mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IBGP-learned transit exits have equal basic attributes but the operator wants a designated egress router to be selected throughout the AS. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit local-preference policy for consistency across ingress points. The governing mechanism is: Within an AS, a BGP path with higher local preference is preferred over one with lower local preference, subject to route eligibility.
B:Verify prefix-level export allowlists during customer peering acceptance. This control addresses the distinct BGP export policy omission operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IBGP-learned transit exits have equal basic attributes but the operator wants a designated egress router to be selected throughout the AS. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit local-preference policy for consistency across ingress points. The governing mechanism is: Within an AS, a BGP path with higher local preference is preferred over one with lower local preference, subject to route eligibility.
C:Review inbound prefix filtering and max-route thresholds with every peer change. This control addresses the distinct BGP import policy leak operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two IBGP-learned transit exits have equal basic attributes but the operator wants a designated egress router to be selected throughout the AS. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit local-preference policy for consistency across ingress points. The governing mechanism is: Within an AS, a BGP path with higher local preference is preferred over one with lower local preference, subject to route eligibility.
Question 456
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two cloned provider routers use the same IS-IS system identifier and generate conflicting LSP origins inside the link-state database. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates.
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
- Maintain a registry of ISO NET system IDs across every area and lab clone.
- Alert on unusual LSP aging patterns and repeated adjacency churn.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Maintain a registry of ISO NET system IDs across every area and lab clone. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two cloned provider routers use the same IS-IS system identifier and generate conflicting LSP origins inside the link-state database. It monitors the mechanism that IS-IS relies on a unique system ID to identify LSP originators and topology nodes. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The nodes appear with distinct system IDs and no repeated conflicting LSP originator entries in the database.
Incorrect Answers
A:Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS ISO family missing operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two cloned provider routers use the same IS-IS system identifier and generate conflicting LSP origins inside the link-state database. The directly relevant continuing check is: Maintain a registry of ISO NET system IDs across every area and lab clone. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS relies on a unique system ID to identify LSP originators and topology nodes.
B:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS narrow metric ceiling operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two cloned provider routers use the same IS-IS system identifier and generate conflicting LSP origins inside the link-state database. The directly relevant continuing check is: Maintain a registry of ISO NET system IDs across every area and lab clone. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS relies on a unique system ID to identify LSP originators and topology nodes.
D:Alert on unusual LSP aging patterns and repeated adjacency churn. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS LSP lifetime anomaly operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two cloned provider routers use the same IS-IS system identifier and generate conflicting LSP origins inside the link-state database. The directly relevant continuing check is: Maintain a registry of ISO NET system IDs across every area and lab clone. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS relies on a unique system ID to identify LSP originators and topology nodes.
Question 457
During production incident triage, engineers observe: An operations team expects a type-5 external route inside an OSPF stub area and reports the absence as an interface failure. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Baseline OSPF timer settings per transport class and alert on configuration drift.
- Document broadcast-segment DR priorities and rehearse controlled elections.
- Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types.
- Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: An operations team expects a type-5 external route inside an OSPF stub area and reports the absence as an interface failure. It monitors the mechanism that OSPF stub areas intentionally restrict external LSAs and normally rely on appropriate default reachability from an ABR for external destinations. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Internal prefixes remain present, the designed default is learned, and external traffic follows that default without type-5 LSAs in the stub.
Incorrect Answers
A:Baseline OSPF timer settings per transport class and alert on configuration drift. This control addresses the distinct OSPF hello dead timer mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An operations team expects a type-5 external route inside an OSPF stub area and reports the absence as an interface failure. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. The governing mechanism is: OSPF stub areas intentionally restrict external LSAs and normally rely on appropriate default reachability from an ABR for external destinations.
B:Document broadcast-segment DR priorities and rehearse controlled elections. This control addresses the distinct DR priority zero misconception operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An operations team expects a type-5 external route inside an OSPF stub area and reports the absence as an interface failure. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. The governing mechanism is: OSPF stub areas intentionally restrict external LSAs and normally rely on appropriate default reachability from an ABR for external destinations.
D:Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. This control addresses the distinct OSPF LSDB discrepancy operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An operations team expects a type-5 external route inside an OSPF stub area and reports the absence as an interface failure. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. The governing mechanism is: OSPF stub areas intentionally restrict external LSAs and normally rely on appropriate default reachability from an ABR for external destinations.
Question 458
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A trace shows the penultimate router removing a transport label before handing a packet to the egress, and an engineer assumes the missing final label is a fault. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes.
- Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services.
- Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews.
- Track reserved and unreserved bandwidth on TE links before new LSP provisioning.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A trace shows the penultimate router removing a transport label before handing a packet to the egress, and an engineer assumes the missing final label is a fault. It monitors the mechanism that Penultimate-hop popping removes the top transport label before the egress when implicit-null is advertised, reducing label-processing work. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The egress receives the expected payload context and end-to-end service passes despite the absence of a top transport label.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare LDP-enabled links with IGP core interfaces after changes. This control addresses the distinct LDP discovery and IGP mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A trace shows the penultimate router removing a transport label before handing a packet to the egress, and an engineer assumes the missing final label is a fault. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. The governing mechanism is: Penultimate-hop popping removes the top transport label before the egress when implicit-null is advertised, reducing label-processing work.
C:Check LDP session transport filtering as part of control-plane ACL reviews. This control addresses the distinct LDP TCP 646 establishment operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A trace shows the penultimate router removing a transport label before handing a packet to the egress, and an engineer assumes the missing final label is a fault. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. The governing mechanism is: Penultimate-hop popping removes the top transport label before the egress when implicit-null is advertised, reducing label-processing work.
D:Track reserved and unreserved bandwidth on TE links before new LSP provisioning. This control addresses the distinct RSVP reservable bandwidth shortage operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A trace shows the penultimate router removing a transport label before handing a packet to the egress, and an engineer assumes the missing final label is a fault. The directly relevant continuing check is: Document expected label stacks at ingress, transit and penultimate hop for key services. The governing mechanism is: Penultimate-hop popping removes the top transport label before the egress when implicit-null is advertised, reducing label-processing work.
Question 459
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A GRE interface remains administratively up while tunneled traffic fails because the outer destination is unreachable through the underlying IPv4 table. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements.
- Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests.
- Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state.
- Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A GRE interface remains administratively up while tunneled traffic fails because the outer destination is unreachable through the underlying IPv4 table. It monitors the mechanism that GRE is a stateless overlay requiring outer endpoint reachability and generally does not bring the interface down merely because a remote endpoint is unreachable. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: An underlay path reaches the outer peer without circular routing and inner GRE packets are successfully decapsulated.
Incorrect Answers
A:Document encryption requirements separately from GRE connectivity requirements. This control addresses the distinct GRE confidentiality misconception operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A GRE interface remains administratively up while tunneled traffic fails because the outer destination is unreachable through the underlying IPv4 table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. The governing mechanism is: GRE is a stateless overlay requiring outer endpoint reachability and generally does not bring the interface down merely because a remote endpoint is unreachable.
B:Include encapsulation overhead in tunnel MTU and traffic acceptance tests. This control addresses the distinct GRE encapsulation MTU overhead operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A GRE interface remains administratively up while tunneled traffic fails because the outer destination is unreachable through the underlying IPv4 table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. The governing mechanism is: GRE is a stateless overlay requiring outer endpoint reachability and generally does not bring the interface down merely because a remote endpoint is unreachable.
D:Audit source/destination tunnel-pair symmetry during new GRE turn-ups. This control addresses the distinct GRE tunnel endpoint mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A GRE interface remains administratively up while tunneled traffic fails because the outer destination is unreachable through the underlying IPv4 table. The directly relevant continuing check is: Monitor underlay reachability independently from tunnel interface administrative state. The governing mechanism is: GRE is a stateless overlay requiring outer endpoint reachability and generally does not bring the interface down merely because a remote endpoint is unreachable.
Question 460
During production incident triage, engineers observe: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added.
- Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types.
- Periodically compare intended and observed SPF cost paths after bandwidth changes.
- Reserve router IDs in an inventory and audit uniqueness during device provisioning.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Reserve router IDs in an inventory and audit uniqueness during device provisioning. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. It monitors the mechanism that OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The routers advertise distinct IDs, neighbors remain Full and the LSDB no longer shows conflicting origins.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added. This control addresses the distinct OSPF passive interface operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. The directly relevant continuing check is: Reserve router IDs in an inventory and audit uniqueness during device provisioning. The governing mechanism is: OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
B:Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. This control addresses the distinct Stub area external LSA expectation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. The directly relevant continuing check is: Reserve router IDs in an inventory and audit uniqueness during device provisioning. The governing mechanism is: OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
C:Periodically compare intended and observed SPF cost paths after bandwidth changes. This control addresses the distinct OSPF metric path preference operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. The directly relevant continuing check is: Reserve router IDs in an inventory and audit uniqueness during device provisioning. The governing mechanism is: OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests