Question 420
During production incident triage, engineers observe: One peer permits only Level 1 and the other only Level 2 on a link, so neither forms an IS-IS adjacency despite reachable Ethernet. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers.
- Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates.
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
- Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: One peer permits only Level 1 and the other only Level 2 on a link, so neither forms an IS-IS adjacency despite reachable Ethernet. It monitors the mechanism that An IS-IS adjacency needs compatible protocol levels as well as link reachability. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: A shared Level 1 or Level 2 adjacency comes up and the right set of level-specific routes is exchanged.
Incorrect Answers
B:Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS ISO family missing operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One peer permits only Level 1 and the other only Level 2 on a link, so neither forms an IS-IS adjacency despite reachable Ethernet. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. The governing mechanism is: An IS-IS adjacency needs compatible protocol levels as well as link reachability.
C:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS narrow metric ceiling operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One peer permits only Level 1 and the other only Level 2 on a link, so neither forms an IS-IS adjacency despite reachable Ethernet. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. The governing mechanism is: An IS-IS adjacency needs compatible protocol levels as well as link reachability.
D:Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS DIS election surprise operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One peer permits only Level 1 and the other only Level 2 on a link, so neither forms an IS-IS adjacency despite reachable Ethernet. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. The governing mechanism is: An IS-IS adjacency needs compatible protocol levels as well as link reachability.
Question 421
During production incident triage, engineers observe: One OSPF router has a different LSA sequence or age for a core link and briefly computes a stale path after a topology event. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added.
- Audit paired OSPF interface area assignments with neighbor-state monitoring.
- Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types.
- Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: One OSPF router has a different LSA sequence or age for a core link and briefly computes a stale path after a topology event. It monitors the mechanism that Link-state routing depends on timely, consistent LSA flooding so routers can run SPF over a coherent LSDB. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Both peers show the expected current LSAs with consistent sequence and topology, and the computed path reaches the destination.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added. This control addresses the distinct OSPF passive interface operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One OSPF router has a different LSA sequence or age for a core link and briefly computes a stale path after a topology event. The directly relevant continuing check is: Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. The governing mechanism is: Link-state routing depends on timely, consistent LSA flooding so routers can run SPF over a coherent LSDB.
B:Audit paired OSPF interface area assignments with neighbor-state monitoring. This control addresses the distinct OSPF area ID mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One OSPF router has a different LSA sequence or age for a core link and briefly computes a stale path after a topology event. The directly relevant continuing check is: Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. The governing mechanism is: Link-state routing depends on timely, consistent LSA flooding so routers can run SPF over a coherent LSDB.
C:Document stub and normal area policies and validate expected LSA types. This control addresses the distinct Stub area external LSA expectation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: One OSPF router has a different LSA sequence or age for a core link and briefly computes a stale path after a topology event. The directly relevant continuing check is: Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. The governing mechanism is: Link-state routing depends on timely, consistent LSA flooding so routers can run SPF over a coherent LSDB.
Question 422
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two participating IS-IS routers stop exchanging valid LSPs after a key rotation applied to only one side. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates.
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
- Stage IS-IS key rotations with overlap and rollback checks wherever supported.
- Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Stage IS-IS key rotations with overlap and rollback checks wherever supported. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two participating IS-IS routers stop exchanging valid LSPs after a key rotation applied to only one side. It monitors the mechanism that When IS-IS authentication is enabled, authenticated messages must pass validation before control-plane information is accepted. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Neighbor exchanges succeed without authentication errors and their corresponding LSDB contents are current.
Incorrect Answers
A:Include interface family iso in standardized IS-IS provisioning templates. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS ISO family missing operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two participating IS-IS routers stop exchanging valid LSPs after a key rotation applied to only one side. The directly relevant continuing check is: Stage IS-IS key rotations with overlap and rollback checks wherever supported. The governing mechanism is: When IS-IS authentication is enabled, authenticated messages must pass validation before control-plane information is accepted.
B:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS narrow metric ceiling operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two participating IS-IS routers stop exchanging valid LSPs after a key rotation applied to only one side. The directly relevant continuing check is: Stage IS-IS key rotations with overlap and rollback checks wherever supported. The governing mechanism is: When IS-IS authentication is enabled, authenticated messages must pass validation before control-plane information is accepted.
D:Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS DIS election surprise operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two participating IS-IS routers stop exchanging valid LSPs after a key rotation applied to only one side. The directly relevant continuing check is: Stage IS-IS key rotations with overlap and rollback checks wherever supported. The governing mechanism is: When IS-IS authentication is enabled, authenticated messages must pass validation before control-plane information is accepted.
Question 423
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A generated default route is expected to support an edge policy, but no eligible route satisfies the generation condition, so the default never becomes active. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review generated-route contributors and policy conditions whenever edge reachability changes.
- Test covered and uncovered address samples as part of aggregate change validation.
- Use multi-flow telemetry and documented hashing expectations when evaluating ECMP efficiency.
- Exercise backup-path liveness detection under downstream and local failure scenarios.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Review generated-route contributors and policy conditions whenever edge reachability changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A generated default route is expected to support an edge policy, but no eligible route satisfies the generation condition, so the default never becomes active. It monitors the mechanism that Generated routes depend on matching contributing routing information and generation policy, rather than merely being present in configuration text. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The generated default becomes active with the expected next hop only when the qualifying contributor exists.
Incorrect Answers
B:Test covered and uncovered address samples as part of aggregate change validation. This control addresses the distinct Aggregate rejection behavior operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A generated default route is expected to support an edge policy, but no eligible route satisfies the generation condition, so the default never becomes active. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review generated-route contributors and policy conditions whenever edge reachability changes. The governing mechanism is: Generated routes depend on matching contributing routing information and generation policy, rather than merely being present in configuration text.
C:Use multi-flow telemetry and documented hashing expectations when evaluating ECMP efficiency. This control addresses the distinct Per-flow hash expectation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A generated default route is expected to support an edge policy, but no eligible route satisfies the generation condition, so the default never becomes active. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review generated-route contributors and policy conditions whenever edge reachability changes. The governing mechanism is: Generated routes depend on matching contributing routing information and generation policy, rather than merely being present in configuration text.
D:Exercise backup-path liveness detection under downstream and local failure scenarios. This control addresses the distinct Static backup blackhole operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A generated default route is expected to support an edge policy, but no eligible route satisfies the generation condition, so the default never becomes active. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review generated-route contributors and policy conditions whenever edge reachability changes. The governing mechanism is: Generated routes depend on matching contributing routing information and generation policy, rather than merely being present in configuration text.
Question 424
During production incident triage, engineers observe: A redundant RE pair has GRES enabled but lacks stateful routing protocol synchronization, so an unplanned switchover causes avoidable routing churn. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Audit NSR state and replicate routing databases before maintenance windows.
- Audit LACP partner identity and collecting/distributing state during bundle maintenance.
- Monitor member count, error rate and utilization separately from AE state.
- Validate planned VRRP priorities and failover behavior after router maintenance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Audit NSR state and replicate routing databases before maintenance windows. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: A redundant RE pair has GRES enabled but lacks stateful routing protocol synchronization, so an unplanned switchover causes avoidable routing churn. It monitors the mechanism that NSR runs routing protocol state on the backup Routing Engine so failover can preserve adjacencies without depending on graceful-restart helpers. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The standby RE has synchronized routing state and peer sessions stay established through a tested RE switch.
Incorrect Answers
B:Audit LACP partner identity and collecting/distributing state during bundle maintenance. This control addresses the distinct LACP partner mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant RE pair has GRES enabled but lacks stateful routing protocol synchronization, so an unplanned switchover causes avoidable routing churn. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit NSR state and replicate routing databases before maintenance windows. The governing mechanism is: NSR runs routing protocol state on the backup Routing Engine so failover can preserve adjacencies without depending on graceful-restart helpers.
C:Monitor member count, error rate and utilization separately from AE state. This control addresses the distinct LAG member imbalance after failure operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant RE pair has GRES enabled but lacks stateful routing protocol synchronization, so an unplanned switchover causes avoidable routing churn. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit NSR state and replicate routing databases before maintenance windows. The governing mechanism is: NSR runs routing protocol state on the backup Routing Engine so failover can preserve adjacencies without depending on graceful-restart helpers.
D:Validate planned VRRP priorities and failover behavior after router maintenance. This control addresses the distinct VRRP master priority failover operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: A redundant RE pair has GRES enabled but lacks stateful routing protocol synchronization, so an unplanned switchover causes avoidable routing churn. The directly relevant continuing check is: Audit NSR state and replicate routing databases before maintenance windows. The governing mechanism is: NSR runs routing protocol state on the backup Routing Engine so failover can preserve adjacencies without depending on graceful-restart helpers.
Question 425
During production incident triage, engineers observe: Two routers on an engineered point-to-point interface spend time trying to use an unnecessary broadcast DR election process. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance.
- Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions.
- Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks.
- Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: Two routers on an engineered point-to-point interface spend time trying to use an unnecessary broadcast DR election process. It monitors the mechanism that OSPF point-to-point network types use one direct adjacency without broadcast-network DR and BDR election. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: Each endpoint shows a point-to-point interface and one stable Full neighbor without DR or BDR expectations.
Incorrect Answers
B:Alert on repeated OSPF adjacency resets and divergent LSA conditions. This control addresses the distinct OSPF LSDB discrepancy operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers on an engineered point-to-point interface spend time trying to use an unnecessary broadcast DR election process. The directly relevant continuing check is: Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. The governing mechanism is: OSPF point-to-point network types use one direct adjacency without broadcast-network DR and BDR election.
C:Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks. This control addresses the distinct OSPF authentication key mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers on an engineered point-to-point interface spend time trying to use an unnecessary broadcast DR election process. The directly relevant continuing check is: Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. The governing mechanism is: OSPF point-to-point network types use one direct adjacency without broadcast-network DR and BDR election.
D:Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. This control addresses the distinct OSPF backbone connectivity operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: Two routers on an engineered point-to-point interface spend time trying to use an unnecessary broadcast DR election process. The directly relevant continuing check is: Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. The governing mechanism is: OSPF point-to-point network types use one direct adjacency without broadcast-network DR and BDR election.
Question 426
During production incident triage, engineers observe: PE-19 has two links of nominally equal bandwidth, but only one next hop is installed because routing metrics and multipath settings do not yield eligible equal-cost paths. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Track ECMP next-hop count and routing-cost drift after transport changes.
- Review route-preference conventions for static backups during routing-policy audits.
- Maintain a documented martian and bogon-address policy aligned with assigned network ranges.
- Review import/export scope and route-copy audits when new routing instances are introduced.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Track ECMP next-hop count and routing-cost drift after transport changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: PE-19 has two links of nominally equal bandwidth, but only one next hop is installed because routing metrics and multipath settings do not yield eligible equal-cost paths. It monitors the mechanism that ECMP depends on eligible equal-cost forwarding choices, not merely matching physical-interface speeds. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The forwarding table shows both expected next hops and representative flows use the authorized paths without loop or asymmetry problems.
Incorrect Answers
B:Review route-preference conventions for static backups during routing-policy audits. This control addresses the distinct Administrative preference overrides static operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-19 has two links of nominally equal bandwidth, but only one next hop is installed because routing metrics and multipath settings do not yield eligible equal-cost paths. The directly relevant continuing check is: Track ECMP next-hop count and routing-cost drift after transport changes. The governing mechanism is: ECMP depends on eligible equal-cost forwarding choices, not merely matching physical-interface speeds.
C:Maintain a documented martian and bogon-address policy aligned with assigned network ranges. This control addresses the distinct Martian-address acceptance operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-19 has two links of nominally equal bandwidth, but only one next hop is installed because routing metrics and multipath settings do not yield eligible equal-cost paths. The directly relevant continuing check is: Track ECMP next-hop count and routing-cost drift after transport changes. The governing mechanism is: ECMP depends on eligible equal-cost forwarding choices, not merely matching physical-interface speeds.
D:Review import/export scope and route-copy audits when new routing instances are introduced. This control addresses the distinct RIB group forwarding copy operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: PE-19 has two links of nominally equal bandwidth, but only one next hop is installed because routing metrics and multipath settings do not yield eligible equal-cost paths. The directly relevant continuing check is: Track ECMP next-hop count and routing-cost drift after transport changes. The governing mechanism is: ECMP depends on eligible equal-cost forwarding choices, not merely matching physical-interface speeds.
Question 427
During production incident triage, engineers observe: IS-IS neighbors are up for IPv4, but IPv6 routes do not appear because the IPv6 reachability information is not advertised in supported IS-IS TLVs. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Check IPv6 static routes for proper next-hop scope after link renumbering.
- Check BGP families, IPv6 route filters and next-hop resolution on each dual-stack peer.
- Inspect both protocol levels' IPv6 TLV propagation during dual-stack deployments.
- Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect both protocol levels' IPv6 TLV propagation during dual-stack deployments. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: IS-IS neighbors are up for IPv4, but IPv6 routes do not appear because the IPv6 reachability information is not advertised in supported IS-IS TLVs. It monitors the mechanism that IS-IS uses suitable TLVs for IPv6 prefix reachability; a healthy IPv4 adjacency does not alone supply IPv6 routing information. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The relevant IPv6 reachability TLVs are present and remote IPv6 prefixes become active in inet6.0.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check IPv6 static routes for proper next-hop scope after link renumbering. This control addresses the distinct IPv6 static link-local next hop operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: IS-IS neighbors are up for IPv4, but IPv6 routes do not appear because the IPv6 reachability information is not advertised in supported IS-IS TLVs. The directly relevant continuing check is: Inspect both protocol levels' IPv6 TLV propagation during dual-stack deployments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS uses suitable TLVs for IPv6 prefix reachability; a healthy IPv4 adjacency does not alone supply IPv6 routing information.
B:Check BGP families, IPv6 route filters and next-hop resolution on each dual-stack peer. This control addresses the distinct IPv6 BGP NLRI family omitted operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: IS-IS neighbors are up for IPv4, but IPv6 routes do not appear because the IPv6 reachability information is not advertised in supported IS-IS TLVs. The directly relevant continuing check is: Inspect both protocol levels' IPv6 TLV propagation during dual-stack deployments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS uses suitable TLVs for IPv6 prefix reachability; a healthy IPv4 adjacency does not alone supply IPv6 routing information.
D:Test both outer IPv4 reachability and inner IPv6 routes during tunnel maintenance. This control addresses the distinct IPv6 over IPv4 transit tunnel operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: IS-IS neighbors are up for IPv4, but IPv6 routes do not appear because the IPv6 reachability information is not advertised in supported IS-IS TLVs. The directly relevant continuing check is: Inspect both protocol levels' IPv6 TLV propagation during dual-stack deployments. The governing mechanism is: IS-IS uses suitable TLVs for IPv6 prefix reachability; a healthy IPv4 adjacency does not alone supply IPv6 routing information.
Question 428
During production incident triage, engineers observe: On an IS-IS broadcast LAN, an unintended router acts as the designated intermediate system because its interface priority differs from the design. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency.
- Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews.
- Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers.
- Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: On an IS-IS broadcast LAN, an unintended router acts as the designated intermediate system because its interface priority differs from the design. It monitors the mechanism that The IS-IS DIS election on a broadcast segment considers interface priority and system ID, rather than OSPF-style DR and BDR design. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The designated system matches the planned candidate, pseudonode LSPs are coherent, and LAN adjacencies remain stable.
Incorrect Answers
A:Validate NET area planning and permitted levels before adding a core adjacency. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS level-one area mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: On an IS-IS broadcast LAN, an unintended router acts as the designated intermediate system because its interface priority differs from the design. The directly relevant continuing check is: Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. The governing mechanism is: The IS-IS DIS election on a broadcast segment considers interface priority and system ID, rather than OSPF-style DR and BDR design.
C:Review link-level capability profiles for L1, L2 and L1/L2 routers. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS level capability mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: On an IS-IS broadcast LAN, an unintended router acts as the designated intermediate system because its interface priority differs from the design. The directly relevant continuing check is: Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. The governing mechanism is: The IS-IS DIS election on a broadcast segment considers interface priority and system ID, rather than OSPF-style DR and BDR design.
D:Baseline metric-style compatibility before area-wide IS-IS cost adjustments. This control addresses the distinct IS-IS narrow metric ceiling operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: On an IS-IS broadcast LAN, an unintended router acts as the designated intermediate system because its interface priority differs from the design. The directly relevant continuing check is: Record DIS priorities and pseudonode behavior in service-provider switching design reviews. The governing mechanism is: The IS-IS DIS election on a broadcast segment considers interface priority and system ID, rather than OSPF-style DR and BDR design.
Question 429
During production incident triage, engineers observe: After a provider switch reboot, the wrong access switch becomes the STP root because its bridge identifier is lower than the intended core root's ID. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Audit edge-port BPDU protection and alerts during customer endpoint changes.
- Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes.
- Test one-way BPDU loss and protected port-state behavior during redundancy reviews.
- Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: After a provider switch reboot, the wrong access switch becomes the STP root because its bridge identifier is lower than the intended core root's ID. It monitors the mechanism that Spanning-tree root election chooses the lowest bridge ID, which includes configured priority and MAC address. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: The intended core device is reported as root and a designated backup root is stable after an election test.
Incorrect Answers
A:Audit edge-port BPDU protection and alerts during customer endpoint changes. This control addresses the distinct Unexpected BPDU on edge port operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After a provider switch reboot, the wrong access switch becomes the STP root because its bridge identifier is lower than the intended core root's ID. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes. The governing mechanism is: Spanning-tree root election chooses the lowest bridge ID, which includes configured priority and MAC address.
C:Test one-way BPDU loss and protected port-state behavior during redundancy reviews. This control addresses the distinct Loop protection after BPDU loss operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After a provider switch reboot, the wrong access switch becomes the STP root because its bridge identifier is lower than the intended core root's ID. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes. The governing mechanism is: Spanning-tree root election chooses the lowest bridge ID, which includes configured priority and MAC address.
D:Exercise RSTP role transition in planned failover tests. This control addresses the distinct RSTP alternate port activation operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: After a provider switch reboot, the wrong access switch becomes the STP root because its bridge identifier is lower than the intended core root's ID. The directly relevant continuing check is: Review STP root and backup priorities after device replacement or MAC changes. The governing mechanism is: Spanning-tree root election chooses the lowest bridge ID, which includes configured priority and MAC address.
Question 430
During production incident triage, engineers observe: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. Which ongoing validation or operating control most directly prevents this specific failure from recurring?
- Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added.
- Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change.
- Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance.
- Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The current live production incident demonstrates why this check matters: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. It monitors the mechanism that Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers. The continuing safeguard should be correlated with the specific acceptance test: ABRs have the intended area 0 connectivity and inter-area routes are present with correct next hops.
Incorrect Answers
A:Review passive-interface policy whenever a customer-facing segment is added. This control addresses the distinct OSPF passive interface operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
C:Include interface network-type checks in PE-to-PE circuit acceptance. This control addresses the distinct Point-to-point OSPF network type operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
D:Rotate authenticated neighbor keys using synchronized maintenance and failure rollback checks. This control addresses the distinct OSPF authentication key mismatch operational scenario rather than preventing recurrence of the live production incident. The observed problem here is: An area border router carries area 20 routes, but traffic between area 20 and area 30 is missing because backbone attachment is broken. The directly relevant continuing check is: Test backbone adjacency and ABR inter-area route reachability on every area change. The governing mechanism is: Normal OSPF multi-area routing relies on backbone area 0 to connect nonbackbone areas through area border routers.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests