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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Traffic chooses the longer provider path although all higher-priority attributes tie and the shorter path is eligible. Here the recorded observation is: an operator expects a change to local Cisco weight to alter all routers' best paths. The applicable cause is: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An engineer predicts the shorter AS_PATH must win although another route has higher LOCAL_PREF. Here the recorded observation is: an operator expects a change to local Cisco weight to alter all routers' best paths. The applicable cause is: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: `show bgp` displays a received network but no usable installed route due to inaccessible next hop. Here the recorded observation is: an operator expects a change to local Cisco weight to alter all routers' best paths. The applicable cause is: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates.

That control reduces a separate risk: An intentional AS-path prepend on the shorter provider made it appear longer to the receiver. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates. The specific required safeguard is: use propagated attributes such as LOCAL_PREF for AS-wide preference rather than relying on local weight.

That control reduces a separate risk: BGP preference order evaluates higher LOCAL_PREF before AS path length when otherwise eligible. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates. The specific required safeguard is: use propagated attributes such as LOCAL_PREF for AS-wide preference rather than relying on local weight.

That control reduces a separate risk: The BGP NEXT_HOP attribute has no resolvable path in the routing table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: bGP weight is locally significant and is not advertised in BGP updates. The specific required safeguard is: use propagated attributes such as LOCAL_PREF for AS-wide preference rather than relying on local weight.

Refine PBR classification to match the intended source and destination selectors would not address the need for a validated policy-based route map matching that source.

Using a supported tracked or verified next-hop policy where appropriate and documenting normal-routing fallback would not address the need for a validated policy-based route map matching that source.

Restoring next-hop reachability through appropriate IGP/static routing or supported next-hop-self policy where required would not address the need for a validated policy-based route map matching that source.

This test measures a different behavior: Run matched and unmatched source/destination test flows to verify only SaaS traffic is steered. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test two source subnets to the same destination and inspect policy match counts and actual next hops.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect `show ip local policy` and trace locally generated syslog packets over the intended monitored next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test two source subnets to the same destination and inspect policy match counts and actual next hops.

This test measures a different behavior: Simulate next-hop loss and inspect path selection for matched traffic. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test two source subnets to the same destination and inspect policy match counts and actual next hops.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Transit users match interface PBR as expected, but the router's own syslog packets still use the ordinary routing table. Here the recorded observation is: inspection traffic bypasses the firewall although the ordinary FIB route is healthy. The applicable cause is: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Packets matching PBR are forwarded to an unreachable policy next hop until the route map changes. Here the recorded observation is: inspection traffic bypasses the firewall although the ordinary FIB route is healthy. The applicable cause is: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Ordinary DNS traffic is sent to the special SaaS inspection next hop. Here the recorded observation is: inspection traffic bypasses the firewall although the ordinary FIB route is healthy. The applicable cause is: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup.

That control reduces a separate risk: The policy route-map match criteria are too broad for the documented service destination. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup. The specific required safeguard is: review PBR sources, next-hop tracking and fallback behavior after subnet changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: The PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup. The specific required safeguard is: review PBR sources, next-hop tracking and fallback behavior after subnet changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: Interface-applied PBR does not act on locally generated packets without a local PBR policy. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: no effective ingress PBR policy matches the inspection source before ordinary route lookup. The specific required safeguard is: review PBR sources, next-hop tracking and fallback behavior after subnet changes.

Enabling supported `ip local policy route-map` for the locally generated syslog flow would not meet the need for a supported tracked or verified next-hop policy where appropriate and document normal-routing fallback.

Refine PBR classification to match the intended source and destination selectors would not meet the need for a supported tracked or verified next-hop policy where appropriate and document normal-routing fallback.

Applying a validated policy-based route map matching that source and setting a reachable policy next hop on the ingress L3 interface would not meet the need for a supported tracked or verified next-hop policy where appropriate and document normal-routing fallback.

This test measures a different behavior: Check BGP next-hop resolution and RIB installation of the previously ineligible prefix. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: simulate next-hop loss and inspect path selection for matched traffic.

This test measures a different behavior: Run matched and unmatched source/destination test flows to verify only SaaS traffic is steered. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: simulate next-hop loss and inspect path selection for matched traffic.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect `show ip local policy` and trace locally generated syslog packets over the intended monitored next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: simulate next-hop loss and inspect path selection for matched traffic.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Transit users match interface PBR as expected, but the router's own syslog packets still use the ordinary routing table. Here the recorded observation is: packets matching PBR are forwarded to an unreachable policy next hop until the route map changes. The applicable cause is: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: `show bgp` displays a received network but no usable installed route due to inaccessible next hop. Here the recorded observation is: packets matching PBR are forwarded to an unreachable policy next hop until the route map changes. The applicable cause is: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Ordinary DNS traffic is sent to the special SaaS inspection next hop. Here the recorded observation is: packets matching PBR are forwarded to an unreachable policy next hop until the route map changes. The applicable cause is: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path.

That control reduces a separate risk: Interface-applied PBR does not act on locally generated packets without a local PBR policy. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path. The specific required safeguard is: monitor policy next-hop reachability and include failure tests in PBR acceptance.

That control reduces a separate risk: The BGP NEXT_HOP attribute has no resolvable path in the routing table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path. The specific required safeguard is: monitor policy next-hop reachability and include failure tests in PBR acceptance.

That control reduces a separate risk: The policy route-map match criteria are too broad for the documented service destination. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the PBR next-hop selection lacks health tracking or an available fallback path. The specific required safeguard is: monitor policy next-hop reachability and include failure tests in PBR acceptance.

Refine PBR classification to match the intended source and destination selectors would not enable supported `ip local policy route-map` for the locally generated syslog flow.

Using the supported `always` option only when intentionally advertising default irrespective of a local installed default would not enable supported `ip local policy route-map` for the locally generated syslog flow.

Using a supported tracked or verified next-hop policy where appropriate and documenting normal-routing fallback would not enable supported `ip local policy route-map` for the locally generated syslog flow.