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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The device never reaches the target precision despite a healthy standard NTP synchronization. Here the recorded observation is: syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. The applicable cause is: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The device synchronizes to an unauthorized source rather than the approved time reference. Here the recorded observation is: syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. The applicable cause is: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A bidirectional group receives data only from one source because the network was built on incompatible source-tree assumptions. Here the recorded observation is: syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. The applicable cause is: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization.

That control reduces a separate risk: The required PIM bidirectional shared-tree/RP design was not consistently enabled. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. The specific required safeguard is: monitor sync state and authenticated time sources, not just a configured server line.

That control reduces a separate risk: NTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. The specific required safeguard is: monitor sync state and authenticated time sources, not just a configured server line.

That control reduces a separate risk: NTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. The specific required safeguard is: monitor sync state and authenticated time sources, not just a configured server line.

Configuring a reachable, approved NTP server and appropriate authentication where supported would not meet the need for a supported PTP grandmaster/transparent or boundary-clock design for the required timing accuracy.

Configuring supported NTP authentication/key associations and restricting permitted peers where required would not meet the need for a supported PTP grandmaster/transparent or boundary-clock design for the required timing accuracy.

Using IGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance would not meet the need for a supported PTP grandmaster/transparent or boundary-clock design for the required timing accuracy.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare NTP association reachability, synchronization state and offset to the authoritative time source. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect PTP master selection, path delay and slave synchronization offset.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect (S,G) subscriptions for the allowed source and confirm other sources are excluded. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect PTP master selection, path delay and slave synchronization offset.

This test measures a different behavior: Check authenticated NTP association state and reject test replies from an untrusted peer. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect PTP master selection, path delay and slave synchronization offset.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The device synchronizes to an unauthorized source rather than the approved time reference. Here the recorded observation is: the device never reaches the target precision despite a healthy standard NTP synchronization. The applicable cause is: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. Here the recorded observation is: the device never reaches the target precision despite a healthy standard NTP synchronization. The applicable cause is: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Receiver sees multicast data from an unapproved source within the same group address. Here the recorded observation is: the device never reaches the target precision despite a healthy standard NTP synchronization. The applicable cause is: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application.

That control reduces a separate risk: Source-specific membership signaling or SSM configuration was not enforced at the receiver edge. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application. The specific required safeguard is: track PTP profile, clock-domain and hardware support before introducing new switches.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application. The specific required safeguard is: track PTP profile, clock-domain and hardware support before introducing new switches.

That control reduces a separate risk: NTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application. The specific required safeguard is: track PTP profile, clock-domain and hardware support before introducing new switches.

Configuring NAT overload/PAT from approved inside sources to the outside interface address would not configure supported NTP authentication/key associations and restrict permitted peers where required.

Configuring a reachable, approved NTP server and appropriate authentication where supported would not configure supported NTP authentication/key associations and restrict permitted peers where required.

Using a supported PTP grandmaster/transparent or boundary-clock design for the required timing accuracy would not configure supported NTP authentication/key associations and restrict permitted peers where required.

This test measures a different behavior: Check unique source-port translations for concurrent inside connections and verify return traffic. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check authenticated NTP association state and reject test replies from an untrusted peer.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect PTP master selection, path delay and slave synchronization offset. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check authenticated NTP association state and reject test replies from an untrusted peer.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare NTP association reachability, synchronization state and offset to the authoritative time source. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check authenticated NTP association state and reject test replies from an untrusted peer.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Only one internal user can establish a translation while the second collides with the same public mapping. Here the recorded observation is: the device synchronizes to an unauthorized source rather than the approved time reference. The applicable cause is: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. Here the recorded observation is: the device synchronizes to an unauthorized source rather than the approved time reference. The applicable cause is: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The device never reaches the target precision despite a healthy standard NTP synchronization. Here the recorded observation is: the device synchronizes to an unauthorized source rather than the approved time reference. The applicable cause is: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement. The specific required safeguard is: rotate NTP keys and audit peer reachability without silently falling back to untrusted clocks.

That control reduces a separate risk: NTP lacks the required hardware timestamp and PTP synchronization behavior for this application. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement. The specific required safeguard is: rotate NTP keys and audit peer reachability without silently falling back to untrusted clocks.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configuration lacks overload port translation needed to multiplex many sessions onto one IP. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: nTP source authentication or access controls are not enforcing the trust requirement. The specific required safeguard is: rotate NTP keys and audit peer reachability without silently falling back to untrusted clocks.

Configuring NAT overload/PAT from approved inside sources to the outside interface address would not configure static inside-source NAT mapping the exact internal host to the approved routable address.

Marking the appropriate LAN and ISP interfaces with correct NAT inside/outside roles would not configure static inside-source NAT mapping the exact internal host to the approved routable address.

Updating the NAT source match to include the approved new subnet without widening to unintended sources would not configure static inside-source NAT mapping the exact internal host to the approved routable address.