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That behavior describes DLP dictionary match: data loss prevention dictionaries detect defined patterns or content conditions. It addresses the separate need to find sensitive information types such as card numbers in permitted inspected content, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.

That behavior describes Exact Data Match: EDM uses an index derived from selected structured enterprise records to identify sensitive data. It addresses the separate need to recognize sensitive structured source records without uploading raw values for ordinary matching, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.

That behavior describes DLP policy block action: an inline DLP rule can deny a transaction when the required content and context match. It addresses the separate need to stop a prohibited upload of classified confidential content to a cloud destination, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.

For Operating-system posture signal, OS name alone is not proof that unrelated disk or endpoint protections are active. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Device posture policy.

For Endpoint protection posture, identity group membership is not a substitute for endpoint-protection evidence. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Device posture policy.

For Unmanaged device restriction, A browser user agent string is not equivalent to trusted endpoint enrollment. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Device posture policy.

That check fits Z-Tunnel forwarding, because inspect the endpoint forwarding mode and tunnel service state. It does not diagnose the different incident involving GRE tunnel and the need to forward office traffic to a cloud security service when the edge supports GRE and the design permits it.

That check fits IPsec tunnel, because inspect IKE and child SA status plus encapsulation counters. It does not diagnose the different incident involving GRE tunnel and the need to forward office traffic to a cloud security service when the edge supports GRE and the design permits it.

That check fits PAC file forwarding, because check PAC retrieval, FindProxyForURL output and effective client proxy settings. It does not diagnose the different incident involving GRE tunnel and the need to forward office traffic to a cloud security service when the edge supports GRE and the design permits it.

This would be evidence for ZPA User Status diagnostics: the filtered authentication record identifies an authentication failure or success. It does not demonstrate that the team can check whether an access-rule change increased denials to a private application using ZPA access policy block trend.

This would be evidence for ZPA App Connector Status diagnostics: the relevant connector shows its status and errors in the selected interval. It does not demonstrate that the team can check whether an access-rule change increased denials to a private application using ZPA access policy block trend.

This would be evidence for ZPA User Activity diagnostics: A filtered session shows the application segment, user identity and reported failure. It does not demonstrate that the team can check whether an access-rule change increased denials to a private application using ZPA access policy block trend.

This would be evidence for ZDX digital experience service: an affected user's timeline shows an application score and relevant path metrics. It does not demonstrate that the team can give an approved remote employee app-specific access without exposing private application addresses publicly using ZPA private application service.

This would be evidence for Cloud policy enforcement: equivalent eligible traffic receives the intended policy result from different user locations. It does not demonstrate that the team can give an approved remote employee app-specific access without exposing private application addresses publicly using ZPA private application service.

This would be evidence for Zero Trust Exchange service: permitted users reach only approved applications while unassigned destinations remain inaccessible. It does not demonstrate that the team can give an approved remote employee app-specific access without exposing private application addresses publicly using ZPA private application service.

For ZPA server-group association, good user authentication cannot repair an unreachable backend server. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy.

For ZPA device posture condition, valid SAML login cannot replace an independently required posture check. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy.

For ZPA application segment, creating a segment does not grant every employee access by itself. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy.

That behavior describes ZIdentity group assignments: group assignment makes the applicable identity population available for policy references. It addresses the separate need to represent a departmental user population for consistent identity-driven controls, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity user record mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative identity audit: audit events record attributable administrative activity for governance and investigation. It addresses the separate need to find which authorized administrator changed a tenant identity setting, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity user record mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative RBAC: role-based administrative permissions limit actions according to assigned administrative roles. It addresses the separate need to let a service-desk operator view diagnostics without permitting broad security policy edits, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity user record mechanism.

That behavior describes DLP boolean condition: DLP rule conditions can combine detectors into a narrowly scoped logical match. It addresses the separate need to require combinations of multiple sensitive signals before escalating a content event, rather than describing the selected DLP dictionary match mechanism.

That behavior describes Exact Data Match: EDM uses an index derived from selected structured enterprise records to identify sensitive data. It addresses the separate need to recognize sensitive structured source records without uploading raw values for ordinary matching, rather than describing the selected DLP dictionary match mechanism.

That behavior describes Custom DLP dictionary: custom dictionaries define organization-specific expressions or matching logic. It addresses the separate need to detect a proprietary customer identifier format absent from default dictionaries, rather than describing the selected DLP dictionary match mechanism.

This would be evidence for DLP boolean condition: the jointly matching sample is blocked while a single-signal negative test is not. It does not demonstrate that the team can detect a proprietary customer identifier format absent from default dictionaries using Custom DLP dictionary.

This would be evidence for DLP dictionary match: A controlled sample containing the targeted data generates a DLP incident match. It does not demonstrate that the team can detect a proprietary customer identifier format absent from default dictionaries using Custom DLP dictionary.

This would be evidence for Exact Data Match: A test file containing an indexed record triggers the corresponding EDM result. It does not demonstrate that the team can detect a proprietary customer identifier format absent from default dictionaries using Custom DLP dictionary.

That behavior describes ZPA server group: A server group maps application-serving environments to the connector groups that can reach them. It addresses the separate need to associate a set of private application destinations with eligible App Connector groups, rather than describing the selected App Connector group mechanism.

That behavior describes App Connector provisioning key: A provisioning key bootstraps registration of an App Connector into its assigned connector group. It addresses the separate need to enroll a newly deployed App Connector with the correct tenant connector group, rather than describing the selected App Connector group mechanism.

That behavior describes ZPA App Connector: an App Connector maintains authorized outbound connections so internal apps need not listen on public addresses. It addresses the separate need to provide an outbound-initiated path from a private app environment to the ZPA service, rather than describing the selected App Connector group mechanism.

This would be evidence for Client Connector ZPA service status: the ZPA status is connected and the approved private application can be reached. It does not demonstrate that the team can confirm that a laptop is applying the intended secure internet access forwarding configuration using Client Connector ZIA service status.

This would be evidence for Client Connector enrollment: the endpoint reports enrolled status and identifies the intended cloud tenant. It does not demonstrate that the team can confirm that a laptop is applying the intended secure internet access forwarding configuration using Client Connector ZIA service status.

This would be evidence for Client Connector user authentication: the client shows the expected authenticated user rather than an unauthenticated state. It does not demonstrate that the team can confirm that a laptop is applying the intended secure internet access forwarding configuration using Client Connector ZIA service status.