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That behavior describes Trusted network detection: trusted network criteria let Client Connector identify a network environment for policy evaluation. It addresses the separate need to apply different client forwarding decisions when the endpoint joins a recognized corporate network, rather than describing the selected Operating-system posture signal mechanism.

That behavior describes Device posture policy: device posture evaluates supported endpoint characteristics and contributes conditions to ZPA access decisions. It addresses the separate need to restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks, rather than describing the selected Operating-system posture signal mechanism.

That behavior describes Endpoint protection posture: A supported posture check examines the configured security control condition on the client. It addresses the separate need to require an endpoint protection condition before permitting access to a protected resource, rather than describing the selected Operating-system posture signal mechanism.

This explanation belongs to Client Connector debug mode: Client log mode can be raised to Debug to capture detailed activity for support. It would guide a different diagnosis, not the described Client Connector repair investigation.

This explanation belongs to Incorrect forwarding profile: A forwarding profile selects ZIA and ZPA actions by the detected network condition. It would guide a different diagnosis, not the described Client Connector repair investigation.

This explanation belongs to Client Connector export logs: Client Connector Troubleshoot can export its collected diagnostic logs for support. It would guide a different diagnosis, not the described Client Connector repair investigation.

That behavior describes Administrative identity audit: audit events record attributable administrative activity for governance and investigation. It addresses the separate need to find which authorized administrator changed a tenant identity setting, rather than describing the selected Administrator sign-on policy mechanism.

That behavior describes ZIdentity user record: ZIdentity centralizes user identity and entitlement information used by Zscaler services. It addresses the separate need to locate a named user's centrally managed service identity for administrative review, rather than describing the selected Administrator sign-on policy mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative RBAC: role-based administrative permissions limit actions according to assigned administrative roles. It addresses the separate need to let a service-desk operator view diagnostics without permitting broad security policy edits, rather than describing the selected Administrator sign-on policy mechanism.

This would be evidence for ZIA VM NSS on-prem SIEM: the private collector receives a matching event through the configured NSS feed. It does not demonstrate that the team can correlate private-app access and App Connector status outside the ZPA console using ZPA LSS receiver integration.

This would be evidence for Incident correlation by identity: A single incident timeline contains relevant user actions from both log feeds. It does not demonstrate that the team can correlate private-app access and App Connector status outside the ZPA console using ZPA LSS receiver integration.

This would be evidence for ZIA Cloud NSS HTTPS collector: the test collector receives the expected JSON event and returns an accepted HTTP response. It does not demonstrate that the team can correlate private-app access and App Connector status outside the ZPA console using ZPA LSS receiver integration.

This would be evidence for Cloud App Control rule: the attempted upload receives the intended block while an approved read operation still works. It does not demonstrate that the team can prevent downloads of prohibited executable file types while permitting approved documents using File type control.

This would be evidence for Bandwidth control class: A sustained test shows the selected class receiving the expected bandwidth treatment. It does not demonstrate that the team can prevent downloads of prohibited executable file types while permitting approved documents using File type control.

This would be evidence for Advanced Threat Protection: A malicious C2 indicator generates a matching ATP action in the log. It does not demonstrate that the team can prevent downloads of prohibited executable file types while permitting approved documents using File type control.

This would be evidence for Firewall Insights view: A scoped result shows the branch, destination port, and enforcement outcome. It does not demonstrate that the team can find whether a suspicious destination was detected by a ZIA threat control using Threat Insights drilldown.

This would be evidence for DNS Insights view: A DNS log shows the requested name, resolved context and policy outcome. It does not demonstrate that the team can find whether a suspicious destination was detected by a ZIA threat control using Threat Insights drilldown.

This would be evidence for Web Insights filter: filtered web events contain the employee identity, blocked action, and corresponding destination. It does not demonstrate that the team can find whether a suspicious destination was detected by a ZIA threat control using Threat Insights drilldown.

This would be evidence for App Connector provisioning key: the new connector registers successfully in the intended tenant and group. It does not demonstrate that the team can manage several related app segments as a logical set for administrative consistency using Application segment group.

This would be evidence for App Connector group: two healthy connector instances appear in the intended group. It does not demonstrate that the team can manage several related app segments as a logical set for administrative consistency using Application segment group.

This would be evidence for ZPA server group: the application segment's server group includes a connector able to reach the target host. It does not demonstrate that the team can manage several related app segments as a logical set for administrative consistency using Application segment group.

That diagnostic target applies to Client Connector export logs, where the team needs to collect detailed endpoint evidence before diagnosing intermittent connectivity. Its failure dependency is Client Connector Troubleshoot can export its collected diagnostic logs for support, which is different from the reported Client Connector repair issue.

That diagnostic target applies to Client Connector debug mode, where the team needs to increase diagnostic detail for a reproducible app issue during a controlled investigation. Its failure dependency is Client log mode can be raised to Debug to capture detailed activity for support, which is different from the reported Client Connector repair issue.

That diagnostic target applies to Incorrect forwarding profile, where the team needs to diagnose why traffic is bypassed on a network that should be tunneled. Its failure dependency is A forwarding profile selects ZIA and ZPA actions by the detected network condition, which is different from the reported Client Connector repair issue.

For ZPA App Connector Status diagnostics, connector status alone cannot prove an individual end user is entitled to the app. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy block trend.

For ZPA User Activity diagnostics, A successful authentication event does not establish a successful application connection. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy block trend.

For ZPA User Status diagnostics, user Status does not by itself prove the backend application responded. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZPA access policy block trend.

This would be evidence for DNS Insights view: A DNS log shows the requested name, resolved context and policy outcome. It does not demonstrate that the team can compare a production issue across a specified one-hour period without mixing prior-day traffic using Insights time filter.

This would be evidence for Firewall Insights view: A scoped result shows the branch, destination port, and enforcement outcome. It does not demonstrate that the team can compare a production issue across a specified one-hour period without mixing prior-day traffic using Insights time filter.

This would be evidence for Web Insights filter: filtered web events contain the employee identity, blocked action, and corresponding destination. It does not demonstrate that the team can compare a production issue across a specified one-hour period without mixing prior-day traffic using Insights time filter.

That behavior describes DLP dictionary match: data loss prevention dictionaries detect defined patterns or content conditions. It addresses the separate need to find sensitive information types such as card numbers in permitted inspected content, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.

That behavior describes Exact Data Match: EDM uses an index derived from selected structured enterprise records to identify sensitive data. It addresses the separate need to recognize sensitive structured source records without uploading raw values for ordinary matching, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.

That behavior describes DLP policy block action: an inline DLP rule can deny a transaction when the required content and context match. It addresses the separate need to stop a prohibited upload of classified confidential content to a cloud destination, rather than describing the selected DLP boolean condition mechanism.