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That diagnostic target applies to Incorrect group mapping, where the team needs to troubleshoot why a finance user is denied a group-restricted web rule despite logging in. Its failure dependency is identity group attributes must be present and mapped to match an identity-based rule, which is different from the reported SAML sign-in loop issue.

That diagnostic target applies to Expired SAML certificate, where the team needs to explain why valid users suddenly fail identity federation after certificate rollover. Its failure dependency is SAML assertion validation depends on a trusted current signing certificate and issuer configuration, which is different from the reported SAML sign-in loop issue.

That diagnostic target applies to TLS interception trust failure, where the team needs to diagnose browser certificate warnings after enabling HTTPS inspection for a managed fleet. Its failure dependency is the inspected client must trust the inspection certificate chain used for relevant TLS interception, which is different from the reported SAML sign-in loop issue.

For Endpoint protection posture, identity group membership is not a substitute for endpoint-protection evidence. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Operating-system posture signal.

For Trusted network detection, being on private IP space alone is not universal proof of a configured trusted network. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Operating-system posture signal.

For Device posture policy, A successful user sign-in does not bypass a required device posture rule. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Operating-system posture signal.

That behavior describes Time-scoped web policy: A time condition narrows the matching period for the web access rule. It addresses the separate need to permit a temporary vendor site only during an approved maintenance window, rather than describing the selected Managed-device cloud restriction mechanism.

That behavior describes Device-risk conditional access: access rules evaluate configured device posture conditions alongside user entitlement. It addresses the separate need to restrict an app if available endpoint posture fails a required control, rather than describing the selected Managed-device cloud restriction mechanism.

That behavior describes Private app microsegmentation: ZPA app-specific policy limits connectivity to explicitly published application segments. It addresses the separate need to restrict an employee to approved applications rather than a whole internal subnet, rather than describing the selected Managed-device cloud restriction mechanism.

This would be evidence for Rule ordering: A narrowly scoped test request matches the intended rule instead of the broad catchall. It does not demonstrate that the team can apply a uniform access restriction to multiple branch office locations at once using Location group.

This would be evidence for ZIA sub-location: traffic from that scope receives the intended distinct location attribution. It does not demonstrate that the team can apply a uniform access restriction to multiple branch office locations at once using Location group.

This would be evidence for ZIA location definition: transactions from the site are attributed to the intended location. It does not demonstrate that the team can apply a uniform access restriction to multiple branch office locations at once using Location group.

This would be evidence for URL filtering block: the browser receives a block notice and the transaction is recorded as denied. It does not demonstrate that the team can warn users before they choose to continue to a permitted but higher-risk site using URL filtering caution.

This would be evidence for URL filtering rule: A controlled request to the category is blocked with the intended rule in its web log. It does not demonstrate that the team can warn users before they choose to continue to a permitted but higher-risk site using URL filtering caution.

This would be evidence for URL policy exception: the approved URL is allowed and another risky URL remains denied. It does not demonstrate that the team can warn users before they choose to continue to a permitted but higher-risk site using URL filtering caution.

This would be evidence for SSL inspection exclusion: the portal remains uninspected while ordinary test traffic is inspected. It does not demonstrate that the team can resolve endpoint trust failures after enterprise TLS interception is approved using Inspection CA trust.

This would be evidence for TLS policy user targeting: two controlled users receive the distinct intended inspection results. It does not demonstrate that the team can resolve endpoint trust failures after enterprise TLS interception is approved using Inspection CA trust.

This would be evidence for TLS inspection rule: A controlled HTTPS file is inspected under the matching SSL policy. It does not demonstrate that the team can resolve endpoint trust failures after enterprise TLS interception is approved using Inspection CA trust.

For Administrative RBAC, end-user entitlement does not grant the same authority as administrator RBAC. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZIdentity group assignments.

For Administrative identity audit, an ordinary end-user browsing log is not a substitute for administrator change history. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZIdentity group assignments.

For ZIdentity user record, A visible user record does not itself prove an endpoint is enrolled or healthy. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for ZIdentity group assignments.

This would be evidence for Endpoint protection posture: the posture test explicitly reports the required protection as passing. It does not demonstrate that the team can restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks using Device posture policy.

This would be evidence for Unmanaged device restriction: the unmanaged test session receives the appropriately limited access result. It does not demonstrate that the team can restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks using Device posture policy.

This would be evidence for Operating-system posture signal: the evaluated device reports the OS attribute that the policy expects. It does not demonstrate that the team can restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks using Device posture policy.

That evidence is appropriate for Incorrect forwarding profile: the endpoint shows an unexpected network type or forwarding action. It would not confirm remediation of Trusted network criteria mismatch triage.

That evidence is appropriate for Client Connector export logs: an exported log bundle captures the relevant connection interval and service errors. It would not confirm remediation of Trusted network criteria mismatch triage.

That evidence is appropriate for Client Connector repair: the repaired client resumes expected network and service operation. It would not confirm remediation of Trusted network criteria mismatch triage.

Administrative identity audit is used to find which authorized administrator changed a tenant identity setting. It works because audit events record attributable administrative activity for governance and investigation, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrator sign-on policy.

ZIdentity user record is used to locate a named user's centrally managed service identity for administrative review. It works because ZIdentity centralizes user identity and entitlement information used by Zscaler services, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrator sign-on policy.

Administrative RBAC is used to let a service-desk operator view diagnostics without permitting broad security policy edits. It works because role-based administrative permissions limit actions according to assigned administrative roles, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrator sign-on policy.

This would be evidence for Threat Insights drilldown: A matching threat event includes the relevant indicator and disposition. It does not demonstrate that the team can investigate whether a suspected domain was queried and what security action followed using DNS Insights view.

This would be evidence for Firewall Insights view: A scoped result shows the branch, destination port, and enforcement outcome. It does not demonstrate that the team can investigate whether a suspected domain was queried and what security action followed using DNS Insights view.

This would be evidence for Web Insights filter: filtered web events contain the employee identity, blocked action, and corresponding destination. It does not demonstrate that the team can investigate whether a suspected domain was queried and what security action followed using DNS Insights view.