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Scoped sharing supports partner consumption without broad workspace rights. It would address limited authenticated external report view, not report-only editing entitlement.

Item-level grants can limit exposure compared with whole-workspace membership. That targets narrowly scoped report consumption, not report-only editing entitlement.

Permission enforcement governs access regardless of whether a link is known. It is useful for secure report despite widely shared URL, not for report-only editing entitlement.

RLS restricts row visibility; OLS restricts model objects. It is useful for separate row and object authorization, not for hide confidential model table.

RLS addresses record filtering without hiding legitimate fields. Its scope is restrict region data at row level, not hide confidential model table.

OLS hides selected model objects from unauthorized principals. That is meant for deny access to salary field metadata and values, not hide confidential model table.

External access depends on both tenant policies and the item's permitted audience. That targets correct guest access policy mismatch, not prevent anonymous disclosure of customer data.

Access lifecycle must remove no-longer-justified external entitlements. It may suit expire completed partner report sharing, not prevent anonymous disclosure of customer data.

B2B sharing can enforce organization policies for external principals. It is useful for authorized partner Power BI consumption, not for preventing anonymous disclosure of customer data.

Audit events attribute supported sharing and administrative operations. It is useful for auditing report permission changes, not for investigating refresh configuration change.

Usage telemetry describes report consumption rather than administrative modifications. That is meant for measure report adoption over time, not investigate refresh configuration change.

Audit logs can support accountability for approved or suspicious content export. It would address trace sensitive report export activity, not investigate refresh configuration change.

Network controls restrict private-source access beyond semantic model roles. It would address defend private data source connectivity, not protect data source secrets from readers.

Managed source identities improve continuity and reduce orphaned credentials. That targets accountable gateway credential ownership, not protect data source secrets from readers.

Minimal source privileges reduce risk of refresh credential compromise. It is useful for preventing overprivileged refresh source access, not for protecting data source secrets from readers.

Customer embedding needs a deliberate security model; anonymous embeds are not adequate. It is useful for governed customer-facing analytics delivery, not for restrict sensitive underlying data export.

Tenant-wide policies constrain administrative features and distribution capabilities. Its scope is centrally govern workspace and sharing features, not restrict sensitive underlying data export.

Tenant settings govern availability of public embedding features. That is meant for prevent anonymous report publication, not restrict sensitive underlying data export.

Elevated workspace roles may bypass service RLS even if Desktop simulates a role. That targets accurate production consumer security test, not diagnose missing dynamic RLS rows.

Multiple RLS roles may combine accessible row sets. It may suit prevent role-union overexposure, not diagnose missing dynamic RLS rows.

Testing under intended role context reveals unintended row exposure. It is useful for validating static region RLS behavior, not for diagnosing missing dynamic RLS rows.

Identity-aware distribution enforces continuing entitlement checks. It is useful for ongoing private board report access, not for intentionally anonymous public summary.

Internal embedding preserves an authenticated user security context. That is meant for employee-scoped intranet Power BI embedding, not intentionally anonymous public summary.

Customer embedding requires an explicit backend authorization design rather than trusting public links. It would address multi-tenant embedded customer isolation, not intentionally anonymous public summary.

Workspace RBAC controls item authoring and administration, not row visibility. It would address limit report editing privileges, not conceal HR-confidential columns.

RLS restricts rows while retaining columns. That targets region-level record authorization, not conceal HR-confidential columns.

Labels classify content independently of row and object permissions. It is useful for label-based content classification and export, not for conceal HR-confidential columns.

RLS design should reflect actual approved data entitlement. Its scope is authorized complete-sales visibility, not fixed per-region security cohorts.

Static RLS filters eligible model rows for users assigned to that role. That is meant for restrict one regional team's facts, not fixed per-region security cohorts.

Dimension-scoped security can filter related fact records when the model path supports it. It would address enforce district-specific row visibility, not fixed per-region security cohorts.

Membership mapping handles many permitted values per user without hard-coded filters. It would address variable multi-center row security, not fix changed viewer identity matches.

Report filters are presentation controls, not authorization boundaries. It may suit enforce security beyond slicer selections, not fix changed viewer identity matches.

Dynamic security maps the viewing identity to current permitted customer rows. It is useful for identity-driven customer entitlements, not for fixing changed viewer identity matches.