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Network controls restrict private-source access beyond semantic model roles. It would address defend private data source connectivity, not prevent overprivileged refresh source access.

Managed source identities improve continuity and reduce orphaned credentials. That targets accountable gateway credential ownership, not prevent overprivileged refresh source access.

Gateway credential secrets are not ordinary report-consumption data. It may suit protect data source secrets from readers, not prevent overprivileged refresh source access.

Tenant-wide policies constrain administrative features and distribution capabilities. Its scope is centrally govern workspace and sharing features, not governed customer-facing analytics delivery.

Tenant settings govern availability of public embedding features. That is meant for prevent anonymous report publication, not governed customer-facing analytics delivery.

Export governance controls permitted extraction operations. It would address restrict sensitive underlying data export, not governed customer-facing analytics delivery.

Dynamic access requires exact identity-to-entitlement matching. It would address diagnose missing dynamic RLS rows, not accurate production consumer security test.

Multiple RLS roles may combine accessible row sets. It may suit prevent role-union overexposure, not accurate production consumer security test.

Testing under intended role context reveals unintended row exposure. It is useful for validating static region RLS behavior, not for accurate production consumer security test.

Identity-aware distribution enforces continuing entitlement checks. It is useful for ongoing private board report access, not for employee-scoped intranet Power BI embedding.

Public embedding exposes the report to anyone with the address. Its scope is intentionally anonymous public summary, not employee-scoped intranet Power BI embedding.

Customer embedding requires an explicit backend authorization design rather than trusting public links. It would address multi-tenant embedded customer isolation, not employee-scoped intranet Power BI embedding.

Workspace RBAC controls item authoring and administration, not row visibility. It would address limit report editing privileges, not label-based content classification and export.

RLS restricts rows while retaining columns. That targets region-level record authorization, not label-based content classification and export.

OLS hides sensitive model fields beyond ordinary row filtering. It may suit conceal HR-confidential columns, not label-based content classification and export.

Static roles apply predetermined filter expressions based on assigned membership. It is useful for fixed per-region security cohorts, not for authorized complete-sales visibility.

Static RLS filters eligible model rows for users assigned to that role. That is meant for restrict one regional team's facts, not authorized complete-sales visibility.

Dimension-scoped security can filter related fact records when the model path supports it. It would address enforce district-specific row visibility, not authorized complete-sales visibility.

Membership mapping handles many permitted values per user without hard-coded filters. It would address variable multi-center row security, not enforce security beyond slicer selections.

Dynamic RLS depends on exact identity resolution to the permitted mapping. That targets fix changed viewer identity matches, not enforce security beyond slicer selections.

Dynamic security maps the viewing identity to current permitted customer rows. It is useful for identity-driven customer entitlements, not for enforcing security beyond slicer selections.

RLS role membership determines whose queries receive the corresponding filters. It is useful for activate role security for approved group, not for preventing unintended expansion from multiple roles.

Desktop role testing does not itself enroll service principals or users in a role. Its scope is enforce RLS in published model, not prevent unintended expansion from multiple roles.

Security mappings should follow lifecycle changes to avoid stale row entitlements. That is meant for revoke row access after contractor end, not prevent unintended expansion from multiple roles.

RLS is enforced for eligible consumers rather than privileged workspace editors. That targets preserve RLS for ordinary report consumer, not protect sensitive data from model authors.

Edit-capable workspace roles are not reliable proxies for restricted Viewer experience. It may suit accurately test viewer RLS, not protect sensitive data from model authors.

Admin, Member and Contributor roles can bypass RLS filtering on items they can edit. It is useful for avoiding RLS bypass through author privilege, not for protecting sensitive data from model authors.

Model Build can enable additional content creation and exploration beyond simple viewing. It is useful for limiting downstream data modeling access, not for enumerate authorized model builders.

Build permission allows authorized users to create related content from the model. That is meant for authorized shared model report creation, not enumerate authorized model builders.

Consumption generally needs less privilege than report authoring. It would address read-only report consumption privilege, not enumerate authorized model builders.

Audiences tailor which reports are delivered without unnecessarily duplicating a model. It would address department-specific app content, not resolve underlying model access dependency.

URLs do not themselves grant underlying report access when governed correctly. That targets prevent access from forwarded app link, not resolve underlying model access dependency.

App audiences control content navigation, not every possible underlying model access path. It is useful for protecting data beyond app audience display, not for resolving underlying model access dependency.