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Privileged model roles are not constrained by ordinary consumer RLS. It would address protect sensitive data from model authors, not preserve RLS for ordinary report consumer.

Edit-capable workspace roles are not reliable proxies for restricted Viewer experience. It may suit accurately test viewer RLS, not preserve RLS for ordinary report consumer.

Admin, Member and Contributor roles can bypass RLS filtering on items they can edit. It is useful for avoiding RLS bypass through author privilege, not for preserving RLS for ordinary report consumer.

Model Build can enable additional content creation and exploration beyond simple viewing. It is useful for limiting downstream data modeling access, not for authorized shared model report creation.

Build permission inventory identifies allowed downstream authors. Its scope is enumerate authorized model builders, not authorized shared model report creation.

Consumption generally needs less privilege than report authoring. It would address read-only report consumption privilege, not authorized shared model report creation.

Audiences tailor which reports are delivered without unnecessarily duplicating a model. It would address department-specific app content, not protect data beyond app audience display.

URLs do not themselves grant underlying report access when governed correctly. That targets prevent access from forwarded app link, not protect data beyond app audience display.

Underlying item authorization remains relevant to report use. It may suit resolve underlying model access dependency, not protect data beyond app audience display.

Label integration can carry classification to supported Power BI exports. Its scope is protection-aware governed export, not label sensitive analytics content.

Labels and item permission must match real source sensitivity. That is meant for avoid misclassification of confidential report, not label sensitive analytics content.

Label availability is controlled through scoped policy assignments. It would address make governed labels available to eligible authors, not label sensitive analytics content.

Scoped sharing supports partner consumption without broad workspace rights. It would address limited authenticated external report view, not narrowly scoped report consumption.

Item-level authoring permissions can separate report changes from model administration. It may suit report-only editing entitlement, not narrowly scoped report consumption.

Permission enforcement governs access regardless of whether a link is known. It is useful for secure report despite widely shared URL, not for narrowly scoped report consumption.

RLS restricts row visibility; OLS restricts model objects. It is useful for separate row and object authorization, not for deny access to salary field metadata and values.

RLS addresses record filtering without hiding legitimate fields. Its scope is restrict region data at row level, not deny access to salary field metadata and values.

Table-level OLS can prevent access to a sensitive model object. It would address hide confidential model table, not deny access to salary field metadata and values.

Public embeds expose data without identity verification, unsuitable for private records. It would address prevent anonymous disclosure of customer data, not authorized partner Power BI consumption.

External access depends on both tenant policies and the item's permitted audience. That targets correct guest access policy mismatch, not authorized partner Power BI consumption.

Access lifecycle must remove no-longer-justified external entitlements. It may suit expire completed partner report sharing, not authorized partner Power BI consumption.

Configuration and refresh records help attribute source of service state changes. Its scope is investigate refresh configuration change, not audit report permission changes.

Usage telemetry describes report consumption rather than administrative modifications. That is meant for measure report adoption over time, not audit report permission changes.

Audit logs can support accountability for approved or suspicious content export. It would address trace sensitive report export activity, not audit report permission changes.

Network controls restrict private-source access beyond semantic model roles. It would address defend private data source connectivity, not accountable gateway credential ownership.

Gateway credential secrets are not ordinary report-consumption data. It may suit protect data source secrets from readers, not accountable gateway credential ownership.

Minimal source privileges reduce risk of refresh credential compromise. It is useful for preventing overprivileged refresh source access, not for accountable gateway credential ownership.

Customer embedding needs a deliberate security model; anonymous embeds are not adequate. It is useful for governed customer-facing analytics delivery, not for preventing anonymous report publication.

Tenant-wide policies constrain administrative features and distribution capabilities. Its scope is centrally govern workspace and sharing features, not prevent anonymous report publication.

Export governance controls permitted extraction operations. It would address restrict sensitive underlying data export, not prevent anonymous report publication.

Dynamic access requires exact identity-to-entitlement matching. It would address diagnose missing dynamic RLS rows, not validate static region RLS behavior.

Elevated workspace roles may bypass service RLS even if Desktop simulates a role. That targets accurate production consumer security test, not validate static region RLS behavior.

Multiple RLS roles may combine accessible row sets. It may suit prevent role-union overexposure, not validate static region RLS behavior.