Question 690
During an inter-POP failover test, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A VPN customer site advertises a prefix successfully into VPNv4 but another participating site never imports it into the intended VRF. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Include multicast-over-VPN traffic tests in multisite service acceptance.
- Validate positive and negative intersite route-target import tests.
- Test site failover for reflected own-site routes and unintended loops.
- Verify each negotiated address family during VPN onboarding.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Validate positive and negative intersite route-target import tests. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: Route targets are extended-community policy selectors controlling which VPN routes are imported into customer VRFs. During audits, confirm: The remote route contains an RT accepted by the receiver and appears in the intended VRF.
Incorrect Answers
A:Include multicast-over-VPN traffic tests in multisite service acceptance. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically MVPN receiver routing absent. L3VPN unicast reachability alone does not establish an MVPN multicast distribution tree. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target export membership and the confirming observation is: The remote route contains an RT accepted by the receiver and appears in the intended VRF.
C:Test site failover for reflected own-site routes and unintended loops. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Site-of-origin multihoming loop. A site-of-origin attribute can prevent a multi-homed VPN site from reimporting routes that originated at that same site. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target export membership and the confirming observation is: The remote route contains an RT accepted by the receiver and appears in the intended VRF.
D:Verify each negotiated address family during VPN onboarding. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically MP-BGP VPNv4 family absent. An established BGP session for IPv4 unicast does not automatically enable VPNv4 address-family exchange. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target export membership and the confirming observation is: The remote route contains an RT accepted by the receiver and appears in the intended VRF.
Question 691
During a new PE-router service turn-up, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two unrelated tenants unexpectedly learn each other's prefixes after a shared route target value was copied into both VRFs. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?
- Check which prefixes and RTs are imported into the shared-services and tenant VRFs.
- Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers.
- Inspect overlapping RT export/import values and exact received VPN routes.
- Inspect the RR BGP negotiated families and VPN route reflection configuration.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Inspect overlapping RT export/import values and exact received VPN routes. This check examines the decisive condition for Route target leak between tenants before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. The confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check which prefixes and RTs are imported into the shared-services and tenant VRFs. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF route leaking to shared service. Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
B:Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
D:Inspect the RR BGP negotiated families and VPN route reflection configuration. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN route reflector family support. A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Question 692
During a customer VPN change window, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two unrelated tenants unexpectedly learn each other's prefixes after a shared route target value was copied into both VRFs. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?
- Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants.
- A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import.
- A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist.
- Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist. The targeted correction is: Assign distinct RT policies to isolated tenants and restrict any deliberate route leaking.
Incorrect Answers
A:Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF route leaking to shared service. Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
B:A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
C:A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN route reflector family support. A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Question 693
During a core-routing migration rehearsal, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two unrelated tenants unexpectedly learn each other's prefixes after a shared route target value was copied into both VRFs. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?
- Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
- Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.
- The core holds separate VPNv4 routes with distinct RDs for the identical customer IPv4 prefix.
- The RR receives and reflects eligible VPN routes to the intended PE clients.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique.
Incorrect Answers
B:Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF route leaking to shared service. Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
C:The core holds separate VPNv4 routes with distinct RDs for the identical customer IPv4 prefix. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
D:The RR receives and reflects eligible VPN routes to the intended PE clients. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN route reflector family support. A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Question 694
During a backbone POP acceptance review, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two unrelated tenants unexpectedly learn each other's prefixes after a shared route target value was copied into both VRFs. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?
- Import only scoped shared-service and return-path routes with appropriate policy.
- Assign distinct RT policies to isolated tenants and restrict any deliberate route leaking.
- Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance.
- Enable the correct VPN address family and safe route reflection on the RR.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Assign distinct RT policies to isolated tenants and restrict any deliberate route leaking. The change addresses the root behavior described here: Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. Verify success with: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Incorrect Answers
A:Import only scoped shared-service and return-path routes with appropriate policy. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF route leaking to shared service. Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
C:Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
D:Enable the correct VPN address family and safe route reflection on the RR. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN route reflector family support. A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Question 695
During an overnight NOC investigation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two unrelated tenants unexpectedly learn each other's prefixes after a shared route target value was copied into both VRFs. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants.
- Test reflected VPN routes between PEs across both reflector failure domains.
- Use negative cross-tenant routing tests on every provisioning change.
- Test branch-to-branch isolation even when all BGP sessions are healthy.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Use negative cross-tenant routing tests on every provisioning change. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. During audits, confirm: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Incorrect Answers
A:Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
B:Test reflected VPN routes between PEs across both reflector failure domains. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN route reflector family support. A route reflector can distribute VPN-IPv4 NLRI without hosting every customer's VRF, provided the proper family and policy exist. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
D:Test branch-to-branch isolation even when all BGP sessions are healthy. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Route target leak between tenants and the confirming observation is: Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
Question 696
During a high-availability validation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: One PE receives the correct CE route but installs it into the default table rather than the customer's routing instance because the attachment interface is assigned incorrectly. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?
- Compare RT namespaces and explicit import/export policies across both providers.
- Inspect whether the ASBRs have corresponding per-VRF interfaces and ordinary interconnection routing.
- Inspect the destination VRF route and CE-facing ARP/neighbor resolution after label termination.
- Inspect the logical CE-facing interface's routing-instance membership and route table location.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Inspect the logical CE-facing interface's routing-instance membership and route table location. This check examines the decisive condition for Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF. The confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Incorrect Answers
A:Compare RT namespaces and explicit import/export policies across both providers. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Inter-AS route target collision. Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
B:Inspect whether the ASBRs have corresponding per-VRF interfaces and ordinary interconnection routing. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Interprovider VPN option A. Interprovider option A uses per-VPN VRF interconnections at ASBRs rather than exchanging VPNv4 directly across a shared core. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
C:Inspect the destination VRF route and CE-facing ARP/neighbor resolution after label termination. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN service egress CE next hop. Successful MPLS service-label disposition does not guarantee the final customer next hop is reachable. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Question 697
During a Junos routing maintenance review, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: One PE receives the correct CE route but installs it into the default table rather than the customer's routing instance because the attachment interface is assigned incorrectly. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?
- L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF.
- Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context.
- Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships.
- Interprovider option A uses per-VPN VRF interconnections at ASBRs rather than exchanging VPNv4 directly across a shared core.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route. The targeted correction is: Attach the CE logical interface to the correct instance type and VRF.
Incorrect Answers
B:Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically LSP penultimate-hop pop effect. Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
C:Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Inter-AS route target collision. Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
D:Interprovider option A uses per-VPN VRF interconnections at ASBRs rather than exchanging VPNv4 directly across a shared core. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Interprovider VPN option A. Interprovider option A uses per-VPN VRF interconnections at ASBRs rather than exchanging VPNv4 directly across a shared core. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Question 698
During a multisite network cutover, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: One PE receives the correct CE route but installs it into the default table rather than the customer's routing instance because the attachment interface is assigned incorrectly. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?
- Forwarding resolution terminates at a real egress rather than recursing between VRF defaults.
- The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
- The receiving PE resolves the remaining service label into the intended VRF forwarding path.
- Test imports contain only the intended interprovider tenant prefixes after translation or filtering.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF.
Incorrect Answers
A:Forwarding resolution terminates at a real egress rather than recursing between VRF defaults. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF routing-loop via defaults. Bidirectional default leaking without terminal specific reachability can create a persistent inter-VRF loop. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
C:The receiving PE resolves the remaining service label into the intended VRF forwarding path. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically LSP penultimate-hop pop effect. Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
D:Test imports contain only the intended interprovider tenant prefixes after translation or filtering. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Inter-AS route target collision. Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Question 699
During a metro aggregation incident, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: One PE receives the correct CE route but installs it into the default table rather than the customer's routing instance because the attachment interface is assigned incorrectly. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?
- Replace cyclic defaults with specific shared-service routes and valid exit paths.
- Accept valid penultimate-hop pop behavior and fix only missing required service-label handling.
- Attach the CE logical interface to the correct instance type and VRF.
- Coordinate unique RT conventions or explicit RT translation across the boundary.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Attach the CE logical interface to the correct instance type and VRF. The change addresses the root behavior described here: L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF. Verify success with: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Incorrect Answers
A:Replace cyclic defaults with specific shared-service routes and valid exit paths. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF routing-loop via defaults. Bidirectional default leaking without terminal specific reachability can create a persistent inter-VRF loop. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
B:Accept valid penultimate-hop pop behavior and fix only missing required service-label handling. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically LSP penultimate-hop pop effect. Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
D:Coordinate unique RT conventions or explicit RT translation across the boundary. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Inter-AS route target collision. Route targets have policy meaning across AS boundaries; overlapping assignment can connect unintended VPN memberships. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Question 700
During a managed service audit, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: One PE receives the correct CE route but installs it into the default table rather than the customer's routing instance because the attachment interface is assigned incorrectly. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Validate security inspection and symmetric routing for each tenant.
- Run traceroute and recursion loop tests for shared-VRF changes.
- Document expected label-stack depth at each monitored hop.
- Include interface-to-tenant mapping validation in turn-up checklists.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Include interface-to-tenant mapping validation in turn-up checklists. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: L3VPN separation starts at the correct PE customer interface association with the VRF. During audits, confirm: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Incorrect Answers
A:Validate security inspection and symmetric routing for each tenant. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically L3VPN Internet breakout design. Internet access for L3VPN customers depends on explicit routing, route leaking or central breakout topology. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
B:Run traceroute and recursion loop tests for shared-VRF changes. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VRF routing-loop via defaults. Bidirectional default leaking without terminal specific reachability can create a persistent inter-VRF loop. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
C:Document expected label-stack depth at each monitored hop. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically LSP penultimate-hop pop effect. Penultimate-hop popping can remove an outer transport label before the egress PE while retaining the service label for VPN context. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Customer CE interface mapped wrong VRF and the confirming observation is: The customer prefix appears only in the intended VRF table and not as an accidental global route.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-SP) (JN0-664) Practice Tests