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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Remote SSH ignores TACACS+ authentication while console login correctly uses it. Here the recorded observation is: all router administration fails when the TACACS+ server becomes unreachable. The applicable cause is: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The rejected engineer remains denied despite valid local credentials configured on the router. Here the recorded observation is: all router administration fails when the TACACS+ server becomes unreachable. The applicable cause is: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Remote administration fails whenever the first configured TACACS+ server is unavailable. Here the recorded observation is: all router administration fails when the TACACS+ server becomes unreachable. The applicable cause is: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors.

That control reduces a separate risk: An authoritative TACACS+ rejection is not the same condition as server unavailability. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors. The specific required safeguard is: test server-error versus explicit-deny handling and keep local credentials vaulted.

That control reduces a separate risk: The AAA server group lacks a usable secondary or uses the wrong server group reference. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors. The specific required safeguard is: test server-error versus explicit-deny handling and keep local credentials vaulted.

That control reduces a separate risk: The named method list was not bound to the VTY line configuration. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors. The specific required safeguard is: test server-error versus explicit-deny handling and keep local credentials vaulted.

Configuring a supported AAA server group with reachable primary and secondary TACACS+ server definitions would not enable supported AAA exec and command authorization through TACACS+ policy with appropriate emergency fallback.

Using a suitable TACACS+ device-administration integration when granular command authorization is required would not enable supported AAA exec and command authorization through TACACS+ policy with appropriate emergency fallback.

Enabling AAA command accounting to an appropriate TACACS+ server with required privilege levels would not enable supported AAA exec and command authorization through TACACS+ policy with appropriate emergency fallback.

This test measures a different behavior: Test a low-privilege administrative login and verify denied commands are enforced at the device. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run an allowed show command and a forbidden configuration command for a limited operator; inspect server authorization logs.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect server accounting logs to find operator, command and timestamp for a test configuration change. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run an allowed show command and a forbidden configuration command for a limited operator; inspect server authorization logs.

This test measures a different behavior: Disable the primary in a lab and confirm the device authenticates against the secondary server. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run an allowed show command and a forbidden configuration command for a limited operator; inspect server authorization logs.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Remote administration fails whenever the first configured TACACS+ server is unavailable. Here the recorded observation is: a viewer who authenticated with TACACS+ can configure router interfaces. The applicable cause is: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The server shows a successful login but no record of who entered `interface` configuration. Here the recorded observation is: a viewer who authenticated with TACACS+ can configure router interfaces. The applicable cause is: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An administrative user receives broad CLI access because the RADIUS design lacks the intended command-by-command policy. Here the recorded observation is: a viewer who authenticated with TACACS+ can configure router interfaces. The applicable cause is: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced.

That control reduces a separate risk: AAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced. The specific required safeguard is: test role-to-command mappings after changing TACACS+ shell profiles.

That control reduces a separate risk: RADIUS network-access AAA was conflated with TACACS+ granular device-command authorization. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced. The specific required safeguard is: test role-to-command mappings after changing TACACS+ shell profiles.

That control reduces a separate risk: The AAA server group lacks a usable secondary or uses the wrong server group reference. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced. The specific required safeguard is: test role-to-command mappings after changing TACACS+ shell profiles.

Creating an AAA login method list with TACACS+ first and local fallback for server error cases would not enable AAA command accounting to an appropriate TACACS+ server with required privilege levels.

Enabling supported AAA exec and command authorization through TACACS+ policy with appropriate emergency fallback would not enable AAA command accounting to an appropriate TACACS+ server with required privilege levels.

Configuring a supported AAA server group with reachable primary and secondary TACACS+ server definitions would not enable AAA command accounting to an appropriate TACACS+ server with required privilege levels.

This test measures a different behavior: Simulate server unreachability and verify local break-glass login; then test explicit TACACS+ reject behavior. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect server accounting logs to find operator, command and timestamp for a test configuration change.

This test measures a different behavior: Disable the primary in a lab and confirm the device authenticates against the secondary server. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect server accounting logs to find operator, command and timestamp for a test configuration change.

This test measures a different behavior: Run an allowed show command and a forbidden configuration command for a limited operator; inspect server authorization logs. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect server accounting logs to find operator, command and timestamp for a test configuration change.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A viewer who authenticated with TACACS+ can configure router interfaces. Here the recorded observation is: the server shows a successful login but no record of who entered `interface` configuration. The applicable cause is: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: All router administration fails when the TACACS+ server becomes unreachable. Here the recorded observation is: the server shows a successful login but no record of who entered `interface` configuration. The applicable cause is: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Remote administration fails whenever the first configured TACACS+ server is unavailable. Here the recorded observation is: the server shows a successful login but no record of who entered `interface` configuration. The applicable cause is: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured.

That control reduces a separate risk: Only authentication was centralized; privileged command authorization was not enforced. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured. The specific required safeguard is: retain command accounting logs securely and verify time synchronization after upgrades.

That control reduces a separate risk: The AAA method list provides no valid local fallback for AAA server errors. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured. The specific required safeguard is: retain command accounting logs securely and verify time synchronization after upgrades.

That control reduces a separate risk: The AAA server group lacks a usable secondary or uses the wrong server group reference. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aAA login accounting was enabled but command accounting was not configured. The specific required safeguard is: retain command accounting logs securely and verify time synchronization after upgrades.

Creating an IOS role-based CLI parser view that explicitly includes permitted junior commands would not meet the need for a suitable TACACS+ device-administration integration when granular command authorization is required.

Enabling supported AAA exec and command authorization through TACACS+ policy with appropriate emergency fallback would not meet the need for a suitable TACACS+ device-administration integration when granular command authorization is required.

Correcting AAA server reachability, allowed UDP ports and shared-secret identity for the RADIUS client would not meet the need for a suitable TACACS+ device-administration integration when granular command authorization is required.