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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel protocol repeatedly flaps with recursive route warnings. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.

A default route in VRF BLUE cannot validate connectivity for endpoints that exist only in VRF RED.

Creating VRF tables is an isolation design step; the fault described here is testing the RED tenant through the global routing context.

That control reduces a separate risk: The route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context. The specific required safeguard is: use VRF-aware monitoring and avoid inferring tenant outages from global tests.

Adjusting tunnel MTU and TCP MSS as supported, or provide an underlay MTU sufficient for encapsulation overhead would not build a supported GRE tunnel between reachable tunnel endpoints and route the intended overlay payload through it.

Protecting the GRE transport with a supported IPsec security association or use an appropriate secured tunnel design would not build a supported GRE tunnel between reachable tunnel endpoints and route the intended overlay payload through it.

Installing an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay would not build a supported GRE tunnel between reachable tunnel endpoints and route the intended overlay payload through it.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect the FIB route to the outer tunnel destination and verify it resolves to a physical next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect tunnel source/destination underlay reachability and encapsulated packet counters.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare fragmentation-needed symptoms and large-packet PMTU tests through the tunnel. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect tunnel source/destination underlay reachability and encapsulated packet counters.

This test measures a different behavior: Capture transit packets and confirm encryption/ESP handling rather than plaintext GRE. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect tunnel source/destination underlay reachability and encapsulated packet counters.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Small packets succeed while full-sized DF TCP segments blackhole. Here the recorded observation is: tunnel interface is up administratively but multicast flows cannot cross because remote GRE endpoint is unreachable. The applicable cause is: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel protocol repeatedly flaps with recursive route warnings. Here the recorded observation is: tunnel interface is up administratively but multicast flows cannot cross because remote GRE endpoint is unreachable. The applicable cause is: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A transit observer can inspect inner routed payloads inside GRE packets. Here the recorded observation is: tunnel interface is up administratively but multicast flows cannot cross because remote GRE endpoint is unreachable. The applicable cause is: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability.

That control reduces a separate risk: Encapsulation overhead reduced effective payload MTU without PMTU/MSS accommodation. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability. The specific required safeguard is: track GRE tunnel endpoints and routing to avoid recursive next-hop resolution.

That control reduces a separate risk: GRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability. The specific required safeguard is: track GRE tunnel endpoints and routing to avoid recursive next-hop resolution.

That control reduces a separate risk: The tunnel destination resolves through the tunnel itself, producing recursive routing. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability. The specific required safeguard is: track GRE tunnel endpoints and routing to avoid recursive next-hop resolution.

Installing an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay would not protect the GRE transport with a supported IPsec security association or use an appropriate secured tunnel design.

Aligning compatible IKE and IPsec transform/proposal parameters, authentication and identities on both peers would not protect the GRE transport with a supported IPsec security association or use an appropriate secured tunnel design.

Building a supported GRE tunnel between reachable tunnel endpoints and routing the intended overlay payload through it would not protect the GRE transport with a supported IPsec security association or use an appropriate secured tunnel design.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect IKE SA and child/ESP SA negotiation state to verify a common proposal. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: capture transit packets and confirm encryption/ESP handling rather than plaintext GRE.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect tunnel source/destination underlay reachability and encapsulated packet counters. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: capture transit packets and confirm encryption/ESP handling rather than plaintext GRE.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect the FIB route to the outer tunnel destination and verify it resolves to a physical next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: capture transit packets and confirm encryption/ESP handling rather than plaintext GRE.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel protocol repeatedly flaps with recursive route warnings. Here the recorded observation is: a transit observer can inspect inner routed payloads inside GRE packets. The applicable cause is: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: IKE authentication succeeds but no child security association is installed. Here the recorded observation is: a transit observer can inspect inner routed payloads inside GRE packets. The applicable cause is: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel interface is up administratively but multicast flows cannot cross because remote GRE endpoint is unreachable. Here the recorded observation is: a transit observer can inspect inner routed payloads inside GRE packets. The applicable cause is: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload.

That control reduces a separate risk: The tunnel destination resolves through the tunnel itself, producing recursive routing. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload. The specific required safeguard is: validate IPsec peer and SA state after tunnel address and crypto policy changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: The peers have no common supported child-SA encryption/integrity proposal. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload. The specific required safeguard is: validate IPsec peer and SA state after tunnel address and crypto policy changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: The GRE outer destination lacks routable underlay reachability. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: gRE encapsulates IP traffic but does not itself encrypt the payload. The specific required safeguard is: validate IPsec peer and SA state after tunnel address and crypto policy changes.

Protecting the GRE transport with a supported IPsec security association or use an appropriate secured tunnel design would not install an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay.

Installing or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table would not install an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay.

Building a supported GRE tunnel between reachable tunnel endpoints and routing the intended overlay payload through it would not install an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay.