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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: VMs on VLAN 120 communicate internally but cannot reach external devices on VLAN 120. Here the recorded observation is: second-level virtual routers report hardware-assisted virtualization unavailable. The applicable cause is: the outer hypervisor did not expose required virtualization extensions to the nested hypervisor.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Changes to one guest kernel unexpectedly take the other lab workload down because both tests run in one OS. Here the recorded observation is: second-level virtual routers report hardware-assisted virtualization unavailable. The applicable cause is: the outer hypervisor did not expose required virtualization extensions to the nested hypervisor.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Packet-capture samples drop during host memory pressure while physical network links show no errors. Here the recorded observation is: second-level virtual routers report hardware-assisted virtualization unavailable. The applicable cause is: the outer hypervisor did not expose required virtualization extensions to the nested hypervisor.

Creating ordinary guest VMs does not expose the CPU virtualization features required by a VM acting as a nested host.

That control reduces a separate risk: The virtual machine lacks sufficient effective compute/memory resources, not packet transport reachability. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the outer hypervisor did not expose required virtualization extensions to the nested hypervisor. The specific required safeguard is: keep nested lab feature support separate from production hardware-virtualization guarantees.

Choosing a laptop-oriented hosted hypervisor does not enable hardware virtualization support inside the current nested VM.

Installing or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table would not create separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF.

Applying the VRF forwarding association would not create separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF.

Testing connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and routing lookup context would not create separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare sourced `ping vrf RED` results and VRF-specific RIB entries. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently.

This test measures a different behavior: Verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently.

This test measures a different behavior: Use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. Here the recorded observation is: customer A packets unexpectedly use Customer B's 10.10.0.0/16 route. The applicable cause is: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. Here the recorded observation is: customer A packets unexpectedly use Customer B's 10.10.0.0/16 route. The applicable cause is: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. Here the recorded observation is: customer A packets unexpectedly use Customer B's 10.10.0.0/16 route. The applicable cause is: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs.

That control reduces a separate risk: Global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs. The specific required safeguard is: audit interface-to-VRF bindings and route import policies during customer onboarding.

That control reduces a separate risk: Assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs. The specific required safeguard is: audit interface-to-VRF bindings and route import policies during customer onboarding.

That control reduces a separate risk: The diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs. The specific required safeguard is: audit interface-to-VRF bindings and route import policies during customer onboarding.

Designing supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy would not apply the VRF forwarding association.

Installing or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table would not apply the VRF forwarding association. Assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered.

Creating separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF would not apply the VRF forwarding association.

This test measures a different behavior: Check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address.

This test measures a different behavior: Check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address.

This test measures a different behavior: Use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. Here the recorded observation is: an interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. The applicable cause is: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. Here the recorded observation is: an interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. The applicable cause is: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Customer A packets unexpectedly use Customer B's 10.10.0.0/16 route. Here the recorded observation is: an interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. The applicable cause is: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered.

That control reduces a separate risk: Global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered. The specific required safeguard is: use a staged VRF-migration checklist that reapplies addresses and tests peers.

That control reduces a separate risk: Tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered. The specific required safeguard is: use a staged VRF-migration checklist that reapplies addresses and tests peers.

That control reduces a separate risk: The route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered. The specific required safeguard is: use a staged VRF-migration checklist that reapplies addresses and tests peers.

Designing supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.

Testing connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and routing lookup context would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.

Creating separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.