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Designing supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.

Testing connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and routing lookup context would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.

Creating separate VRF routing tables and bind each customer's L3 interfaces to the correct VRF would not install or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect the FIB route to the outer tunnel destination and verify it resolves to a physical next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop.

This test measures a different behavior: Check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop.

This test measures a different behavior: Check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. Here the recorded observation is: hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. The applicable cause is: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel protocol repeatedly flaps with recursive route warnings. Here the recorded observation is: hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. The applicable cause is: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Customer A packets unexpectedly use Customer B's 10.10.0.0/16 route. Here the recorded observation is: hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. The applicable cause is: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table.

That control reduces a separate risk: Tenant interfaces or route lookups are in the global table rather than isolated VRFs. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. The specific required safeguard is: keep VRF-qualified static routes and monitoring separate from global reachability.

That control reduces a separate risk: The diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. The specific required safeguard is: keep VRF-qualified static routes and monitoring separate from global reachability.

That control reduces a separate risk: The route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. The specific required safeguard is: keep VRF-qualified static routes and monitoring separate from global reachability.

Applying the VRF forwarding association would not design supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy.

Installing or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table would not design supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy.

Testing connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and routing lookup context would not design supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy.

This test measures a different behavior: Verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary.

This test measures a different behavior: Use a VRF-specific route lookup and sourced ping to check the tenant's default next hop. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare sourced `ping vrf RED` results and VRF-specific RIB entries. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Hosts in VRF BLUE have no default route despite `show ip route` displaying 0.0.0.0/0 globally. Here the recorded observation is: adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. The applicable cause is: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. Here the recorded observation is: adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. The applicable cause is: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. Here the recorded observation is: adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. The applicable cause is: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope.

That control reduces a separate risk: Assigning VRF forwarding cleared its previous IP configuration, which was never re-entered. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. The specific required safeguard is: audit imported prefixes and deny implicit all-route leakage after policy edits.

That control reduces a separate risk: The diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. The specific required safeguard is: audit imported prefixes and deny implicit all-route leakage after policy edits.

That control reduces a separate risk: Global and VRF routing tables are distinct; the default exists in the wrong table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the route-leaking policy imported more prefixes than the approved shared-service scope. The specific required safeguard is: audit imported prefixes and deny implicit all-route leakage after policy edits.

Installing an underlay route to the remote GRE destination through physical transport, outside the GRE overlay would not test connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and route lookup context.

Installing or verify a default route explicitly in the BLUE VRF routing table would not test connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and route lookup context.

Designing supported selective VRF route leaking with explicit import/export route targets or platform policy would not test connectivity using the correct VRF-qualified ping and route lookup context.

This test measures a different behavior: Verify both the interface VRF association and the restored primary IP address. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare sourced `ping vrf RED` results and VRF-specific RIB entries.

This test measures a different behavior: Check only the DNS service prefix is visible across the intended VRF boundary. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare sourced `ping vrf RED` results and VRF-specific RIB entries.

This test measures a different behavior: Check `show ip route vrf` for each tenant and verify overlapping prefixes resolve independently. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare sourced `ping vrf RED` results and VRF-specific RIB entries.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Tunnel protocol repeatedly flaps with recursive route warnings. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Adding general inter-VRF connectivity accidentally exposes every tenant server between the VRFs. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An interface loses L3 reachability immediately after a `vrf forwarding` command. Here the recorded observation is: global ping fails although properly sourced VRF RED applications work. The applicable cause is: the diagnostic used the global table rather than the tenant VRF routing context.