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That behavior describes Advanced Threat Protection: ATP services evaluate relevant suspicious destinations or traffic patterns under security policy. It addresses the separate need to detect and prevent selected high-risk web threats and command-and-control indicators, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud App Control rule: application-aware controls can govern supported user actions in selected cloud applications. It addresses the separate need to disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.

That behavior describes Bandwidth control class: bandwidth classes and rules shape or police matched traffic according to configured limits. It addresses the separate need to reserve adequate capacity for collaboration traffic while constraining less important categories, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud App Control activity rule: activity-level rules evaluate recognized cloud application actions under the enforcement policy. It addresses the separate need to differentiate a sensitive action such as posting or uploading from passive browsing on a supported service, rather than describing the selected Tenant restriction policy mechanism.

That behavior describes Unsanctioned cloud app block: cloud App Control can enforce deny decisions against classified cloud services. It addresses the separate need to stop access to a cloud service designated as unacceptable in the tenant, rather than describing the selected Tenant restriction policy mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud App Control rule: application-aware controls can govern supported user actions in selected cloud applications. It addresses the separate need to disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported, rather than describing the selected Tenant restriction policy mechanism.

That check belongs to Client Connector debug mode: return logging to its managed baseline after collecting sufficient evidence. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector export logs failure.

That check belongs to Incorrect forwarding profile: compare detected network, selected profile and actual traffic-forwarding path. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector export logs failure.

That check belongs to Client Connector repair: compare pre- and post-repair service status and client errors. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector export logs failure.

That behavior describes ZIA Cloud NSS HTTPS collector: cloud NSS can deliver selected supported log types over HTTPS to a compatible collector. It addresses the separate need to send selected ZIA security logs to a cloud SIEM ingestion endpoint, rather than describing the selected ZIA VM NSS on-prem SIEM mechanism.

That behavior describes Incident correlation by identity: shared user and time fields can support correlation between web and private-app activity. It addresses the separate need to join permitted security events across ZIA and ZPA in an enterprise analytics workflow, rather than describing the selected ZIA VM NSS on-prem SIEM mechanism.

That behavior describes ZPA LSS receiver integration: LSS forwards supported ZPA diagnostics to an external log receiver. It addresses the separate need to correlate private-app access and App Connector status outside the ZPA console, rather than describing the selected ZIA VM NSS on-prem SIEM mechanism.

This would be evidence for Cloud App Control activity rule: the targeted user action is denied while unaffected app functions remain allowed. It does not demonstrate that the team can disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported using Cloud App Control rule.

This would be evidence for Unsanctioned cloud app block: A request to the blocked app is denied and attributed to the designated rule. It does not demonstrate that the team can disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported using Cloud App Control rule.

This would be evidence for Tenant restriction policy: corporate tenant access succeeds while the prohibited personal tenant is restricted. It does not demonstrate that the team can disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported using Cloud App Control rule.

Administrator sign-on policy is used to require approved authentication conditions specifically for administrative console sessions. It works because administrative login policy governs administrator authentication independently of ordinary web traffic rules, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrative identity audit.

ZIdentity group assignments is used to represent a departmental user population for consistent identity-driven controls. It works because group assignment makes the applicable identity population available for policy references, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrative identity audit.

ZIdentity user record is used to locate a named user's centrally managed service identity for administrative review. It works because ZIdentity centralizes user identity and entitlement information used by Zscaler services, but does not directly implement the named need for Administrative identity audit.

That check fits Cloud App Control activity rule, because check app activity type and whether the request is inspected and logged. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Unsanctioned cloud app block and the need to stop access to a cloud service designated as unacceptable in the tenant.

That check fits Tenant restriction policy, because inspect tenant condition, identity mapping and both tenant test results. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Unsanctioned cloud app block and the need to stop access to a cloud service designated as unacceptable in the tenant.

That check fits Cloud App Control rule, because inspect cloud-app action classification and policy activity record. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Unsanctioned cloud app block and the need to stop access to a cloud service designated as unacceptable in the tenant.

That behavior describes SSL inspection exclusion: the SSL policy exception prevents decryption of a narrowly identified destination. It addresses the separate need to avoid decrypting an explicitly exempt finance portal while inspecting ordinary business sites, rather than describing the selected HTTPS response malware scan mechanism.

That behavior describes TLS inspection rule: the secure web proxy selectively decrypts eligible TLS traffic before applying inline controls. It addresses the separate need to enable content policy evaluation inside selected HTTPS connections with approved exceptions, rather than describing the selected HTTPS response malware scan mechanism.

That behavior describes TLS policy user targeting: SSL policy conditions can use supported identity and other contextual criteria. It addresses the separate need to inspect traffic for managed employees but exempt a documented test population, rather than describing the selected HTTPS response malware scan mechanism.

This would be evidence for Rule location condition: A request from the targeted branch matches while another site is unaffected. It does not demonstrate that the team can ensure an approved exception is not shadowed by a general deny in ordered policies using Security rule priority.

This would be evidence for Policy test transaction: the web or firewall log shows the new rule ID and correct disposition. It does not demonstrate that the team can ensure an approved exception is not shadowed by a general deny in ordered policies using Security rule priority.

This would be evidence for Policy exception expiry: the exception is no longer effective after the documented end date. It does not demonstrate that the team can ensure an approved exception is not shadowed by a general deny in ordered policies using Security rule priority.

For Device-risk conditional access, endpoint posture signal availability depends on the supported client and platform. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Managed-device cloud restriction.

For Private app microsegmentation, segment labels cannot compensate for wildcard ports that expose excessive scope. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Managed-device cloud restriction.

For Time-scoped web policy, A time condition does not independently identify which user or destination qualifies. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Managed-device cloud restriction.

SAML identity provider is used to allow employees to sign in to Zscaler using their enterprise identity provider rather than a second password. It works because SAML federation carries signed authentication assertions from the configured identity provider to the service, but does not directly implement the named need for IdP signing-certificate rollover.

SAML assertion attributes is used to make department or group claims from a completed sign-in available as policy context. It works because the identity provider sends mapped claims in the SAML assertion for authorized policy use, but does not directly implement the named need for IdP signing-certificate rollover.

SCIM provisioning is used to keep users and groups provisioned without relying on an interactive login to create records. It works because SCIM exchanges user and group lifecycle changes through a provisioning integration, but does not directly implement the named need for IdP signing-certificate rollover.