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For Forwarding profile, the same forwarding action need not apply on every trusted and untrusted network. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for IPsec tunnel.

For GRE tunnel, GRE alone does not encrypt an untrusted transport path. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for IPsec tunnel.

For Z-Tunnel forwarding, A PAC-only mode may not capture traffic outside proxy-aware protocols. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for IPsec tunnel.

This would be evidence for App Connector group: two healthy connector instances appear in the intended group. It does not demonstrate that the team can provide an outbound-initiated path from a private app environment to the ZPA service using ZPA App Connector.

This would be evidence for ZPA server group: the application segment's server group includes a connector able to reach the target host. It does not demonstrate that the team can provide an outbound-initiated path from a private app environment to the ZPA service using ZPA App Connector.

This would be evidence for App Connector provisioning key: the new connector registers successfully in the intended tenant and group. It does not demonstrate that the team can provide an outbound-initiated path from a private app environment to the ZPA service using ZPA App Connector.

That check belongs to Client Connector export logs: export logs while reproducing the behavior under normal policy. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector debug mode failure.

That check belongs to Client Connector repair: compare pre- and post-repair service status and client errors. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector debug mode failure.

That check belongs to Incorrect forwarding profile: compare detected network, selected profile and actual traffic-forwarding path. It would not directly diagnose the separate Client Connector debug mode failure.

That behavior describes Web Insights filter: ZIA Web Insights supports transaction analysis with user, action, destination, and time filters. It addresses the separate need to identify the blocked web requests for one named employee during an incident window, rather than describing the selected Firewall Insights view mechanism.

That behavior describes DNS Insights view: DNS Insights exposes observed DNS traffic and associated classifications or enforcement where recorded. It addresses the separate need to investigate whether a suspected domain was queried and what security action followed, rather than describing the selected Firewall Insights view mechanism.

That behavior describes Threat Insights drilldown: threat Insights associates observable security events with threat classifications and enforcement. It addresses the separate need to find whether a suspicious destination was detected by a ZIA threat control, rather than describing the selected Firewall Insights view mechanism.

This would be evidence for ZPA application catalog: the desired hostname, service ports and segment assignment appear in the tenant catalog. It does not demonstrate that the team can keep a specifically exempt sensitive or incompatible HTTPS flow from being decrypted using ZIA SSL inspection bypass.

This would be evidence for ZIA SSL trust deployment: A permitted test HTTPS connection completes without certificate trust warnings and is logged as inspected. It does not demonstrate that the team can keep a specifically exempt sensitive or incompatible HTTPS flow from being decrypted using ZIA SSL inspection bypass.

This would be evidence for ZIA SSL inspection enablement: A controlled test session is classified as inspected and can be checked against an inline security rule. It does not demonstrate that the team can keep a specifically exempt sensitive or incompatible HTTPS flow from being decrypted using ZIA SSL inspection bypass.

App Connector provisioning key is used to enroll a newly deployed App Connector with the correct tenant connector group. It works because A provisioning key bootstraps registration of an App Connector into its assigned connector group, but does not directly implement the named need for Application segment group.

App Connector group is used to provide redundancy for application connector capacity in a selected environment. It works because A connector group organizes approved connector instances for availability and policy routing, but does not directly implement the named need for Application segment group.

ZPA server group is used to associate a set of private application destinations with eligible App Connector groups. It works because A server group maps application-serving environments to the connector groups that can reach them, but does not directly implement the named need for Application segment group.

That check fits Client Connector app profile integration, because validate enrollment, platform, assigned policy and forwarding profile. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Identity group policy mapping and the need to use identity provider group attributes to apply different web access controls.

That check fits SCIM directory synchronization, because verify provisioner status, group changes and deprovisioned users. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Identity group policy mapping and the need to use identity provider group attributes to apply different web access controls.

That check fits SAML identity federation, because check SAML trust metadata and the expected identity attributes. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Identity group policy mapping and the need to use identity provider group attributes to apply different web access controls.

That behavior describes Cloud Firewall network rule: A firewall rule evaluates eligible network-level destination and port conditions. It addresses the separate need to deny an unwanted outbound TCP service for selected locations at cloud enforcement, rather than describing the selected Firewall application awareness mechanism.

That behavior describes DNS security policy: DNS inspection and policy can reject queries for prohibited domains. It addresses the separate need to block requests to a confirmed malicious DNS destination before a downstream connection, rather than describing the selected Firewall application awareness mechanism.

That behavior describes FQDN firewall policy: FQDN-aware policy conditions can use destination hostname context for rule matching. It addresses the separate need to apply a network policy to an approved destination name rather than a fixed remote IP where supported, rather than describing the selected Firewall application awareness mechanism.

That behavior describes URL filtering caution: A caution action presents user-facing policy guidance at the relevant request. It addresses the separate need to warn users before they choose to continue to a permitted but higher-risk site, rather than describing the selected URL filtering rule mechanism.

That behavior describes URL filtering block: A block action denies the classified web request under the matching policy. It addresses the separate need to prevent users from continuing to an unacceptable category regardless of personal preference, rather than describing the selected URL filtering rule mechanism.

That behavior describes Custom URL category: custom URL categories group explicit FQDNs or URLs for targeted web policy conditions. It addresses the separate need to treat a specific set of business domains separately from broad vendor categories, rather than describing the selected URL filtering rule mechanism.

Private app access event is used to investigate which identity or policy authorized a private application session. It works because ZPA access records link user context to evaluated policy and target private application, but does not directly implement the named need for ZPA browser access.

Client-based private app access is used to let a managed client connect to a non-browser private application through policy-controlled ZPA. It works because Client Connector directs an approved application's private access through ZPA services, but does not directly implement the named need for ZPA browser access.

Private app segment mapping is used to identify a specific internal app by approved host or IP and port combinations for per-app access. It works because an application segment names the destination and service ports governed by ZPA policy, but does not directly implement the named need for ZPA browser access.

That behavior describes Advanced Threat Protection: ATP services evaluate relevant suspicious destinations or traffic patterns under security policy. It addresses the separate need to detect and prevent selected high-risk web threats and command-and-control indicators, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud App Control rule: application-aware controls can govern supported user actions in selected cloud applications. It addresses the separate need to disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.

That behavior describes Bandwidth control class: bandwidth classes and rules shape or police matched traffic according to configured limits. It addresses the separate need to reserve adequate capacity for collaboration traffic while constraining less important categories, rather than describing the selected File type control mechanism.