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Agent attribution and traceability support investigation, but do not enumerate the compromised identity’s effective write entitlements.

Runtime activity correlation can show observed actions but underestimates potential blast radius unless combined with effective entitlements and reachable data.

Applying a new Conditional Access rule can contain future access but cannot quantify resources already reachable under the compromised identity.

A cloud risk dashboard may highlight exposures, but one agent’s inherited entitlement requires identity/group and resource-scope analysis.

A CA policy restricts token issuance under selected conditions; it cannot itself enumerate inherited permissions and resource authorization reach.

Pruning unused agent tools is a separate exposure control; it does not reveal RBAC granted indirectly by the group.

Ownership reassignment handles agent lifecycle governance but does not identify the resources used during the recorded compromise.

Role and reachability analysis estimates what the agent could access, but cannot by itself establish which services were touched.

Agent protection enrollment status explains monitoring coverage but not the downstream resources proven accessed in this case.

Deprovisioning a retired agent applies to an end-of-life identity, not an active production agent requiring distinct identity.

Reviewing role scope matters but cannot separate the agent from the shared human identity used to authenticate its tool operations.

Adding log correlation to a shared identity improves request tracing but cannot create a separately revocable identity boundary for the agent.

Archiving the app project does not disable its distinct service principal or revoke HR role assignments and existing tokens.

Audit correlation explains prior actions but cannot revoke the current authority of the retired agent.

Narrowing a retired agent’s permissions leaves a principal with access it no longer legitimately needs; lifecycle removal is indicated.

Renaming a role is cosmetic: the underlying privileges and token claims do not change.

A unique identity is important, but an individually named principal can still retain excessive directory-wide authorizations.

Deleting an actively required agent is not necessary when the security problem can be resolved by least-privilege authorization changes.

Creating a separate agent identity is helpful but without end-to-end tool/action logging and caller correlation may still leave a record’s initiator unknown.

A shared account identity proves only the account acted, not which independent agent and initiating user selected the mutation.

Role scope limits future actions but is not evidence of which agent performed a particular mutation.

Backend routing validation is necessary after gateway setup but does not remove the duplicated direct Foundry API keys from client applications.

Per-client quotas limit usage after gateway adoption but do not alone centralize the Foundry backend credential.

Gateway correlation and logging help accountability but do not replace the clients’ direct endpoint keys without the routed gateway configuration.

Centralizing backend credentials through the gateway does not prevent an authorized client from saturating the model deployment.

Validating the chosen region/model backend addresses compliance and routing, not excessive request rate per client.

A backend-wide quota cannot isolate or throttle the single abusive consumer before it consumes shared capacity.

Moving calls behind a gateway centralizes control but cannot attribute them without enabling scoped identity and correlation telemetry.

Deployment backend validation concerns permitted model/region, not app-level forensic attribution.

Aggregate token usage does not identify which registered client or request produced the risky interaction.

Centralizing credentials through a gateway cannot ensure permitted processing geography when the backend configuration points elsewhere.

Changing a display name does not modify where model processing occurs or meet geography/residency controls.

Rate limits are about capacity and fairness, not the backend region to which regulated prompts are routed.