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Analyzing risk findings informs priorities, but does not change the grants that are exposing the confidential records.

DSPM discovery helps identify oversharing, but observation alone does not remove broad SharePoint access to confidential source documents.

A label without verified access controls does not automatically revoke the Everyone or Anyone sharing paths cited in the findings.

Discovery and analytics supply findings; they do not allocate remediation ownership, deadline or evidence of closure.

Suppressing an unassigned risk hides evidence instead of establishing remediation accountability and does not lower the underlying exposure.

More policy mapping can clarify exposure severity, but unowned findings still have no accountable party to reduce risk.

Inventory and connector coverage checks establish eligible agents, but cannot by themselves reject a malicious runtime prompt-injection action.

Investigating runtime detections without enabling the supported preventive policy is insufficient when protection must block the injected tool invocation.

Deterministic tool authorization is necessary defense in depth, but it does not itself turn on the requested Defender real-time protection feature.

A runtime protection capability is not automatically applied to every agent; it still needs supported onboarding and effective policy targeting.

Blocking a detected risky tool action is useful after protection is correctly scoped; it cannot cover an agent omitted from the current policy.

Tenant-level enablement while explicitly excluding this agent is not evidence that its tool invocations are inspected or blocked.

A model refusal is non-deterministic and leaves the high-privilege connector callable; it cannot guarantee that restricted records stay inside the approved boundary.

General injection protections are useful, but the stated threat is an actual restricted data export that requires enforceable action/destination authorization.

Verifying whether an agent is onboarded does not block the specific restricted connector export observed in this incident.

Prompt text alone cannot enforce a downstream connector permission check; a tool could still execute under a broadly privileged service principal.

Agent protection scope checks are useful for onboarding but cannot establish that the connected API refuses an unauthorized operation.

Runtime detection may block covered threats, but it is not a substitute for checking each operation against effective connector/API authorization.

Interactive-user MFA grants are not available to autonomous agent identity subjects; policy conditions and controls must match this agent identity type.

Disabling a compromised identity is incident containment, not the normal conditional admission policy required for a healthy new agent.

Reviewing agent sign-in evaluation can diagnose a policy after it is configured but cannot enforce the presently missing rule.

Agent identities are separate policy subjects; cloning a human-user MFA grant can target the wrong object or rely on an unsupported interactive control.

Noninteractive agent identities cannot complete human MFA challenges, and supported agent-identity Conditional Access uses Block rather than ordinary user grant controls.

Revocation may be necessary during containment, but it would not establish whether the proposed Conditional Access policy actually matched the intended agent identity.

Removing a display entry does not disable the agent principal, revoke grants or invalidate the credentials and sessions it can use.

Choosing an appropriate CA policy is a preventive gate, not sufficient containment of an identity already compromised and holding credentials or tokens.

A policy-scope audit alone does not remove the compromised principal’s ability to act until the effective access path is blocked or revoked.

Revoking a compromised token may be a valid incident response, but it is not the first policy-design check needed to verify agent-specific targeting and grant support.

Human MFA is not an applicable remediation for an autonomous agent identity that cannot perform an interactive authentication step.

Matching a human display name does not select the agent identity object or resource token subject; verify the actual principal selected in the policy.

Agent attribution and traceability support investigation, but do not enumerate the compromised identity’s effective write entitlements.

Runtime activity correlation can show observed actions but underestimates potential blast radius unless combined with effective entitlements and reachable data.

Applying a new Conditional Access rule can contain future access but cannot quantify resources already reachable under the compromised identity.