Question 860
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A customer routing instance unexpectedly reaches another customer's prefix because an overly broad route import exposes paths across isolation boundaries. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Add a static default route in every tenant to conceal the leaked routes." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports.
- Changing OSPF cost does not normally displace a lower-preference static route for the identical prefix.
- An unconditional default masks missing prerequisites and may direct traffic into an unintended path.
- Removing valid specifics would disrupt actual destinations and does not establish a correct summary-fallback design.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Add a static default route in every tenant to conceal the leaked routes. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that Separate Junos routing instances maintain distinct routing tables; cross-instance reachability requires an intentional route-leak mechanism and suitable policy. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Tighten the route import/export conditions to the explicitly authorized customer prefixes and verify instance isolation.
Incorrect Answers
B:Changing OSPF cost does not normally displace a lower-preference static route for the identical prefix. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Administrative preference overrides static case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a static default route in every tenant to conceal the leaked routes. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports. This distinction matters because Separate Junos routing instances maintain distinct routing tables; cross-instance reachability requires an intentional route-leak mechanism and suitable policy.
C:An unconditional default masks missing prerequisites and may direct traffic into an unintended path. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Generated default route prerequisite case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a static default route in every tenant to conceal the leaked routes. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports. This distinction matters because Separate Junos routing instances maintain distinct routing tables; cross-instance reachability requires an intentional route-leak mechanism and suitable policy.
D:Removing valid specifics would disrupt actual destinations and does not establish a correct summary-fallback design. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Aggregate rejection behavior case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a static default route in every tenant to conceal the leaked routes. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports. This distinction matters because Separate Junos routing instances maintain distinct routing tables; cross-instance reachability requires an intentional route-leak mechanism and suitable policy.
Question 861
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A BGP feed contains private or customer-specific prefixes that should be rejected but are installed because the receiving policy accepts too broadly. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Rely on upstream filtering alone and leave local import rules open." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary.
- Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability.
- ECMP settings do not allow an eBGP session to cross an intermediate hop when multihop is missing.
- A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Rely on upstream filtering alone and leave local import rules open. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Install a narrowly scoped BGP import policy rejecting prohibited prefixes before accepting the intended announced routes.
Incorrect Answers
B:Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IBGP loopback source resolution case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Rely on upstream filtering alone and leave local import rules open. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. This distinction matters because BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
C:ECMP settings do not allow an eBGP session to cross an intermediate hop when multihop is missing. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated EBGP multihop peering case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Rely on upstream filtering alone and leave local import rules open. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. This distinction matters because BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
D:A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP next-hop inaccessible case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Rely on upstream filtering alone and leave local import rules open. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. This distinction matters because BGP import policy controls which routes may enter the receiving route selection process, separate from the remote peer's export choice.
Question 862
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A redundant link should resume traffic when the active path fails, but the switch stays blocked because engineers confuse RSTP alternate and edge port roles. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Force all redundant ports into permanent forwarding state." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- MTU is not the STP bridge-ID control and does not prevent superior BPDUs from winning election.
- Removing STP protection can permit the unauthorized bridge to create a forwarding loop.
- Making redundant ports forward simultaneously can introduce a Layer 2 loop and broadcast storm.
- Layer 3 route preference does not determine Layer 2 spanning-tree root or port roles.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:Making redundant ports forward simultaneously can introduce a Layer 2 loop and broadcast storm. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Force all redundant ports into permanent forwarding state. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Validate RSTP root and alternate port roles and point-to-point link conditions before testing rapid alternate-port transition.
Incorrect Answers
A:MTU is not the STP bridge-ID control and does not prevent superior BPDUs from winning election. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Root protection against rogue core case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Force all redundant ports into permanent forwarding state. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Making redundant ports forward simultaneously can introduce a Layer 2 loop and broadcast storm. This distinction matters because RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
B:Removing STP protection can permit the unauthorized bridge to create a forwarding loop. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Unexpected BPDU on edge port case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Force all redundant ports into permanent forwarding state. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Making redundant ports forward simultaneously can introduce a Layer 2 loop and broadcast storm. This distinction matters because RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
D:Layer 3 route preference does not determine Layer 2 spanning-tree root or port roles. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Per-VLAN spanning-tree path case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Force all redundant ports into permanent forwarding state. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Making redundant ports forward simultaneously can introduce a Layer 2 loop and broadcast storm. This distinction matters because RSTP holds alternate paths in a discarding state to avoid loops, then can rapidly transition a suitable alternate after the active path fails.
Question 863
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: After cloning a PE template, two routers use the same OSPF router ID and the topology shows conflicting advertisements. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Change the syslog hostname but keep the duplicate router IDs." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Router-ID identity is not an OSPF path-cost control knob.
- Syslog names are not OSPF originator identifiers, so the underlying conflict remains.
- Unilateral removal of authentication does not establish a trusted matching configuration and weakens control-plane protection.
- Blanket redistribution can expose management and unrelated customer networks and create routing instability.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Syslog names are not OSPF originator identifiers, so the underlying conflict remains. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Change the syslog hostname but keep the duplicate router IDs. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Assign and verify a unique stable OSPF router ID for each router, then refresh affected neighbor state.
Incorrect Answers
A:Router-ID identity is not an OSPF path-cost control knob. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated OSPF metric path preference case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the syslog hostname but keep the duplicate router IDs. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Syslog names are not OSPF originator identifiers, so the underlying conflict remains. This distinction matters because OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
C:Unilateral removal of authentication does not establish a trusted matching configuration and weakens control-plane protection. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated OSPF authentication key mismatch case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the syslog hostname but keep the duplicate router IDs. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Syslog names are not OSPF originator identifiers, so the underlying conflict remains. This distinction matters because OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
D:Blanket redistribution can expose management and unrelated customer networks and create routing instability. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated OSPF export policy omission case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the syslog hostname but keep the duplicate router IDs. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Syslog names are not OSPF originator identifiers, so the underlying conflict remains. This distinction matters because OSPF router IDs uniquely identify LSA originators and participating routers within the routing domain.
Question 864
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A prefix is received from a valid BGP peer but remains unusable because the advertised BGP next hop has no resolving route in the local table. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Increase BGP local preference on a route whose next hop remains unreachable." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary.
- A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop.
- Interface IPv6 addressing alone does not authorize or exchange BGP inet6 unicast NLRI.
- Suppressing logs hides liveness evidence and cannot repair lost control traffic or poorly chosen timers.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Increase BGP local preference on a route whose next hop remains unreachable. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that BGP next-hop reachability is a prerequisite to making a received route eligible for active forwarding and path selection. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Restore IGP or static reachability for the intended BGP next hop, or apply the correct next-hop policy where design requires it.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP import policy leak case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Increase BGP local preference on a route whose next hop remains unreachable. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop. This distinction matters because BGP next-hop reachability is a prerequisite to making a received route eligible for active forwarding and path selection.
C:Interface IPv6 addressing alone does not authorize or exchange BGP inet6 unicast NLRI. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP IPv6 family inactive case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Increase BGP local preference on a route whose next hop remains unreachable. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop. This distinction matters because BGP next-hop reachability is a prerequisite to making a received route eligible for active forwarding and path selection.
D:Suppressing logs hides liveness evidence and cannot repair lost control traffic or poorly chosen timers. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP peer flap from mismatched hold timers case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Increase BGP local preference on a route whose next hop remains unreachable. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that A higher preference cannot create a missing recursive path to a BGP next hop. This distinction matters because BGP next-hop reachability is a prerequisite to making a received route eligible for active forwarding and path selection.
Question 865
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: An LDP session is operational, but a destination FEC lacks the usable outgoing label that an ingress PE expects to use. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Assume that an Operational LDP session alone proves all labeled destinations work." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Suppressing alarms cannot provide a precomputed alternate label-switched route.
- Session establishment says nothing about whether an individual FEC has a usable label mapping.
- Renumbering a destination node SID does not inherently specify a new intermediate route sequence.
- IP TTL does not control implicit-null versus explicit-null label disposition.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Session establishment says nothing about whether an individual FEC has a usable label mapping. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Assume that an Operational LDP session alone proves all labeled destinations work. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that LDP maps forwarding equivalence classes to labels learned from the downstream next hop; a session can be up without an applicable mapping for every FEC. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Verify FEC route reachability, neighbor label advertisement and the label mapping installed for the specific destination.
Incorrect Answers
A:Suppressing alarms cannot provide a precomputed alternate label-switched route. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated RSVP link protection plan case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Assume that an Operational LDP session alone proves all labeled destinations work. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Session establishment says nothing about whether an individual FEC has a usable label mapping. This distinction matters because LDP maps forwarding equivalence classes to labels learned from the downstream next hop; a session can be up without an applicable mapping for every FEC.
C:Renumbering a destination node SID does not inherently specify a new intermediate route sequence. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated SR-MPLS node-SID shortest path case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Assume that an Operational LDP session alone proves all labeled destinations work. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Session establishment says nothing about whether an individual FEC has a usable label mapping. This distinction matters because LDP maps forwarding equivalence classes to labels learned from the downstream next hop; a session can be up without an applicable mapping for every FEC.
D:IP TTL does not control implicit-null versus explicit-null label disposition. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Explicit-null forwarding case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Assume that an Operational LDP session alone proves all labeled destinations work. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Session establishment says nothing about whether an individual FEC has a usable label mapping. This distinction matters because LDP maps forwarding equivalence classes to labels learned from the downstream next hop; a session can be up without an applicable mapping for every FEC.
Question 866
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A route is active locally but a new eBGP customer cannot see it because the intended route has no matching BGP export acceptance. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Disable all export filtering so the full routing table is advertised to the customer." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Router IDs are late tie-breakers and duplicating them cannot replace proper MED comparison or policy.
- Suppressing logs hides liveness evidence and cannot repair lost control traffic or poorly chosen timers.
- ECMP settings do not allow an eBGP session to cross an intermediate hop when multihop is missing.
- Unbounded export may disclose internal prefixes or become a source of accidental Internet route leaks.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Unbounded export may disclose internal prefixes or become a source of accidental Internet route leaks. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Disable all export filtering so the full routing table is advertised to the customer. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that BGP route advertisements are shaped by export routing policy and eligibility rather than the mere presence of a route in inet.0. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Apply an export policy that permits precisely the required public prefix to the designated neighbor and rejects unrelated routes.
Incorrect Answers
A:Router IDs are late tie-breakers and duplicating them cannot replace proper MED comparison or policy. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP MED comparison scope case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all export filtering so the full routing table is advertised to the customer. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Unbounded export may disclose internal prefixes or become a source of accidental Internet route leaks. This distinction matters because BGP route advertisements are shaped by export routing policy and eligibility rather than the mere presence of a route in inet.0.
B:Suppressing logs hides liveness evidence and cannot repair lost control traffic or poorly chosen timers. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP peer flap from mismatched hold timers case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all export filtering so the full routing table is advertised to the customer. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Unbounded export may disclose internal prefixes or become a source of accidental Internet route leaks. This distinction matters because BGP route advertisements are shaped by export routing policy and eligibility rather than the mere presence of a route in inet.0.
C:ECMP settings do not allow an eBGP session to cross an intermediate hop when multihop is missing. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated EBGP multihop peering case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all export filtering so the full routing table is advertised to the customer. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Unbounded export may disclose internal prefixes or become a source of accidental Internet route leaks. This distinction matters because BGP route advertisements are shaped by export routing policy and eligibility rather than the mere presence of a route in inet.0.
Question 867
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: An infrastructure route is present in inet.0 but absent from a secondary table whose applications depend on that route, and operators assume all tables automatically share entries. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Change the router hostname to match the routing-instance name." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Physical link-up does not establish downstream forwarding correctness beyond the adjacent hop.
- Changing accounting counters does not change first-match classification or forwarding decisions.
- More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports.
- Hostname changes do not import a route between separate routing information bases.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Hostname changes do not import a route between separate routing information bases. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Change the router hostname to match the routing-instance name. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that Routing instances and RIBs are isolated unless routes are explicitly installed or copied into other tables through supported mechanisms. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Configure and test the intended RIB group or specific controlled route import into the appropriate secondary routing table.
Incorrect Answers
A:Physical link-up does not establish downstream forwarding correctness beyond the adjacent hop. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Static backup blackhole case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the router hostname to match the routing-instance name. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Hostname changes do not import a route between separate routing information bases. This distinction matters because Routing instances and RIBs are isolated unless routes are explicitly installed or copied into other tables through supported mechanisms.
B:Changing accounting counters does not change first-match classification or forwarding decisions. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Filter policy overmatch case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the router hostname to match the routing-instance name. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Hostname changes do not import a route between separate routing information bases. This distinction matters because Routing instances and RIBs are isolated unless routes are explicitly installed or copied into other tables through supported mechanisms.
C:More defaults can increase unintended connectivity without removing unauthorized route imports. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated Routing instance cross-leak case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change the router hostname to match the routing-instance name. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Hostname changes do not import a route between separate routing information bases. This distinction matters because Routing instances and RIBs are isolated unless routes are explicitly installed or copied into other tables through supported mechanisms.
Question 868
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: Small IPv6 pings succeed over a provider path but larger sessions stall because an intermediate filter blocks Packet Too Big messages needed by IPv6 Path MTU Discovery. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Disable all ICMPv6 control traffic for a presumed hardening improvement." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- IPv6 route configuration alone cannot deliver IPv6 payload across an IPv4-only segment with no encapsulation path.
- Blocking needed ICMPv6 breaks IPv6 control mechanisms including Path MTU Discovery.
- An IPv4 route cannot supply the missing IPv6 link-local scope or next-hop selection.
- IPv4 path preference cannot create missing IPv6 NLRI negotiation or advertisement.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Blocking needed ICMPv6 breaks IPv6 control mechanisms including Path MTU Discovery. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Disable all ICMPv6 control traffic for a presumed hardening improvement. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that IPv6 routers do not fragment transit packets; working Path MTU Discovery relies on ICMPv6 errors when packets exceed a path MTU. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Permit required ICMPv6 Packet Too Big signaling and align encapsulation MTU with the supported end-to-end path.
Incorrect Answers
A:IPv6 route configuration alone cannot deliver IPv6 payload across an IPv4-only segment with no encapsulation path. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IPv6 over IPv4 transit tunnel case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all ICMPv6 control traffic for a presumed hardening improvement. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Blocking needed ICMPv6 breaks IPv6 control mechanisms including Path MTU Discovery. This distinction matters because IPv6 routers do not fragment transit packets; working Path MTU Discovery relies on ICMPv6 errors when packets exceed a path MTU.
C:An IPv4 route cannot supply the missing IPv6 link-local scope or next-hop selection. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IPv6 static link-local next hop case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all ICMPv6 control traffic for a presumed hardening improvement. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Blocking needed ICMPv6 breaks IPv6 control mechanisms including Path MTU Discovery. This distinction matters because IPv6 routers do not fragment transit packets; working Path MTU Discovery relies on ICMPv6 errors when packets exceed a path MTU.
D:IPv4 path preference cannot create missing IPv6 NLRI negotiation or advertisement. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IPv6 BGP NLRI family omitted case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Disable all ICMPv6 control traffic for a presumed hardening improvement. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Blocking needed ICMPv6 breaks IPv6 control mechanisms including Path MTU Discovery. This distinction matters because IPv6 routers do not fragment transit packets; working Path MTU Discovery relies on ICMPv6 errors when packets exceed a path MTU.
Question 869
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: An IBGP session targets a remote loopback but the local router sources traffic from a physical interface not permitted by its peer, so the BGP connection fails. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Change only the BGP local preference while keeping the incorrect source." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary.
- OSPF LAN DR election settings do not modify the BGP path attributes being compared.
- Interface IPv6 addressing alone does not authorize or exchange BGP inet6 unicast NLRI.
- Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Change only the BGP local preference while keeping the incorrect source. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Configure a consistent local BGP source address and ensure both loopbacks are reachable through the IGP or static routing design.
Incorrect Answers
A:Remote-side policy is outside local control and does not enforce an explicit receiving security boundary. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP import policy leak case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change only the BGP local preference while keeping the incorrect source. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability. This distinction matters because IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
B:OSPF LAN DR election settings do not modify the BGP path attributes being compared. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP AS-path comparison case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change only the BGP local preference while keeping the incorrect source. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability. This distinction matters because IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
C:Interface IPv6 addressing alone does not authorize or exchange BGP inet6 unicast NLRI. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated BGP IPv6 family inactive case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Change only the BGP local preference while keeping the incorrect source. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Local preference governs route choice and does not change TCP source address or peer reachability. This distinction matters because IBGP loopback peering depends on correct local address selection and recursive reachability to the configured peer endpoint.
Question 870
During a controlled acceptance rehearsal of the same defect on a separate test network, engineers observe: A core node repeatedly ages out IS-IS LSPs from one neighbor, leaving intermittent missing routes and shortened adjacency uptime. An engineer suggests the shortcut: "Add a permanent static route for every intermittent IS-IS destination." Which critique explains the specific risk of that shortcut?
- OSPF election settings are unrelated to IS-IS DIS selection on the LAN.
- Mass static redistribution adds scale and maintenance risk instead of using the designed hierarchy.
- Premature transit eligibility can blackhole traffic while the node has incomplete routing state.
- Static routes conceal incomplete flooding and can become incorrect during legitimate topology changes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Static routes conceal incomplete flooding and can become incorrect during legitimate topology changes. In this controlled acceptance rehearsal the shortcut was explicitly proposed as: Add a permanent static route for every intermittent IS-IS destination. It fails to resolve the underlying problem that IS-IS LSP sequence, remaining lifetime and flooding determine which topology information survives in the LSDB. A sound alternative is the targeted engineering action: Investigate LSP flooding and neighbor stability, repairing the actual control-plane loss and refreshing current topology information.
Incorrect Answers
A:OSPF election settings are unrelated to IS-IS DIS selection on the LAN. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IS-IS DIS election surprise case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a permanent static route for every intermittent IS-IS destination. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Static routes conceal incomplete flooding and can become incorrect during legitimate topology changes. This distinction matters because IS-IS LSP sequence, remaining lifetime and flooding determine which topology information survives in the LSDB.
B:Mass static redistribution adds scale and maintenance risk instead of using the designed hierarchy. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IS-IS Level 1 exit default case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a permanent static route for every intermittent IS-IS destination. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Static routes conceal incomplete flooding and can become incorrect during legitimate topology changes. This distinction matters because IS-IS LSP sequence, remaining lifetime and flooding determine which topology information survives in the LSDB.
C:Premature transit eligibility can blackhole traffic while the node has incomplete routing state. That critique concerns a shortcut from the unrelated IS-IS overload-state recovery case. The shortcut actually proposed in this controlled acceptance rehearsal is: Add a permanent static route for every intermittent IS-IS destination. It should be rejected for the narrower reason that Static routes conceal incomplete flooding and can become incorrect during legitimate topology changes. This distinction matters because IS-IS LSP sequence, remaining lifetime and flooding determine which topology information survives in the LSDB.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests