Question 360
Which mechanism correctly explains Service account identity isolation in this security case: A compromised nonproduction job must not gain the production service account's permissions?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The operative mechanism for Service account identity isolation: Bind each runtime to its own dedicated service account and avoid granting cross-impersonation rights without need. For this scenario (a compromised nonproduction job must not gain the production service account's permissions), verify that a nonproduction token cannot impersonate or act as the production service account.
Incorrect Answers
This describes how Default service account privilege hardening works instead: Explicitly disable automatic privileged defaults where applicable and minimize or remove legacy bindings on default accounts. It is useful when a security review finds an unused default service account with persistent overly broad grants, but it does not explain the selected Service account identity isolation for the current requirement (a compromised nonproduction job must not gain the production service account's permissions).
This describes how Disable service account key creation works instead: Use the appropriate organization policy constraint restricting service account key creation across the intended hierarchy. It is useful when a fleet migration has eliminated json keys and needs a preventative guardrail against their reintroduction, but it does not explain the selected Service account identity isolation for the current requirement (a compromised nonproduction job must not gain the production service account's permissions).
This describes how Service account key audit and rotation works instead: Inventory and audit key use, migrate clients to short-lived identities when possible, and carefully disable or rotate exposed keys. It is useful when a rotation procedure must retire compromised credentials without interrupting a running batch workload, but it does not explain the selected Service account identity isolation for the current requirement (a compromised nonproduction job must not gain the production service account's permissions).






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