Pass Your CompTIA CAS-005 Exam Easy!

Correcting certificate trust and EAP server/client identity validation would not revalidate identity proofing and audit the authenticator enrollment. MFA security depends on secure registration and recovery.

Biometrics are not infallible or universally usable. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: an enterprise deploys facial biometrics without a fallback for users whose characteristics are unreadable. The proper immediate action is to revalidate identity proofing and audit the authenticator enrollment.

Identity and access control would not revalidate identity proofing and audit the authenticator enrollment. MFA security depends on secure registration and recovery.

Correcting the relying-party audience configuration and verifying intended recipient would not update trusted signing certificates through approved metadata rollover.

The current facts call for this action: update trusted signing certificates through approved metadata rollover.

Rejecting the response and repairing nonce binding in the client flow would not update trusted signing certificates through approved metadata rollover.

The reported condition calls for this action: Assign scoped identities and rotate secrets from a managed vault.

The current facts call for this action: assign scoped identities and rotate secrets from a managed vault.

Temporary access lowers persistent privilege. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: a system administrator has global standing access for an infrequent quarterly task. The proper immediate action is to assign scoped identities and rotate secrets from a managed vault.

The current facts call for this action: apply continuous access evaluation or revoke relevant sessions and tokens.

Successful initial sign-in does not satisfy every action's assurance need. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: a privileged account signs in from a managed device but a sensitive action lacks required step-up. The proper immediate action is to apply continuous access evaluation or revoke relevant sessions and tokens.

The reported condition calls for this action: Apply continuous access evaluation or revoke relevant sessions and tokens.

Restoring time synchronization would not resolve the duplicate SPN and validate the intended service binding.

Captured service credentials can support unauthorized reuse. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: a legacy app stores a service ticket in a shared location accessible to other processes. The proper immediate action is to resolve the duplicate SPN and validate the intended service binding.

Investigating the requesting host, ticket types and approved service behavior would not resolve the duplicate SPN and validate the intended service binding.

Fixing unique subject mapping and validating identity association would not reject the response and repair nonce binding in the client flow.

The current facts call for this action: reject the response and repair nonce binding in the client flow.

Updating trusted signing certificates through approved metadata rollover would not reject the response and repair nonce binding in the client flow.

The reported condition calls for this action: Protect ticket caches and constrain service account access.

The current facts call for this action: protect ticket caches and constrain service account access.

Unusual Kerberos patterns require contextual validation. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: a service account suddenly requests tickets for many unrelated resources. The proper immediate action is to protect ticket caches and constrain service account access.

The current facts call for this action: correct certificate trust and EAP server/client identity validation.

Biometrics are not infallible or universally usable. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: an enterprise deploys facial biometrics without a fallback for users whose characteristics are unreadable. The proper immediate action is to correct certificate trust and EAP server/client identity validation.

The reported condition calls for this action: Correct certificate trust and EAP server/client identity validation.

Treat the app as a public client and use a suitable PKCE-based flow would not validate issuer, token audience, signature and scope.

Account state changes do not automatically invalidate every token. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: an administrator disables an account but its refresh tokens remain accepted by the SaaS service. The proper immediate action is to validate issuer, token audience, signature and scope before authorization.

Reduce delegated permissions and review consent authorization would not validate issuer, token audience, signature and scope.

Using trusted identity provider and network signals in conditions would not preserve method claims and policy evaluation evidence for review.

The current facts call for this action: preserve method claims and policy evaluation evidence for review.

Applying continuous access evaluation or revoke relevant sessions and tokens would not preserve method claims and policy evaluation evidence for review.

The reported condition calls for this action: Test controlled emergency sign-in and record independent monitoring.

The current facts call for this action: test controlled emergency sign-in and record independent monitoring.

Shared long-lived credentials magnify compromise impact. The scenario does not present the alternate condition: a service account uses the same password across a fleet and has no rotation ownership. The proper immediate action is to test controlled emergency sign-in and record independent monitoring.