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This concern applies to gNMI SAMPLE telemetry mode in a different scenario where operators need to collect interface counters at a predictable periodic cadence. For the deployed gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription approach, the relevant caution is instead that not every model path supports ON_CHANGE semantics.

This concern applies to NSO service model intent mapping in a different scenario where operators need to deploy a repeatable multi-router service from a single declarative service request. For the deployed gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription approach, the relevant caution is instead that not every model path supports ON_CHANGE semantics.

This concern applies to SNMP community versus user model in a different scenario where operators need to remove shared plaintext-community access from a sensitive provider management network. For the deployed gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription approach, the relevant caution is instead that not every model path supports ON_CHANGE semantics.

gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription instead addresses a different condition: receive notifications only when eligible operational state leaves change. It would instead require you to configure ON_CHANGE for supported state paths rather than fixed polling, not the stated goal to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors.

Terraform plan before apply instead addresses a different condition: review configuration impact before making a broad service-provider change. It would instead require you to generate and approve the infrastructure plan prior to applying, not the stated goal to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors.

Terraform state consistency instead addresses a different condition: track provisioned infrastructure objects and detect changes against code. It would instead require you to use controlled Terraform state with secure remote locking and versioning, not the stated goal to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors.

The proposed step is for gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription, whose purpose is to receive notifications only when eligible operational state leaves change. It would not perform the necessary gNMI mutual TLS authentication operation: configure TLS certificates with compatible peer verification for gRPC management.

The proposed step is for Terraform plan before apply, whose purpose is to review configuration impact before making a broad service-provider change. It would not perform the necessary gNMI mutual TLS authentication operation: configure TLS certificates with compatible peer verification for gRPC management.

The proposed step is for Terraform state consistency, whose purpose is to track provisioned infrastructure objects and detect changes against code. It would not perform the necessary gNMI mutual TLS authentication operation: configure TLS certificates with compatible peer verification for gRPC management.

The observation would verify gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription under the separate requirement to receive notifications only when eligible operational state leaves change. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI mutual TLS authentication result: an authorized collector completes mTLS and an untrusted peer is rejected.

The observation would verify Terraform plan before apply under the separate requirement to review configuration impact before making a broad service-provider change. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI mutual TLS authentication result: an authorized collector completes mTLS and an untrusted peer is rejected.

The observation would verify Terraform state consistency under the separate requirement to track provisioned infrastructure objects and detect changes against code. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI mutual TLS authentication result: an authorized collector completes mTLS and an untrusted peer is rejected.

This defect belongs to gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription, where the affected outcome is to receive notifications only when eligible operational state leaves change. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI mutual TLS authentication design in this case: the management service accepts any certificate with verification disabled.

This defect belongs to Terraform plan before apply, where the affected outcome is to review configuration impact before making a broad service-provider change. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI mutual TLS authentication design in this case: the management service accepts any certificate with verification disabled.

This defect belongs to Terraform state consistency, where the affected outcome is to track provisioned infrastructure objects and detect changes against code. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI mutual TLS authentication design in this case: the management service accepts any certificate with verification disabled.

This concern applies to gNMI ON_CHANGE subscription in a different scenario where operators need to receive notifications only when eligible operational state leaves change. For the deployed gNMI mutual TLS authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that certificate expiration can interrupt subscription delivery.

This concern applies to Terraform plan before apply in a different scenario where operators need to review configuration impact before making a broad service-provider change. For the deployed gNMI mutual TLS authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that certificate expiration can interrupt subscription delivery.

This concern applies to Terraform state consistency in a different scenario where operators need to track provisioned infrastructure objects and detect changes against code. For the deployed gNMI mutual TLS authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that certificate expiration can interrupt subscription delivery.

gNMI mutual TLS authentication instead addresses a different condition: restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors. It would instead require you to configure TLS certificates with compatible peer verification for gRPC management, not the stated goal to subscribe to a narrow BGP neighbor state subtree instead of all device operational nodes.

RESTCONF management endpoint selection instead addresses a different condition: read YANG-modeled configuration from a device using an authenticated HTTPS client. It would instead require you to enable supported RESTCONF and query the intended data resource over TLS, not the stated goal to subscribe to a narrow BGP neighbor state subtree instead of all device operational nodes.

YANG operational versus config state instead addresses a different condition: separate a read-only interface counter from an editable interface configuration leaf. It would instead require you to use YANG config false operational nodes for observed state and config true nodes for settings, not the stated goal to subscribe to a narrow BGP neighbor state subtree instead of all device operational nodes.

The proposed step is for gNMI mutual TLS authentication, whose purpose is to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors. It would not perform the necessary gNMI model path targeting operation: select a supported specific YANG path for the gNMI subscription.

The proposed step is for RESTCONF management endpoint selection, whose purpose is to read YANG-modeled configuration from a device using an authenticated HTTPS client. It would not perform the necessary gNMI model path targeting operation: select a supported specific YANG path for the gNMI subscription.

The proposed step is for YANG operational versus config state, whose purpose is to separate a read-only interface counter from an editable interface configuration leaf. It would not perform the necessary gNMI model path targeting operation: select a supported specific YANG path for the gNMI subscription.

The observation would verify gNMI mutual TLS authentication under the separate requirement to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI model path targeting result: updates carry the desired neighbor status without a full device state dump.

The observation would verify RESTCONF management endpoint selection under the separate requirement to read YANG-modeled configuration from a device using an authenticated HTTPS client. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI model path targeting result: updates carry the desired neighbor status without a full device state dump.

The observation would verify YANG operational versus config state under the separate requirement to separate a read-only interface counter from an editable interface configuration leaf. It does not demonstrate the needed gNMI model path targeting result: updates carry the desired neighbor status without a full device state dump.

This defect belongs to gNMI mutual TLS authentication, where the affected outcome is to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI model path targeting design in this case: the collector subscribes to an unrelated interface subtree.

This defect belongs to RESTCONF management endpoint selection, where the affected outcome is to read YANG-modeled configuration from a device using an authenticated HTTPS client. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI model path targeting design in this case: the collector subscribes to an unrelated interface subtree.

This defect belongs to YANG operational versus config state, where the affected outcome is to separate a read-only interface counter from an editable interface configuration leaf. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the gNMI model path targeting design in this case: the collector subscribes to an unrelated interface subtree.

This concern applies to gNMI mutual TLS authentication in a different scenario where operators need to restrict streaming telemetry to approved mutually authenticated collectors. For the deployed gNMI model path targeting approach, the relevant caution is instead that data-model revisions may change paths and translation requirements.

This concern applies to RESTCONF management endpoint selection in a different scenario where operators need to read YANG-modeled configuration from a device using an authenticated HTTPS client. For the deployed gNMI model path targeting approach, the relevant caution is instead that data-model revisions may change paths and translation requirements.

This concern applies to YANG operational versus config state in a different scenario where operators need to separate a read-only interface counter from an editable interface configuration leaf. For the deployed gNMI model path targeting approach, the relevant caution is instead that data-model revisions may change paths and translation requirements.