Question 350
After Harbor Metro deploys BGP neighbor TCP authentication to ensure an external BGP session establishes only with peers possessing the agreed session authentication material, the primary acceptance check passes (the BGP neighbor reaches Established only when peers use matching authentication keys). What remaining operational risk should still be part of the design review?
- EBGP policy and prefix filtering are still required after peering forms.
- Key rotation and credential synchronization must avoid unexpected peering outages.
- Key rollover must avoid transient adjacency loss.
- Local preference is an internal-AS policy and not exported to eBGP peers.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The relevant boundary of BGP neighbor TCP authentication is that key rotation and credential synchronization must avoid unexpected peering outages. Passing the acceptance test does not eliminate this residual operational risk.
Incorrect Answers
A:This concern applies to BGP remote AS alignment in a different scenario where operators need to form an external BGP peering between provider and customer autonomous systems. For the deployed BGP neighbor TCP authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that key rotation and credential synchronization must avoid unexpected peering outages.
C:This concern applies to OSPF authentication consistency in a different scenario where operators need to prevent unauthenticated route participation across a core adjacency. For the deployed BGP neighbor TCP authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that key rotation and credential synchronization must avoid unexpected peering outages.
D:This concern applies to BGP local preference exit policy in a different scenario where operators need to make internal routers prefer one provider egress for outbound traffic. For the deployed BGP neighbor TCP authentication approach, the relevant caution is instead that key rotation and credential synchronization must avoid unexpected peering outages.
Question 351
Summit Service Provider must diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB. The operator is comparing several service-provider methods. Which design or control directly addresses that stated requirement?
- IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency
- NSR control-plane failover
- BGP next-hop resolution failure
- OSPF designated router election
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:BGP next-hop resolution failure matches this requirement: the team should check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop. A relevant outcome would be that the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency instead addresses a different condition: restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It would instead require you to align supported MTU and adjacency parameters on both connected interfaces, not the stated goal to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB.
B:NSR control-plane failover instead addresses a different condition: preserve routing protocol state across a supported redundant control processor switchover. It would instead require you to enable and verify nonstop routing on eligible platform and protocol instances, not the stated goal to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB.
D:OSPF designated router election instead addresses a different condition: reduce adjacency overhead on a shared broadcast Ethernet segment. It would instead require you to choose OSPF network type and DR priorities intentionally on the multiaccess network, not the stated goal to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB.
Question 352
At Ridgeway Networks, the engineering change is approved for BGP next-hop resolution failure. The specific goal is to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB. Which implementation step belongs in this change plan?
- Align supported MTU and adjacency parameters on both connected interfaces.
- Enable and verify nonstop routing on eligible platform and protocol instances.
- Choose OSPF network type and DR priorities intentionally on the multiaccess network.
- Check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Implementing BGP next-hop resolution failure requires the operator to check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop. This makes the required goal testable using evidence that the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:The proposed step is for IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency, whose purpose is to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It would not perform the necessary BGP next-hop resolution failure operation: check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop.
B:The proposed step is for NSR control-plane failover, whose purpose is to preserve routing protocol state across a supported redundant control processor switchover. It would not perform the necessary BGP next-hop resolution failure operation: check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop.
C:The proposed step is for OSPF designated router election, whose purpose is to reduce adjacency overhead on a shared broadcast Ethernet segment. It would not perform the necessary BGP next-hop resolution failure operation: check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop.
Question 353
Lakeside Transport has deployed BGP next-hop resolution failure to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB. The implementation step was to check recursion and IGP reachability for the advertised BGP next hop. Which observation demonstrates that the requested service is working?
- The BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
- The adjacency reaches Up after the mismatch is corrected.
- Adjacencies and route state survive a planned RP switchover without full reconvergence.
- The intended DR and BDR appear in OSPF neighbor and interface status.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:For BGP next-hop resolution failure, successful verification means that the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface. That evidence directly tests whether the provider can diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB after deployment.
Incorrect Answers
B:The observation would verify IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency under the separate requirement to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP next-hop resolution failure result: the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
C:The observation would verify NSR control-plane failover under the separate requirement to preserve routing protocol state across a supported redundant control processor switchover. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP next-hop resolution failure result: the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
D:The observation would verify OSPF designated router election under the separate requirement to reduce adjacency overhead on a shared broadcast Ethernet segment. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP next-hop resolution failure result: the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
Question 354
While troubleshooting BGP next-hop resolution failure at Coastal Communications, the intended acceptance outcome is still missing: the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface. Which fault condition should be investigated first for this particular design?
- Routing export policy is changed although hello padding still fails.
- More BGP prefixes are advertised while the existing next hop remains unreachable.
- Only BGP graceful restart is configured and assumed identical to NSR.
- Point-to-point behavior is assumed for a many-router Ethernet network.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:The suspected defect directly frustrates BGP next-hop resolution failure: more BGP prefixes are advertised while the existing next hop remains unreachable. Correcting it should allow verification that the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface.
Incorrect Answers
A:This defect belongs to IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency, where the affected outcome is to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP next-hop resolution failure design in this case: more BGP prefixes are advertised while the existing next hop remains unreachable.
C:This defect belongs to NSR control-plane failover, where the affected outcome is to preserve routing protocol state across a supported redundant control processor switchover. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP next-hop resolution failure design in this case: more BGP prefixes are advertised while the existing next hop remains unreachable.
D:This defect belongs to OSPF designated router election, where the affected outcome is to reduce adjacency overhead on a shared broadcast Ethernet segment. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP next-hop resolution failure design in this case: more BGP prefixes are advertised while the existing next hop remains unreachable.
Question 355
After Bluebird Infrastructure deploys BGP next-hop resolution failure to diagnose a valid BGP route absent from the forwarding RIB, the primary acceptance check passes (the BGP path becomes usable when the next hop resolves to a valid interface). What remaining operational risk should still be part of the design review?
- An MTU increase needs to be supported across the physical path.
- NSR requires platform and peer-specific feature support.
- The preferred control-plane path is not necessarily an installable FIB path.
- DR priority changes alone do not always trigger immediate reelection.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The relevant boundary of BGP next-hop resolution failure is that the preferred control-plane path is not necessarily an installable FIB path. Passing the acceptance test does not eliminate this residual operational risk.
Incorrect Answers
A:This concern applies to IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency in a different scenario where operators need to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. For the deployed BGP next-hop resolution failure approach, the relevant caution is instead that the preferred control-plane path is not necessarily an installable FIB path.
B:This concern applies to NSR control-plane failover in a different scenario where operators need to preserve routing protocol state across a supported redundant control processor switchover. For the deployed BGP next-hop resolution failure approach, the relevant caution is instead that the preferred control-plane path is not necessarily an installable FIB path.
D:This concern applies to OSPF designated router election in a different scenario where operators need to reduce adjacency overhead on a shared broadcast Ethernet segment. For the deployed BGP next-hop resolution failure approach, the relevant caution is instead that the preferred control-plane path is not necessarily an installable FIB path.
Question 356
Horizon Exchange must stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors. The operator is comparing several service-provider methods. Which design or control directly addresses that stated requirement?
- BGP route reflector scale
- IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency
- RPL route policy execution order
- BGP route reflection loop prevention
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:BGP route reflection loop prevention matches this requirement: the team should use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design. A relevant outcome would be that paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
Incorrect Answers
A:BGP route reflector scale instead addresses a different condition: avoid a full mesh of iBGP peer sessions across a large provider AS. It would instead require you to designate route reflectors and client sessions with suitable cluster identity, not the stated goal to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors.
B:IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency instead addresses a different condition: restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It would instead require you to align supported MTU and adjacency parameters on both connected interfaces, not the stated goal to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors.
C:RPL route policy execution order instead addresses a different condition: apply an explicit route reject before a broad default permit condition. It would instead require you to order route-policy clauses so the narrow deny is evaluated first, not the stated goal to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors.
Question 357
At Cedar Wireless, the engineering change is approved for BGP route reflection loop prevention. The specific goal is to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors. Which implementation step belongs in this change plan?
- Use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design.
- Designate route reflectors and client sessions with suitable cluster identity.
- Align supported MTU and adjacency parameters on both connected interfaces.
- Order route-policy clauses so the narrow deny is evaluated first.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Implementing BGP route reflection loop prevention requires the operator to use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design. This makes the required goal testable using evidence that paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
Incorrect Answers
B:The proposed step is for BGP route reflector scale, whose purpose is to avoid a full mesh of iBGP peer sessions across a large provider AS. It would not perform the necessary BGP route reflection loop prevention operation: use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design.
C:The proposed step is for IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency, whose purpose is to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It would not perform the necessary BGP route reflection loop prevention operation: use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design.
D:The proposed step is for RPL route policy execution order, whose purpose is to apply an explicit route reject before a broad default permit condition. It would not perform the necessary BGP route reflection loop prevention operation: use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design.
Question 358
Willow Regional has deployed BGP route reflection loop prevention to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors. The implementation step was to use correct originator-ID and cluster-list behavior for the reflector design. Which observation demonstrates that the requested service is working?
- Client routes are reflected to eligible internal peers without a full mesh.
- Paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
- The adjacency reaches Up after the mismatch is corrected.
- The prohibited prefix is rejected while unrelated eligible routes pass.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:For BGP route reflection loop prevention, successful verification means that paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate. That evidence directly tests whether the provider can stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors after deployment.
Incorrect Answers
A:The observation would verify BGP route reflector scale under the separate requirement to avoid a full mesh of iBGP peer sessions across a large provider AS. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP route reflection loop prevention result: paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
C:The observation would verify IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency under the separate requirement to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP route reflection loop prevention result: paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
D:The observation would verify RPL route policy execution order under the separate requirement to apply an explicit route reject before a broad default permit condition. It does not demonstrate the needed BGP route reflection loop prevention result: paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
Question 359
While troubleshooting BGP route reflection loop prevention at Atlas Backbone, the intended acceptance outcome is still missing: paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate. Which fault condition should be investigated first for this particular design?
- Ordinary iBGP split-horizon behavior prevents a route reaching other clients.
- Routing export policy is changed although hello padding still fails.
- Route-reflector clients are chained without preserving loop-control attributes.
- A broad pass condition precedes the deny so the prohibition never executes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The suspected defect directly frustrates BGP route reflection loop prevention: route-reflector clients are chained without preserving loop-control attributes. Correcting it should allow verification that paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate.
Incorrect Answers
A:This defect belongs to BGP route reflector scale, where the affected outcome is to avoid a full mesh of iBGP peer sessions across a large provider AS. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP route reflection loop prevention design in this case: route-reflector clients are chained without preserving loop-control attributes.
B:This defect belongs to IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency, where the affected outcome is to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP route reflection loop prevention design in this case: route-reflector clients are chained without preserving loop-control attributes.
D:This defect belongs to RPL route policy execution order, where the affected outcome is to apply an explicit route reject before a broad default permit condition. It is not the direct failure mode identified for the BGP route reflection loop prevention design in this case: route-reflector clients are chained without preserving loop-control attributes.
Question 360
After Starlight IP Services deploys BGP route reflection loop prevention to stop reflected paths from looping among route reflectors, the primary acceptance check passes (paths with the local originator or reflector cluster are rejected as appropriate). What remaining operational risk should still be part of the design review?
- Reflector placement and redundancy shape convergence and path visibility.
- An MTU increase needs to be supported across the physical path.
- Policy ordering should be tested with representative matched and unmatched routes.
- Badly designed reflector clusters can hide alternative routes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:The relevant boundary of BGP route reflection loop prevention is that badly designed reflector clusters can hide alternative routes. Passing the acceptance test does not eliminate this residual operational risk.
Incorrect Answers
A:This concern applies to BGP route reflector scale in a different scenario where operators need to avoid a full mesh of iBGP peer sessions across a large provider AS. For the deployed BGP route reflection loop prevention approach, the relevant caution is instead that badly designed reflector clusters can hide alternative routes.
B:This concern applies to IS-IS adjacency MTU consistency in a different scenario where operators need to restore an IS-IS neighbor relationship failing due to mismatched interface MTUs. For the deployed BGP route reflection loop prevention approach, the relevant caution is instead that badly designed reflector clusters can hide alternative routes.
C:This concern applies to RPL route policy execution order in a different scenario where operators need to apply an explicit route reject before a broad default permit condition. For the deployed BGP route reflection loop prevention approach, the relevant caution is instead that badly designed reflector clusters can hide alternative routes.
Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR) (350-501) Practice Tests