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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: No translations are created for packets that otherwise match the source ACL. Here the recorded observation is: each router reports local HSRP state but hosts see intermittent default-gateway ARP behavior. The applicable cause is: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Clients keep forwarding through an HSRP Active router with no WAN path. Here the recorded observation is: each router reports local HSRP state but hosts see intermittent default-gateway ARP behavior. The applicable cause is: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The lower-priority router stays Active after the preferred router recovers although preemption was required. Here the recorded observation is: each router reports local HSRP state but hosts see intermittent default-gateway ARP behavior. The applicable cause is: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy.

That control reduces a separate risk: The preferred HSRP peer lacks the intended preempt behavior or priority policy. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy. The specific required safeguard is: use side-by-side HSRP peer configuration diffs after subnet migrations.

That control reduces a separate risk: The NAT inside/outside interface roles are absent or reversed for packet direction. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy. The specific required safeguard is: use side-by-side HSRP peer configuration diffs after subnet migrations.

That control reduces a separate risk: HSRP tracked-object policy does not detect or penalize upstream loss. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: peers disagree on virtual address/group configuration and cannot provide coherent redundancy. The specific required safeguard is: use side-by-side HSRP peer configuration diffs after subnet migrations.

Providing a reachable RP for the PIM-SM any-source multicast groups, respecting PIM neighbor and RPF state would not address the need for follow RPF checks by ensuring unicast routing toward the multicast source identifies the receiving interface.

Using IGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance would not address the need for follow RPF checks by ensuring unicast routing toward the multicast source identifies the receiving interface.

Selecting supported bidirectional PIM with a properly established RP and designated-forwarder behavior would not address the need for follow RPF checks by ensuring unicast routing toward the multicast source identifies the receiving interface.

This test measures a different behavior: Verify bidirectional group tree state and upstream/downstream forwarding from multiple sources. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect multicast RPF interface, source route and drop counters for the (S,G) stream.

This test measures a different behavior: Check the RP mapping and (*,G)/(S,G) tree progression after receiver joins. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect multicast RPF interface, source route and drop counters for the (S,G) stream.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect (S,G) subscriptions for the allowed source and confirm other sources are excluded. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect multicast RPF interface, source route and drop counters for the (S,G) stream.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A bidirectional group receives data only from one source because the network was built on incompatible source-tree assumptions. Here the recorded observation is: multicast traffic is dropped even though the receiver has joined the group. The applicable cause is: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: IGMP membership appears on the last-hop router but no ASM source traffic reaches receivers. Here the recorded observation is: multicast traffic is dropped even though the receiver has joined the group. The applicable cause is: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Receiver sees multicast data from an unapproved source within the same group address. Here the recorded observation is: multicast traffic is dropped even though the receiver has joined the group. The applicable cause is: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source.

That control reduces a separate risk: The required PIM bidirectional shared-tree/RP design was not consistently enabled. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source. The specific required safeguard is: validate multicast RPF under alternate-path routing and asymmetric provider changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: Source-specific membership signaling or SSM configuration was not enforced at the receiver edge. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source. The specific required safeguard is: validate multicast RPF under alternate-path routing and asymmetric provider changes.

That control reduces a separate risk: PIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source. The specific required safeguard is: validate multicast RPF under alternate-path routing and asymmetric provider changes.

Follow RPF checks by ensuring unicast routing toward the multicast source identifies the receiving interface would not provide a reachable RP for the PIM-SM any-source multicast groups, respecting PIM neighbor and RPF state.

Using IGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance would not provide a reachable RP for the PIM-SM any-source multicast groups, respecting PIM neighbor and RPF state.

Configuring a reachable, approved NTP server and appropriate authentication where supported would not provide a reachable RP for the PIM-SM any-source multicast groups, respecting PIM neighbor and RPF state.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect multicast RPF interface, source route and drop counters for the (S,G) stream. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check the RP mapping and (*,G)/(S,G) tree progression after receiver joins.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect (S,G) subscriptions for the allowed source and confirm other sources are excluded. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check the RP mapping and (*,G)/(S,G) tree progression after receiver joins.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare NTP association reachability, synchronization state and offset to the authoritative time source. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check the RP mapping and (*,G)/(S,G) tree progression after receiver joins.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Syslog timestamps drift because the switch is not synchronized to any valid NTP peer. Here the recorded observation is: iGMP membership appears on the last-hop router but no ASM source traffic reaches receivers. The applicable cause is: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Receiver sees multicast data from an unapproved source within the same group address. Here the recorded observation is: iGMP membership appears on the last-hop router but no ASM source traffic reaches receivers. The applicable cause is: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Multicast traffic is dropped even though the receiver has joined the group. Here the recorded observation is: iGMP membership appears on the last-hop router but no ASM source traffic reaches receivers. The applicable cause is: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configured NTP source is unreachable or not accepted for synchronization. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete. The specific required safeguard is: monitor RP availability and multicast tree state separately from IGMP subscriptions.

That control reduces a separate risk: Incoming multicast violates reverse-path forwarding against the unicast route to the source. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete. The specific required safeguard is: monitor RP availability and multicast tree state separately from IGMP subscriptions.

That control reduces a separate risk: Source-specific membership signaling or SSM configuration was not enforced at the receiver edge. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: pIM sparse-mode shared-tree RP signaling or reachability is incomplete. The specific required safeguard is: monitor RP availability and multicast tree state separately from IGMP subscriptions.

Configuring static inside-source NAT mapping the exact internal host to the approved routable address would not meet the need for iGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance.

Follow RPF checks by ensuring unicast routing toward the multicast source identifies the receiving interface would not meet the need for iGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance.

Selecting supported bidirectional PIM with a properly established RP and designated-forwarder behavior would not meet the need for iGMPv3 source filters and an appropriate PIM SSM range rather than any-source RP reliance.