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This would be evidence for ZIA sub-location: traffic from that scope receives the intended distinct location attribution. It does not demonstrate that the team can make a reviewed change effective for relevant traffic rather than leaving a draft configuration unapplied using Policy activation.

This would be evidence for ZIA location definition: transactions from the site are attributed to the intended location. It does not demonstrate that the team can make a reviewed change effective for relevant traffic rather than leaving a draft configuration unapplied using Policy activation.

This would be evidence for Location group: the rule correctly matches all member locations including a newly added one. It does not demonstrate that the team can make a reviewed change effective for relevant traffic rather than leaving a draft configuration unapplied using Policy activation.

That behavior describes Device posture policy: device posture evaluates supported endpoint characteristics and contributes conditions to ZPA access decisions. It addresses the separate need to restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks, rather than describing the selected Trusted network detection mechanism.

That behavior describes Operating-system posture signal: Client posture information can express supported OS characteristics to access policy evaluation. It addresses the separate need to use supported operating-system attributes when deciding whether an endpoint may connect, rather than describing the selected Trusted network detection mechanism.

That behavior describes Endpoint protection posture: A supported posture check examines the configured security control condition on the client. It addresses the separate need to require an endpoint protection condition before permitting access to a protected resource, rather than describing the selected Trusted network detection mechanism.

This would be evidence for Client Connector ZPA service status: the ZPA status is connected and the approved private application can be reached. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate the signed-in endpoint user with identity-based forwarding policies using Client Connector user authentication.

This would be evidence for Client Connector enrollment: the endpoint reports enrolled status and identifies the intended cloud tenant. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate the signed-in endpoint user with identity-based forwarding policies using Client Connector user authentication.

This would be evidence for Client Connector ZIA service status: the ZIA indicator is active and the forwarding mode matches the policy. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate the signed-in endpoint user with identity-based forwarding policies using Client Connector user authentication.

Rule location condition is used to apply a web restriction only to traffic attributed to specified offices. It works because location conditions scope policy matching to configured sites or site groups, but does not directly implement the named need for Security rule priority.

Policy exception expiry is used to make a vendor-access exception temporary rather than permanent. It works because A scheduled or expiring exception reduces the interval during which elevated access exists, but does not directly implement the named need for Security rule priority.

Policy test transaction is used to prove that a changed allow or deny rule actually affects current user requests. It works because A new controlled request yields an enforcement record that identifies the applied rule, but does not directly implement the named need for Security rule priority.

That behavior describes Administrator sign-on policy: administrative login policy governs administrator authentication independently of ordinary web traffic rules. It addresses the separate need to require approved authentication conditions specifically for administrative console sessions, rather than describing the selected Administrative RBAC mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative identity audit: audit events record attributable administrative activity for governance and investigation. It addresses the separate need to find which authorized administrator changed a tenant identity setting, rather than describing the selected Administrative RBAC mechanism.

That behavior describes ZIdentity user record: ZIdentity centralizes user identity and entitlement information used by Zscaler services. It addresses the separate need to locate a named user's centrally managed service identity for administrative review, rather than describing the selected Administrative RBAC mechanism.

That behavior describes Unsanctioned cloud app block: cloud App Control can enforce deny decisions against classified cloud services. It addresses the separate need to stop access to a cloud service designated as unacceptable in the tenant, rather than describing the selected Cloud App Control activity rule mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud app isolate action: an isolate action renders supported sessions remotely under the assigned isolation policy. It addresses the separate need to allow a controlled browser session to a higher-risk web app without directly exposing the endpoint to active web content, rather than describing the selected Cloud App Control activity rule mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud App Control rule: application-aware controls can govern supported user actions in selected cloud applications. It addresses the separate need to disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported, rather than describing the selected Cloud App Control activity rule mechanism.

That check belongs to App Connector backend reachability: test DNS and TCP reachability from the serving connector environment. It would not directly diagnose the separate App Connector cloud disconnect failure.

That check belongs to ZPA entitlement mismatch: inspect matched access rule and user attributes in session diagnostics. It would not directly diagnose the separate App Connector cloud disconnect failure.

That check belongs to ZPA app segment mismatch: confirm destination FQDN, protocol and ports against the segment definition. It would not directly diagnose the separate App Connector cloud disconnect failure.

That evidence is appropriate for DLP policy false positive: A controlled positive and negative test isolate the overbroad detector condition. It would not confirm remediation of NSS missing web events.

That evidence is appropriate for ZIA request-path mismatch: A fresh test request appears under the expected source and forwarding channel. It would not confirm remediation of NSS missing web events.

That evidence is appropriate for Client Connector export logs: an exported log bundle captures the relevant connection interval and service errors. It would not confirm remediation of NSS missing web events.

That diagnostic target applies to DLP policy false positive, where the team needs to investigate a blocked upload of an approved document misclassified as restricted data. Its failure dependency is A DLP event records its matched detector and policy action for a content transaction, which is different from the reported NSS missing web events issue.

That diagnostic target applies to ZIA request-path mismatch, where the team needs to determine whether a failed request was actually forwarded to the Zscaler service. Its failure dependency is forwarding settings and observed tunnel or web logs help distinguish bypass from enforcement, which is different from the reported NSS missing web events issue.

That diagnostic target applies to Client Connector export logs, where the team needs to collect detailed endpoint evidence before diagnosing intermittent connectivity. Its failure dependency is Client Connector Troubleshoot can export its collected diagnostic logs for support, which is different from the reported NSS missing web events issue.

That check fits Administrative RBAC, because inspect assigned role and attempt a harmless access-rights verification. It does not diagnose the different incident involving ZIdentity group assignments and the need to represent a departmental user population for consistent identity-driven controls.

That check fits ZIdentity user record, because compare user record and the actual sign-in or entitlement event. It does not diagnose the different incident involving ZIdentity group assignments and the need to represent a departmental user population for consistent identity-driven controls.

That check fits Administrative identity audit, because search the administrator audit trail for the changed object and time. It does not diagnose the different incident involving ZIdentity group assignments and the need to represent a departmental user population for consistent identity-driven controls.

Forwarding profile is used to apply different traffic-forwarding decisions to corporate and untrusted endpoint network conditions. It works because the forwarding profile defines how Client Connector forwards or bypasses traffic under conditions, but does not directly implement the named need for PAC file forwarding.

Z-Tunnel forwarding is used to forward supported endpoint internet traffic through Client Connector's tunnel mode. It works because Z-Tunnel uses client forwarding transport to direct eligible traffic to ZIA enforcement, but does not directly implement the named need for PAC file forwarding.

GRE tunnel is used to forward office traffic to a cloud security service when the edge supports GRE and the design permits it. It works because A GRE tunnel encapsulates traffic toward Zscaler without providing encryption by itself, but does not directly implement the named need for PAC file forwarding.