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For IPsec tunnel, an established IKE negotiation alone does not prove traffic selectors and routing are correct. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for GRE tunnel.

For Z-Tunnel forwarding, A PAC-only mode may not capture traffic outside proxy-aware protocols. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for GRE tunnel.

For PAC file forwarding, PAC files do not control every non-proxy-aware application or all UDP traffic. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for GRE tunnel.

That check fits ZIA internet security, because inspect ZIA traffic-forwarding evidence and a matching web transaction. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Cloud policy enforcement and the need to apply consistent security decisions when remote staff move between office and home networks.

That check fits ZPA private application service, because verify application policy, connector health and absence of public app exposure. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Cloud policy enforcement and the need to apply consistent security decisions when remote staff move between office and home networks.

That check fits Zero Trust Exchange service, because verify an authorized app path and a separately denied unauthorized destination. It does not diagnose the different incident involving Cloud policy enforcement and the need to apply consistent security decisions when remote staff move between office and home networks.

That behavior describes ZPA App Connector Status diagnostics: App Connector Status diagnostics captures connector request health and recent error indicators. It addresses the separate need to inspect whether connectors serving a private application are currently unhealthy, rather than describing the selected ZPA User Activity diagnostics mechanism.

That behavior describes ZPA access policy block trend: user Activity diagnostics provides an access-policy block view over a chosen time interval. It addresses the separate need to check whether an access-rule change increased denials to a private application, rather than describing the selected ZPA User Activity diagnostics mechanism.

That behavior describes ZPA User Status diagnostics: ZPA User Status diagnostics focuses on client authentication and status records. It addresses the separate need to distinguish authentication failures from downstream private-app connection failures, rather than describing the selected ZPA User Activity diagnostics mechanism.

This would be evidence for URL filtering rule: A controlled request to the category is blocked with the intended rule in its web log. It does not demonstrate that the team can treat a specific set of business domains separately from broad vendor categories using Custom URL category.

This would be evidence for URL policy exception: the approved URL is allowed and another risky URL remains denied. It does not demonstrate that the team can treat a specific set of business domains separately from broad vendor categories using Custom URL category.

This would be evidence for URL filtering block: the browser receives a block notice and the transaction is recorded as denied. It does not demonstrate that the team can treat a specific set of business domains separately from broad vendor categories using Custom URL category.

Bandwidth control class is used to reserve adequate capacity for collaboration traffic while constraining less important categories. It works because bandwidth classes and rules shape or police matched traffic according to configured limits, but does not directly implement the named need for File type control.

Advanced Threat Protection is used to detect and prevent selected high-risk web threats and command-and-control indicators. It works because ATP services evaluate relevant suspicious destinations or traffic patterns under security policy, but does not directly implement the named need for File type control.

Cloud App Control rule is used to disallow uploading files to an unsanctioned SaaS application while retaining allowed read-only use where supported. It works because application-aware controls can govern supported user actions in selected cloud applications, but does not directly implement the named need for File type control.

That behavior describes ZIdentity user record: ZIdentity centralizes user identity and entitlement information used by Zscaler services. It addresses the separate need to locate a named user's centrally managed service identity for administrative review, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity group assignments mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative RBAC: role-based administrative permissions limit actions according to assigned administrative roles. It addresses the separate need to let a service-desk operator view diagnostics without permitting broad security policy edits, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity group assignments mechanism.

That behavior describes Administrative identity audit: audit events record attributable administrative activity for governance and investigation. It addresses the separate need to find which authorized administrator changed a tenant identity setting, rather than describing the selected ZIdentity group assignments mechanism.

That behavior describes Cloud Firewall network rule: A firewall rule evaluates eligible network-level destination and port conditions. It addresses the separate need to deny an unwanted outbound TCP service for selected locations at cloud enforcement, rather than describing the selected DNS security policy mechanism.

That behavior describes FQDN firewall policy: FQDN-aware policy conditions can use destination hostname context for rule matching. It addresses the separate need to apply a network policy to an approved destination name rather than a fixed remote IP where supported, rather than describing the selected DNS security policy mechanism.

That behavior describes Firewall application awareness: application-aware firewall conditions use classified traffic attributes under supported inspection. It addresses the separate need to distinguish recognized application behavior from just raw destination port numbers, rather than describing the selected DNS security policy mechanism.

That check fits IdP signing-certificate rollover, because inspect IdP SAML metadata and update the signing certificate before retesting. It does not diagnose the different incident involving SAML assertion attributes and the need to make department or group claims from a completed sign-in available as policy context.

That check fits SCIM group membership, because compare identity-provider group members with received provisioning updates. It does not diagnose the different incident involving SAML assertion attributes and the need to make department or group claims from a completed sign-in available as policy context.

That check fits SAML identity provider, because inspect SAML issuer, audience, certificate trust and login error details. It does not diagnose the different incident involving SAML assertion attributes and the need to make department or group claims from a completed sign-in available as policy context.

For ZPA application entitlement, successful identity authentication is insufficient when the access-policy rule denies the app. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Private app access event.

For Client-based private app access, A clientless browser URL alone will not grant arbitrary TCP application connectivity. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Private app access event.

For ZPA browser access, browser access is not a general network tunnel for arbitrary protocols. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Private app access event.

Cloud Sandbox analysis is used to analyze an unknown suspicious executable through behavioral detonation where policy permits. It works because cloud sandboxing evaluates supported submitted files beyond a basic static signature check, but does not directly implement the named need for Intrusion prevention signature.

Advanced Threat Protection is used to detect and prevent selected high-risk web threats and command-and-control indicators. It works because ATP services evaluate relevant suspicious destinations or traffic patterns under security policy, but does not directly implement the named need for Intrusion prevention signature.

Malware protection rule is used to stop a known malicious file download before it reaches an endpoint. It works because malware inspection applies configured detection and block controls to observed file transfers, but does not directly implement the named need for Intrusion prevention signature.

This would be evidence for App Connector provisioning key: the new connector registers successfully in the intended tenant and group. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate a set of private application destinations with eligible App Connector groups using ZPA server group.

This would be evidence for App Connector group: two healthy connector instances appear in the intended group. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate a set of private application destinations with eligible App Connector groups using ZPA server group.

This would be evidence for ZPA App Connector: connector health is good and an approved private app connection reaches the expected service. It does not demonstrate that the team can associate a set of private application destinations with eligible App Connector groups using ZPA server group.