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For Client Connector user authentication, enrollment of a device does not always imply that the current user has authenticated. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Client Connector ZIA service status.

For Client Connector enrollment, installing the package does not prove successful user authentication or service enrollment. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Client Connector ZIA service status.

For Client Connector ZPA service status, A healthy ZIA web connection does not establish ZPA private app entitlement. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Client Connector ZIA service status.

That check fits SAML assertion attributes, because inspect raw assertion attributes and the configured identity attribute mapping. It does not diagnose the different incident involving IdP signing-certificate rollover and the need to restore federated login after an identity provider rotates its SAML signing certificate.

That check fits SCIM provisioning, because inspect provisioning connector status and failed SCIM create or delete operations. It does not diagnose the different incident involving IdP signing-certificate rollover and the need to restore federated login after an identity provider rotates its SAML signing certificate.

That check fits SAML identity provider, because inspect SAML issuer, audience, certificate trust and login error details. It does not diagnose the different incident involving IdP signing-certificate rollover and the need to restore federated login after an identity provider rotates its SAML signing certificate.

For Endpoint protection posture, identity group membership is not a substitute for endpoint-protection evidence. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Trusted network detection.

For Device posture policy, A successful user sign-in does not bypass a required device posture rule. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Trusted network detection.

For Operating-system posture signal, OS name alone is not proof that unrelated disk or endpoint protections are active. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for Trusted network detection.

This would be evidence for GRE tunnel: the GRE tunnel is up and test traffic is observed on the corresponding ZIA path. It does not demonstrate that the team can forward supported endpoint internet traffic through Client Connector's tunnel mode using Z-Tunnel forwarding.

This would be evidence for Forwarding profile: the client selects the expected trusted-network branch of its assigned forwarding profile. It does not demonstrate that the team can forward supported endpoint internet traffic through Client Connector's tunnel mode using Z-Tunnel forwarding.

This would be evidence for PAC file forwarding: A test URL returns the expected PAC proxy route and is observed at the cloud service. It does not demonstrate that the team can forward supported endpoint internet traffic through Client Connector's tunnel mode using Z-Tunnel forwarding.

That behavior describes Cloud Firewall network rule: A firewall rule evaluates eligible network-level destination and port conditions. It addresses the separate need to deny an unwanted outbound TCP service for selected locations at cloud enforcement, rather than describing the selected FQDN firewall policy mechanism.

That behavior describes Firewall application awareness: application-aware firewall conditions use classified traffic attributes under supported inspection. It addresses the separate need to distinguish recognized application behavior from just raw destination port numbers, rather than describing the selected FQDN firewall policy mechanism.

That behavior describes DNS security policy: DNS inspection and policy can reject queries for prohibited domains. It addresses the separate need to block requests to a confirmed malicious DNS destination before a downstream connection, rather than describing the selected FQDN firewall policy mechanism.

That behavior describes SAML assertion attributes: the identity provider sends mapped claims in the SAML assertion for authorized policy use. It addresses the separate need to make department or group claims from a completed sign-in available as policy context, rather than describing the selected IdP signing-certificate rollover mechanism.

That behavior describes SCIM provisioning: SCIM exchanges user and group lifecycle changes through a provisioning integration. It addresses the separate need to keep users and groups provisioned without relying on an interactive login to create records, rather than describing the selected IdP signing-certificate rollover mechanism.

That behavior describes SAML identity provider: SAML federation carries signed authentication assertions from the configured identity provider to the service. It addresses the separate need to allow employees to sign in to Zscaler using their enterprise identity provider rather than a second password, rather than describing the selected IdP signing-certificate rollover mechanism.

For GRE tunnel, GRE alone does not encrypt an untrusted transport path. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for PAC file forwarding.

For Forwarding profile, the same forwarding action need not apply on every trusted and untrusted network. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for PAC file forwarding.

For Z-Tunnel forwarding, A PAC-only mode may not capture traffic outside proxy-aware protocols. It is not the specific constraint the reviewer needs to assess for PAC file forwarding.

Device posture policy is used to restrict a sensitive private application to endpoints meeting defined security checks. It works because device posture evaluates supported endpoint characteristics and contributes conditions to ZPA access decisions, but does not directly implement the named need for Unmanaged device restriction.

Operating-system posture signal is used to use supported operating-system attributes when deciding whether an endpoint may connect. It works because Client posture information can express supported OS characteristics to access policy evaluation, but does not directly implement the named need for Unmanaged device restriction.

Endpoint protection posture is used to require an endpoint protection condition before permitting access to a protected resource. It works because A supported posture check examines the configured security control condition on the client, but does not directly implement the named need for Unmanaged device restriction.

URL filtering rule is used to block an identified risky web category for a selected user population. It works because URL filtering evaluates destination classification and matching user or location rule conditions, but does not directly implement the named need for URL filtering block.

Custom URL category is used to treat a specific set of business domains separately from broad vendor categories. It works because custom URL categories group explicit FQDNs or URLs for targeted web policy conditions, but does not directly implement the named need for URL filtering block.

URL filtering caution is used to warn users before they choose to continue to a permitted but higher-risk site. It works because A caution action presents user-facing policy guidance at the relevant request, but does not directly implement the named need for URL filtering block.

That evidence is appropriate for ZPA entitlement mismatch: A policy-block log identifies the denying rule for the affected user. It would not confirm remediation of App Connector backend reachability.

That evidence is appropriate for ZPA app segment mismatch: after the segment includes the approved service port, that specific flow succeeds. It would not confirm remediation of App Connector backend reachability.

That evidence is appropriate for App Connector cloud disconnect: the connector reconnects after its identified network or registration fault is resolved. It would not confirm remediation of App Connector backend reachability.

ZIA internet security serves the separate requirement to inspect and enforce policy for corporate users' internet and SaaS-bound traffic. It does not solve the requested Zero Trust Exchange service use case under the explicit limitation that zero trust does not mean that every connection is allowed once a VPN is established.

ZDX digital experience service serves the separate requirement to diagnose user-perceived application performance across endpoint, network and application paths. It does not solve the requested Zero Trust Exchange service use case under the explicit limitation that zero trust does not mean that every connection is allowed once a VPN is established.

ZPA private application service serves the separate requirement to give an approved remote employee app-specific access without exposing private application addresses publicly. It does not solve the requested Zero Trust Exchange service use case under the explicit limitation that zero trust does not mean that every connection is allowed once a VPN is established.