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Inspect successful authentication events and the factor or method that established the identity claim. This would test authentication, whereas the required evidence is: Review application settings, identity permissions, and provider platform maintenance coverage separately.

Verify that access decisions still enforce identity-centric requirements from home, office, and mobile networks. This would test identity as security perimeter, whereas the required evidence is: Review application settings, identity permissions, and provider platform maintenance coverage separately.

Test access as authorized and unauthorized identities and verify permission evaluations differ correctly. This would test authorization, whereas the required evidence is: Review application settings, identity permissions, and provider platform maintenance coverage separately.

Federation extends authentication trust across organizational or security boundaries. This describes federation; the governing concept here is: PaaS abstracts infrastructure management without removing the customer's application and data security decisions.

An identity provider authenticates identities and supplies the identity information applications rely on. This describes identity provider; the governing concept here is: PaaS abstracts infrastructure management without removing the customer's application and data security decisions.

Authorization determines what an authenticated identity may do to a given resource. This describes authorization; the governing concept here is: PaaS abstracts infrastructure management without removing the customer's application and data security decisions.

Mistaking possession of a username for proof the claimant is authenticated. That caution concerns authentication; the specific misconception here is: Assuming managed runtimes automatically secure every application permission and data-handling decision.

Assuming single sign-on automatically gives a user authorization to every connected application. That caution concerns single sign-on concept; the specific misconception here is: Assuming managed runtimes automatically secure every application permission and data-handling decision.

Assuming a directory group entry automatically grants access to every resource without permission configuration. That caution concerns directory services; the specific misconception here is: Assuming managed runtimes automatically secure every application permission and data-handling decision.

Configure trusted single sign-on across applications that accept the identity provider's session or tokens. That addresses a different task: a staff member needs to open several approved cloud apps without repeated independent sign-ins. The present requirement concerns defense in depth.

Use an identity provider to authenticate identities and provide trusted identity claims to relying applications. That addresses a different task: several applications must rely on one trusted service to issue identity assertions for users. The present requirement concerns defense in depth.

Establish a trusted federation relationship so the external identity provider can authenticate the partner users. That addresses a different task: a partner's staff should use its existing organizational identity to access a separate service. The present requirement concerns defense in depth.

Query authorized directory entries and compare membership and attribute changes to the source of truth. This would test directory services, whereas the required evidence is: Map each threat path to independent controls and test whether another layer still reduces impact after one fails.

Validate the trust configuration and sign-in tokens while confirming no separate local password is required. This would test federation, whereas the required evidence is: Map each threat path to independent controls and test whether another layer still reduces impact after one fails.

Inspect successful authentication events and the factor or method that established the identity claim. This would test authentication, whereas the required evidence is: Map each threat path to independent controls and test whether another layer still reduces impact after one fails.

An identity provider authenticates identities and supplies the identity information applications rely on. This describes identity provider; the governing concept here is: Defense in depth deliberately layers independent protection so a single compromised control does not expose every asset.

Federation extends authentication trust across organizational or security boundaries. This describes federation; the governing concept here is: Defense in depth deliberately layers independent protection so a single compromised control does not expose every asset.

Authentication establishes who or what is making an identity claim; it precedes authorization decisions. This describes authentication; the governing concept here is: Defense in depth deliberately layers independent protection so a single compromised control does not expose every asset.

Mistaking possession of a username for proof the claimant is authenticated. That caution concerns authentication; the specific misconception here is: Claiming a strong network edge eliminates the need for identity, endpoint, and data controls.

Assuming a directory group entry automatically grants access to every resource without permission configuration. That caution concerns directory services; the specific misconception here is: Claiming a strong network edge eliminates the need for identity, endpoint, and data controls.

Assuming every application must independently store and validate every user's password. That caution concerns identity provider; the specific misconception here is: Claiming a strong network edge eliminates the need for identity, endpoint, and data controls.

Base access protection on user and workload identities with contextual policy rather than only network location. That addresses a different task: remote workers use cloud services from networks not managed by the enterprise. The present requirement concerns zero trust explicit verification.

Use directory services to organize identity objects and make them discoverable to authorized systems. That addresses a different task: an enterprise needs a managed directory of users, groups, and related identity attributes. The present requirement concerns zero trust explicit verification.

Use an identity provider to authenticate identities and provide trusted identity claims to relying applications. That addresses a different task: several applications must rely on one trusted service to issue identity assertions for users. The present requirement concerns zero trust explicit verification.

Verify that access decisions still enforce identity-centric requirements from home, office, and mobile networks. This would test identity as security perimeter, whereas the required evidence is: Review access-policy decisions and logs for both on-premises and remote requests with comparable risk signals.

Trace a sign-in through the provider and validate the relying application's accepted identity assertion. This would test identity provider, whereas the required evidence is: Review access-policy decisions and logs for both on-premises and remote requests with comparable risk signals.

Query authorized directory entries and compare membership and attribute changes to the source of truth. This would test directory services, whereas the required evidence is: Review access-policy decisions and logs for both on-premises and remote requests with comparable risk signals.

Directory services provide a structured identity store and lookup capabilities; they do not alone define every resource permission. This describes directory services; the governing concept here is: Zero Trust says verify explicitly, not trust requests because they originated inside a familiar network.

Authorization determines what an authenticated identity may do to a given resource. This describes authorization; the governing concept here is: Zero Trust says verify explicitly, not trust requests because they originated inside a familiar network.

An identity provider authenticates identities and supplies the identity information applications rely on. This describes identity provider; the governing concept here is: Zero Trust says verify explicitly, not trust requests because they originated inside a familiar network.

Assuming federation requires copying all partner passwords into the receiving organization. That caution concerns federation; the specific misconception here is: Treating physical office location as sufficient proof of identity and authorization.

Assuming every application must independently store and validate every user's password. That caution concerns identity provider; the specific misconception here is: Treating physical office location as sufficient proof of identity and authorization.

Assuming a directory group entry automatically grants access to every resource without permission configuration. That caution concerns directory services; the specific misconception here is: Treating physical office location as sufficient proof of identity and authorization.