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Client/connector health checks diagnose an existing connection; they do not create the one application the contractor is authorized to access.

Least-privilege segment tuning is a necessary later refinement but assumes that a target application and connector path have already been published.

Correlating sign-in and access records is useful evidence after access is provisioned but does not expose the internal app privately.

Publishing another copy of an already published application does not diagnose the failing client/connector or backend network path.

Tightening Conditional Access for the user can change authorization but will not repair a broken connector-to-app network route after the user has been allowed.

Reducing allowed destinations is useful for an overbroad application segment, whereas this connection is failing to reach its already defined private server.

MFA on a different app does not enforce device compliance for the targeted Private Access enterprise application. The correct resource assignment and grant control are necessary.

A successful private tunnel only establishes network transport. It does not prove Conditional Access has evaluated the intended user, target app or device state.

Network segmentation restricts destinations, but it does not fix a device-compliance grant currently assigned to another enterprise application.

Adding an enterprise app definition alone may not fix the failing connector; restore the existing approved Private Access path and policy end to end.

Segment minimization limits the scope of an already working private route but cannot justify replacing it with unrestricted public ingress.

Inspecting connector and client health is necessary diagnosis, but the requested security decision is to restore approved private access rather than bypass controls by publishing a public endpoint.

Correlating logs helps diagnose historical usage but does not itself restrict an overly broad application segment.

Conditional Access governs who may obtain access, but even a compliant user should not inherit unrestricted network destinations through an oversized segment.

The connector’s reachability does not justify publishing the entire internal subnet as a single private application.

Publishing a new private resource expands available paths and cannot revoke previously permitted access by a former app user.

Connector health helps when authorized users cannot reach the app, not when access persists after removal of authorization.

Creating another Conditional Access policy without finding the effective assignment or existing session may leave the former user able to connect.

A compliant-device or MFA grant may deny access but cannot make an unsupported client platform or protocol compatible with Private Access.

Permitting public access is not an appropriate substitute for determining whether the legacy platform meets Private Access prerequisites.

Creating a new application entry does not resolve whether the legacy endpoint can run a supported Global Secure Access client or use the required transport.

Correlating logs identifies who accessed the extra destinations, but observation alone cannot prevent future lateral movement.

Checking connector health cannot constrain a working private-app session that currently exposes neighboring destinations beyond the approved application.

Publishing a resource alone does not constrain an overbroad subnet or allowed-port segment that was already configured.

Publishing a resource is a setup step and does not prove that any named user reached it through the route.

Configuring Conditional Access proves policy intent, not which caller actually connected to the private application.

Least-privilege segment design helps prevent overexposure but is not audit evidence of the principal behind a completed session.

SQL principal/database permissions affect post-connection authorization but cannot replace the private-only network route required here.

Storage Blob/Files subresources are unrelated to publishing an Azure SQL logical server through its supported private endpoint.

DNS integration is necessary for working private resolution but cannot by itself remove SQL public ingress if no private endpoint/public restriction has been configured.

A working Blob private endpoint already exists. Creating another or disabling public access without fixing the spoke resolver would still leave this client resolving the wrong address.

On-premises hybrid forwarding is a separate scenario. This fault occurs in a spoke VNet whose custom DNS server forwards Blob names outside the linked private-zone resolution path.

Separate endpoint subresources are necessary when using other Storage APIs, but Blob is already available privately and its spoke DNS forwarding is the remaining defect.