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The proposed observation checks the different multitenant publisher app consent scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the daemon's access token roles claim and run the intended Graph operation without a user sign-in.

The proposed observation checks the different app secret expiration rollover scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the daemon's access token roles claim and run the intended Graph operation without a user sign-in.

The proposed observation checks the different app roles token claims scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the daemon's access token roles claim and run the intended Graph operation without a user sign-in.

This diagnosis fits a separate multitenant publisher app consent incident: A test customer tenant cannot consent because the app registration is restricted to accounts in the vendor's directory only. It does not explain this case's observed failure; delegated user scopes cannot substitute for application permission grants in client credential flow.

This diagnosis fits a separate redirect uri security incident: The token endpoint rejects the request due to a redirect URI mismatch after the callback domain changes. It does not explain this case's observed failure; delegated user scopes cannot substitute for application permission grants in client credential flow.

This diagnosis fits a separate app secret expiration rollover incident: The daemon begins receiving invalid_client immediately after the only existing secret expires. It does not explain this case's observed failure; delegated user scopes cannot substitute for application permission grants in client credential flow.

This control manages future certificate credential for unattended client drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described delegated versus application permissions case. The correct safeguard is: keep daemon application permissions narrower than interactive user permission bundles.

This control manages future redirect uri security drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described delegated versus application permissions case. The correct safeguard is: keep daemon application permissions narrower than interactive user permission bundles.

This control manages future app roles token claims drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described delegated versus application permissions case. The correct safeguard is: keep daemon application permissions narrower than interactive user permission bundles.

That action implements the separate delegated versus application permissions decision. It is appropriate when a scheduled overnight report daemon calls Microsoft Graph with client credentials and no signed-in employee session. The present case instead requires the specific certificate credential for unattended client change: upload an approved application certificate credential and use the corresponding private key in the client assertion process.

That action implements the separate redirect uri security decision. It is appropriate when a web app registration is configured for the OAuth authorization code flow, but its authentication redirects are failing after a hostname change. The present case instead requires the specific certificate credential for unattended client change: upload an approved application certificate credential and use the corresponding private key in the client assertion process.

That action implements the separate app secret expiration rollover decision. It is appropriate when a client-credential integration uses an app registration secret that expires next month and must avoid a midnight outage. The present case instead requires the specific certificate credential for unattended client change: upload an approved application certificate credential and use the corresponding private key in the client assertion process.

The proposed observation checks the different delegated versus application permissions scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: acquire a test app token using the certificate and confirm old secret removal does not break service.

The proposed observation checks the different multitenant publisher app consent scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: acquire a test app token using the certificate and confirm old secret removal does not break service.

The proposed observation checks the different app secret expiration rollover scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: acquire a test app token using the certificate and confirm old secret removal does not break service.

This diagnosis fits a separate multitenant publisher app consent incident: A test customer tenant cannot consent because the app registration is restricted to accounts in the vendor's directory only. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the credential presented by the client no longer matches an active trusted certificate on the app registration.

This diagnosis fits a separate app secret expiration rollover incident: The daemon begins receiving invalid_client immediately after the only existing secret expires. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the credential presented by the client no longer matches an active trusted certificate on the app registration.

This diagnosis fits a separate delegated versus application permissions incident: The daemon fails because its token lacks the Graph permission even though a developer consented to a delegated scope. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the credential presented by the client no longer matches an active trusted certificate on the app registration.

This control manages future app secret expiration rollover drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described certificate credential for unattended client case. The correct safeguard is: plan overlapping certificate rollover and protect private keys from repository exposure.

This control manages future delegated versus application permissions drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described certificate credential for unattended client case. The correct safeguard is: plan overlapping certificate rollover and protect private keys from repository exposure.

This control manages future redirect uri security drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described certificate credential for unattended client case. The correct safeguard is: plan overlapping certificate rollover and protect private keys from repository exposure.

That action implements the separate app secret expiration rollover decision. It is appropriate when a client-credential integration uses an app registration secret that expires next month and must avoid a midnight outage. The present case instead requires the specific multitenant publisher app consent change: configure the intended multitenant app registration and publish verified ownership/consent information appropriate for customer review.

That action implements the separate certificate credential for unattended client decision. It is appropriate when a backend integration uses an app registration for client credentials and must replace a hard-coded client secret with a controlled certificate. The present case instead requires the specific multitenant publisher app consent change: configure the intended multitenant app registration and publish verified ownership/consent information appropriate for customer review.

That action implements the separate app roles token claims decision. It is appropriate when a custom API wants the caller's Reader or Approver application role represented in tokens, with no manual access list inside the app. The present case instead requires the specific multitenant publisher app consent change: configure the intended multitenant app registration and publish verified ownership/consent information appropriate for customer review.

The proposed observation checks the different redirect uri security scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: from a separate test tenant, complete an approved consent flow and verify creation of its local service principal.

The proposed observation checks the different app roles token claims scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: from a separate test tenant, complete an approved consent flow and verify creation of its local service principal.

The proposed observation checks the different certificate credential for unattended client scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: from a separate test tenant, complete an approved consent flow and verify creation of its local service principal.

This diagnosis fits a separate app secret expiration rollover incident: The daemon begins receiving invalid_client immediately after the only existing secret expires. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the application's supported account types do not allow use by the intended external organizational tenant.

This diagnosis fits a separate app roles token claims incident: An employee can authenticate but the API rejects Reader operations because no app role is present in the token. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the application's supported account types do not allow use by the intended external organizational tenant.

This diagnosis fits a separate delegated versus application permissions incident: The daemon fails because its token lacks the Graph permission even though a developer consented to a delegated scope. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the application's supported account types do not allow use by the intended external organizational tenant.

That action implements the separate app roles token claims decision. It is appropriate when a custom API wants the caller's Reader or Approver application role represented in tokens, with no manual access list inside the app. The present case instead requires the specific multitenant publisher app consent change: configure the intended multitenant app registration and publish verified ownership/consent information appropriate for customer review.

This control manages future app roles token claims drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described multitenant publisher app consent case. The correct safeguard is: review publisher identity and least-privilege scopes when submitting changes to multitenant apps.

That action implements the separate delegated versus application permissions decision. It is appropriate when a scheduled overnight report daemon calls Microsoft Graph with client credentials and no signed-in employee session. The present case instead requires the specific multitenant publisher app consent change: configure the intended multitenant app registration and publish verified ownership/consent information appropriate for customer review.