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The proposed observation checks the different defaultazurecredential workload use scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the shared application client ID and distinct tenant-specific service principal object IDs.

The proposed observation checks the different aks workload identity service account scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the shared application client ID and distinct tenant-specific service principal object IDs.

The proposed observation checks the different system-assigned managed identity lifetime scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: inspect the shared application client ID and distinct tenant-specific service principal object IDs.

This diagnosis fits a separate defaultazurecredential workload use incident: Production fails because code accidentally depends on a local developer CLI credential not present on the VM. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the vendor owns the app registration in its home tenant; the customer manages the local enterprise application service principal.

This diagnosis fits a separate workload identity conditional access incident: A client-credential application keeps authenticating despite a Conditional Access policy aimed only at human users. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the vendor owns the app registration in its home tenant; the customer manages the local enterprise application service principal.

This diagnosis fits a separate user-assigned managed identity reuse incident: After replacing an app instance the service stops accessing data because a new system-assigned principal lacks the previous role grants. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the vendor owns the app registration in its home tenant; the customer manages the local enterprise application service principal.

This control manages future defaultazurecredential workload use drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described app registration and enterprise service principal case. The correct safeguard is: document application versus service-principal object IDs before modifying consent or assignments.

This control manages future user-assigned managed identity reuse drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described app registration and enterprise service principal case. The correct safeguard is: document application versus service-principal object IDs before modifying consent or assignments.

This control manages future managed identity role propagation drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described app registration and enterprise service principal case. The correct safeguard is: document application versus service-principal object IDs before modifying consent or assignments.

That action implements the separate app registration and enterprise service principal decision. It is appropriate when a SaaS vendor registers one multitenant application, while a customer needs an independently controllable local identity for enterprise app assignments. The present case instead requires the specific workload identity conditional access change: configure supported Conditional Access policies for workload identities targeting eligible service principals and available conditions.

That action implements the separate aks workload identity service account decision. It is appropriate when an AKS deployment needs a pod to access Azure Key Vault using a specific identity without mounting a client secret into the container. The present case instead requires the specific workload identity conditional access change: configure supported Conditional Access policies for workload identities targeting eligible service principals and available conditions.

That action implements the separate github oidc federated credential decision. It is appropriate when a GitHub Actions workflow deploys Azure infrastructure from one approved repository and branch with no stored long-lived app secret. The present case instead requires the specific workload identity conditional access change: configure supported Conditional Access policies for workload identities targeting eligible service principals and available conditions.

The proposed observation checks the different app registration and enterprise service principal scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: check the service principal sign-in logs and relevant Conditional Access evaluation on a controlled workload authentication.

The proposed observation checks the different system-assigned managed identity lifetime scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: check the service principal sign-in logs and relevant Conditional Access evaluation on a controlled workload authentication.

The proposed observation checks the different aks workload identity service account scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: check the service principal sign-in logs and relevant Conditional Access evaluation on a controlled workload authentication.

This diagnosis fits a separate aks workload identity service account incident: Pods running under the default Kubernetes service account cannot exchange tokens for the designated Entra identity. It does not explain this case's observed failure; user-targeted Conditional Access and workload identity policies have different eligible target types.

This diagnosis fits a separate user-assigned managed identity reuse incident: After replacing an app instance the service stops accessing data because a new system-assigned principal lacks the previous role grants. It does not explain this case's observed failure; user-targeted Conditional Access and workload identity policies have different eligible target types.

This diagnosis fits a separate app registration and enterprise service principal incident: A customer admin searches only App registrations and cannot find the installed third-party application's local access assignments. It does not explain this case's observed failure; user-targeted Conditional Access and workload identity policies have different eligible target types.

This control manages future user-assigned managed identity reuse drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described workload identity conditional access case. The correct safeguard is: inventory privileged service principals and review relevant workload policies and license prerequisites.

This control manages future aks workload identity service account drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described workload identity conditional access case. The correct safeguard is: inventory privileged service principals and review relevant workload policies and license prerequisites.

This control manages future github oidc federated credential drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described workload identity conditional access case. The correct safeguard is: inventory privileged service principals and review relevant workload policies and license prerequisites.

That action implements the separate github oidc federated credential decision. It is appropriate when a GitHub Actions workflow deploys Azure infrastructure from one approved repository and branch with no stored long-lived app secret. The present case instead requires the specific federated credential audience mismatch change: align the federated identity credential's expected audience with the valid external workload token audience.

That action implements the separate managed identity role propagation decision. It is appropriate when an Azure Automation job using its managed identity is granted a new RBAC role, but the next immediate API call still fails. The present case instead requires the specific federated credential audience mismatch change: align the federated identity credential's expected audience with the valid external workload token audience.

That action implements the separate aks workload identity service account decision. It is appropriate when an AKS deployment needs a pod to access Azure Key Vault using a specific identity without mounting a client secret into the container. The present case instead requires the specific federated credential audience mismatch change: align the federated identity credential's expected audience with the valid external workload token audience.

The proposed observation checks the different system-assigned managed identity lifetime scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: decode a test token's issuer, subject and audience claims and verify a successful token exchange.

The proposed observation checks the different managed identity azure rbac authorization scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: decode a test token's issuer, subject and audience claims and verify a successful token exchange.

The proposed observation checks the different aks workload identity service account scenario. Even a successful test would not establish the requested outcome here: decode a test token's issuer, subject and audience claims and verify a successful token exchange.

This diagnosis fits a separate managed identity azure rbac authorization incident: Token acquisition succeeds but Blob data reads return authorization failure. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the federated credential audience does not match the JWT aud claim.

This diagnosis fits a separate github oidc federated credential incident: An unapproved branch can obtain tokens because the federated identity subject was configured too broadly. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the federated credential audience does not match the JWT aud claim.

This diagnosis fits a separate aks workload identity service account incident: Pods running under the default Kubernetes service account cannot exchange tokens for the designated Entra identity. It does not explain this case's observed failure; the federated credential audience does not match the JWT aud claim.

This control manages future defaultazurecredential workload use drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described federated credential audience mismatch case. The correct safeguard is: test federated assertion claims as a set during identity-provider updates rather than weakening subject restrictions.

This control manages future system-assigned managed identity lifetime drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described federated credential audience mismatch case. The correct safeguard is: test federated assertion claims as a set during identity-provider updates rather than weakening subject restrictions.

This control manages future github oidc federated credential drift, but it does not reduce the continuing exposure in the described federated credential audience mismatch case. The correct safeguard is: test federated assertion claims as a set during identity-provider updates rather than weakening subject restrictions.