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96 Questions & Answers

Last Update: Oct 12, 2026

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Juniper JN0-664 Practice Test 79

Question 780

During a managed service audit, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A customer is itself a carrier and must transport its own customer VPN labels over another provider's backbone without exposing individual downstream routes. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?

  1. Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants.
  2. Perform control-plane and data-plane inter-AS checks on every provider handoff.
  3. Require service-route and labeled-transport checks as separate release gates.
  4. Test label reachability and unauthorized route separation at the provider boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Test label reachability and unauthorized route separation at the provider boundary. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: Carrier-of-carriers service can transport another carrier's label-switched traffic across a provider without importing every downstream customer route. During audits, confirm: The carrier receives the agreed label transport and its customer routes remain isolated from the backbone provider's tenant control plane.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Carrier supporting carrier labeled service and the confirming observation is: The carrier receives the agreed label transport and its customer routes remain isolated from the backbone provider's tenant control plane.

B:

Perform control-plane and data-plane inter-AS checks on every provider handoff. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Interprovider option C transport. Interprovider option C relies on resolving remote PE next hops with a suitable inter-AS labeled path while VPN routes can be exchanged separately. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Carrier supporting carrier labeled service and the confirming observation is: The carrier receives the agreed label transport and its customer routes remain isolated from the backbone provider's tenant control plane.

C:

Require service-route and labeled-transport checks as separate release gates. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically MPLS transport label missing. A usable L3VPN data path requires provider transport reachability in addition to customer service route advertisements. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Carrier supporting carrier labeled service and the confirming observation is: The carrier receives the agreed label transport and its customer routes remain isolated from the backbone provider's tenant control plane.

Question 781

During a control-plane reliability review, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two tenants need controlled access to one shared DNS service but must not exchange routes with each other. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?

  1. Check which prefixes and RTs are imported into the shared-services and tenant VRFs.
  2. Compare hub/spoke route-target import/export policy with the route distribution topology.
  3. Inspect overlapping RT export/import values and exact received VPN routes.
  4. Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Check which prefixes and RTs are imported into the shared-services and tenant VRFs. This check examines the decisive condition for VRF route leaking to shared service before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. The confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Compare hub/spoke route-target import/export policy with the route distribution topology. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

C:

Inspect overlapping RT export/import values and exact received VPN routes. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route target leak between tenants. Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

D:

Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Question 782

During a service-provider escalation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two tenants need controlled access to one shared DNS service but must not exchange routes with each other. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?

  1. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches.
  2. Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants.
  3. Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique.
  4. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes. The targeted correction is: Import only scoped shared-service and return-path routes with appropriate policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

C:

Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route target leak between tenants. Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

D:

A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Question 783

During a new PE-router service turn-up, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two tenants need controlled access to one shared DNS service but must not exchange routes with each other. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?

  1. Branch VRFs lack direct peer branch routes while the hub has the intended forwarding reachability.
  2. Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist.
  3. Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.
  4. The core holds separate VPNv4 routes with distinct RDs for the identical customer IPv4 prefix.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Branch VRFs lack direct peer branch routes while the hub has the intended forwarding reachability. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

B:

Cross-tenant VPN routes disappear after RT isolation while authorized same-tenant routes persist. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route target leak between tenants. Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

D:

The core holds separate VPNv4 routes with distinct RDs for the identical customer IPv4 prefix. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Question 784

During a customer VPN change window, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two tenants need controlled access to one shared DNS service but must not exchange routes with each other. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?

  1. Implement asymmetric hub/spoke RT exchange and validate hub routing and return paths.
  2. Assign distinct RT policies to isolated tenants and restrict any deliberate route leaking.
  3. Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance.
  4. Import only scoped shared-service and return-path routes with appropriate policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Import only scoped shared-service and return-path routes with appropriate policy. The change addresses the root behavior described here: Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. Verify success with: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement asymmetric hub/spoke RT exchange and validate hub routing and return paths. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

B:

Assign distinct RT policies to isolated tenants and restrict any deliberate route leaking. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route target leak between tenants. Shared route-target import membership can intentionally or accidentally connect routing domains even when route distinguishers remain unique. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

C:

Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Question 785

During a core-routing migration rehearsal, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: Two tenants need controlled access to one shared DNS service but must not exchange routes with each other. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?

  1. Keep negative cross-tenant tests and a shared-service route inventory.
  2. Test branch-to-branch isolation even when all BGP sessions are healthy.
  3. Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants.
  4. Test tenant isolation and label forwarding across the AS boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Keep negative cross-tenant tests and a shared-service route inventory. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: Shared service access requires deliberate selective route leaking, not global RT membership across all tenants. During audits, confirm: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Test branch-to-branch isolation even when all BGP sessions are healthy. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN hub-and-spoke controlled import. VPN hub-and-spoke restrictions are enforced through route distribution and topology policy, not merely by naming sites branches. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

C:

Check RD uniqueness separately from route target policy when onboarding overlapping tenants. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

D:

Test tenant isolation and label forwarding across the AS boundary. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Interprovider VPN option B. Interprovider option B can exchange labeled VPNv4 routes between ASBRs to extend VPNs across provider domains. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is VRF route leaking to shared service and the confirming observation is: Each tenant reaches the authorized DNS prefix but cannot install another tenant's unrelated prefixes.

Question 786

During a customer service restoration, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: IPv4 L3VPN routes work but a new IPv6 service prefix never arrives at a remote PE even though both CEs have IPv6 addresses. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?

  1. Inspect OSPF path types and the applicability of a sham-link design for the PE-to-PE VPN.
  2. Inspect negotiated VPNv6 address family and IPv6-specific VRF route policy.
  3. Inspect the VPN route's BGP next hop and the IGP/MPLS path to that specific loopback.
  4. Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Inspect negotiated VPNv6 address family and IPv6-specific VRF route policy. This check examines the decisive condition for IPv6 VPN reachability before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success. The confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Inspect OSPF path types and the applicability of a sham-link design for the PE-to-PE VPN. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Sham link OSPF backdoor preference. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

C:

Inspect the VPN route's BGP next hop and the IGP/MPLS path to that specific loopback. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN next-hop not reachable. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

D:

Inspect each VRF's route distinguisher and the resulting VPN-IPv4 prefix identifiers. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Question 787

During an edge-to-core validation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: IPv4 L3VPN routes work but a new IPv6 service prefix never arrives at a remote PE even though both CEs have IPv6 addresses. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?

  1. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue.
  2. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path.
  3. IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success.
  4. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE. The targeted correction is: Enable the supported IPv6 VPN family with matching route targets and forwarding.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Sham link OSPF backdoor preference. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

B:

VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN next-hop not reachable. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

D:

A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Question 788

During a high-availability validation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: IPv4 L3VPN routes work but a new IPv6 service prefix never arrives at a remote PE even though both CEs have IPv6 addresses. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?

  1. The PE-provided path competes in the expected OSPF intra-area calculation with correct forwarding.
  2. Both peers negotiate VPNv4 and exchange the intended customer routes.
  3. The remote PE loopback is reachable through labeled transport and the VPN route becomes usable.
  4. IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The PE-provided path competes in the expected OSPF intra-area calculation with correct forwarding. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Sham link OSPF backdoor preference. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

B:

Both peers negotiate VPNv4 and exchange the intended customer routes. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically MP-BGP VPNv4 family absent. An established BGP session for IPv4 unicast does not automatically enable VPNv4 address-family exchange. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

C:

The remote PE loopback is reachable through labeled transport and the VPN route becomes usable. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN next-hop not reachable. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Question 789

During a Junos routing maintenance review, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: IPv4 L3VPN routes work but a new IPv6 service prefix never arrives at a remote PE even though both CEs have IPv6 addresses. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?

  1. Enable the supported IPv6 VPN family with matching route targets and forwarding.
  2. Configure a supported sham link only when the customer's OSPF design requires it and transport is validated.
  3. Restore underlying PE loopback routing and label reachability.
  4. Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Enable the supported IPv6 VPN family with matching route targets and forwarding. The change addresses the root behavior described here: IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success. Verify success with: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure a supported sham link only when the customer's OSPF design requires it and transport is validated. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Sham link OSPF backdoor preference. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

C:

Restore underlying PE loopback routing and label reachability. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN next-hop not reachable. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

D:

Configure unique appropriate RDs on each relevant PE routing instance. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Route distinguisher for overlapping customer routes. A route distinguisher makes overlapping customer IPv4 prefixes distinguishable in VPN-IPv4 NLRI, but does not by itself decide route import. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Question 790

During a multisite network cutover, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: IPv4 L3VPN routes work but a new IPv6 service prefix never arrives at a remote PE even though both CEs have IPv6 addresses. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?

  1. Model backdoor failure and path restoration before modifying customer OSPF area design.
  2. Verify IPv4 and IPv6 VPN route sets separately during dual-stack expansion.
  3. Verify each negotiated address family during VPN onboarding.
  4. Watch hidden VPN routes and underlay route loss together.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Verify IPv4 and IPv6 VPN route sets separately during dual-stack expansion. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: IPv6 L3VPN route exchange needs the appropriate MP-BGP address family and IPv6 route handling independent of IPv4 VPN success. During audits, confirm: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Model backdoor failure and path restoration before modifying customer OSPF area design. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically Sham link OSPF backdoor preference. An OSPF sham link can make the provider path appear as an intra-area option to address a backdoor path-type preference issue. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

C:

Verify each negotiated address family during VPN onboarding. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically MP-BGP VPNv4 family absent. An established BGP session for IPv4 unicast does not automatically enable VPNv4 address-family exchange. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.

D:

Watch hidden VPN routes and underlay route loss together. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different Layer 3 VPNs condition, specifically VPN next-hop not reachable. VPN control-plane reachability is not enough; the remote PE next hop must resolve to a usable provider transport path. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is IPv6 VPN reachability and the confirming observation is: IPv6 VPN routes appear and their transport next hops resolve to the correct remote PE.


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