Question 360
During a service-provider escalation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A Junos border router learns a BGP path but an active static route wins the RIB, so the BGP path is not exported as the team expected. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Log origin attribute changes when redistributing or aggregating BGP routes.
- Check recursive next-hop reachability from representative internal routers when adding EBGP peers.
- Check interaction between RIB preference and BGP local preference in mixed-protocol reviews.
- Test what happens when the static winner disappears before permitting inactive advertisements.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Test what happens when the static winner disappears before permitting inactive advertisements. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: BGP normally exports eligible active routes; advertise-inactive has bounded semantics and may permit a nonactive BGP path when a non-BGP route is active. During audits, confirm: Neighbor advertisements include the intended nonactive BGP path only under supported and explicitly reviewed conditions.
Incorrect Answers
A:Log origin attribute changes when redistributing or aggregating BGP routes. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Junos advertise-inactive semantics and the confirming observation is: Neighbor advertisements include the intended nonactive BGP path only under supported and explicitly reviewed conditions.
B:Check recursive next-hop reachability from representative internal routers when adding EBGP peers. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP next-hop-self at border. Passing external reachability into IBGP without a reachable next hop can leave the route unusable for internal clients. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Junos advertise-inactive semantics and the confirming observation is: Neighbor advertisements include the intended nonactive BGP path only under supported and explicitly reviewed conditions.
C:Check interaction between RIB preference and BGP local preference in mixed-protocol reviews. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically Route preference versus BGP local-pref. Junos chooses among protocols using route preference before BGP's local preference decides among BGP candidates. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is Junos advertise-inactive semantics and the confirming observation is: Neighbor advertisements include the intended nonactive BGP path only under supported and explicitly reviewed conditions.
Question 361
During a core-routing migration rehearsal, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A service provider wants to distribute a targeted network-layer DDoS rate or discard action across eligible routers without hand-editing a firewall filter on every box. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?
- Verify the intended FlowSpec family, validation controls and match/action encoding before accepting rules.
- Compare origin codes and verify no earlier tie-break attributes differ.
- Inspect firewall counters and TCP establishment attempts between the configured BGP endpoints.
- Compare AS_PATH lengths and any policy that rewrites higher-priority attributes.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Verify the intended FlowSpec family, validation controls and match/action encoding before accepting rules. This check examines the decisive condition for BGP flow specification mitigation before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support. The confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Incorrect Answers
B:Compare origin codes and verify no earlier tie-break attributes differ. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
C:Inspect firewall counters and TCP establishment attempts between the configured BGP endpoints. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
D:Compare AS_PATH lengths and any policy that rewrites higher-priority attributes. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically AS-path length selection. After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Question 362
During a backbone POP acceptance review, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A service provider wants to distribute a targeted network-layer DDoS rate or discard action across eligible routers without hand-editing a firewall filter on every box. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?
- At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred.
- BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support.
- BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages.
- After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria. The targeted correction is: Deploy controlled FlowSpec import validation and a bounded mitigation action for the exact attack signature.
Incorrect Answers
A:At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
C:BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
D:After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically AS-path length selection. After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Question 363
During an overnight NOC investigation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A service provider wants to distribute a targeted network-layer DDoS rate or discard action across eligible routers without hand-editing a firewall filter on every box. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?
- The route with the preferred origin becomes best under otherwise equal higher-priority attributes.
- TCP handshake completes and BGP reaches Established after the targeted filter correction.
- The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
- The shortest eligible AS path becomes preferred once conflicting policy overrides are removed.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support.
Incorrect Answers
A:The route with the preferred origin becomes best under otherwise equal higher-priority attributes. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
B:TCP handshake completes and BGP reaches Established after the targeted filter correction. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
D:The shortest eligible AS path becomes preferred once conflicting policy overrides are removed. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically AS-path length selection. After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Question 364
During a customer service restoration, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A service provider wants to distribute a targeted network-layer DDoS rate or discard action across eligible routers without hand-editing a firewall filter on every box. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?
- Correct unwanted origin-setting policy if the preferred path must differ.
- Allow the authorized BGP endpoint and TCP flow through the control-plane filter rather than disabling filtering globally.
- Correct route-policy attributes or prepend design to implement the intended preference.
- Deploy controlled FlowSpec import validation and a bounded mitigation action for the exact attack signature.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Deploy controlled FlowSpec import validation and a bounded mitigation action for the exact attack signature. The change addresses the root behavior described here: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support. Verify success with: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Incorrect Answers
A:Correct unwanted origin-setting policy if the preferred path must differ. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
B:Allow the authorized BGP endpoint and TCP flow through the control-plane filter rather than disabling filtering globally. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
C:Correct route-policy attributes or prepend design to implement the intended preference. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically AS-path length selection. After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Question 365
During an edge-to-core validation, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A service provider wants to distribute a targeted network-layer DDoS rate or discard action across eligible routers without hand-editing a firewall filter on every box. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Enforce expiry, approval and emergency rollback for distributed traffic filters.
- Log origin attribute changes when redistributing or aggregating BGP routes.
- Track approved BGP peer addresses and rule hits in edge firewall audits.
- Audit path-length and local preference before changing peering relationships.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Enforce expiry, approval and emergency rollback for distributed traffic filters. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-match rules with associated actions through BGP control-plane updates, subject to validation and platform support. During audits, confirm: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Incorrect Answers
B:Log origin attribute changes when redistributing or aggregating BGP routes. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP ORIGIN attribute tie. At the applicable BGP selection stage, lower origin-type value (IGP before incomplete) is preferred. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
C:Track approved BGP peer addresses and rule hits in edge firewall audits. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
D:Audit path-length and local preference before changing peering relationships. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically AS-path length selection. After equal higher-priority selection attributes, BGP generally prefers the shorter AS path among eligible candidate paths. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is BGP flow specification mitigation and the confirming observation is: The authorized FlowSpec rule appears on target routers and affects only test traffic matching its criteria.
Question 366
During a multisite network cutover, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A newly distributed FlowSpec rule drops legitimate customer traffic because its destination match covers an entire customer aggregate instead of one attacked host. Which targeted check most directly distinguishes the likely cause before a configuration change?
- Examine prefix-match length logic, policy order and received route attributes.
- Inspect FlowSpec destination-prefix and protocol/port components and active actions.
- Inspect the effective group and neighbor policy hierarchy rather than only the neighbor stanza.
- Inspect firewall counters and TCP establishment attempts between the configured BGP endpoints.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Inspect FlowSpec destination-prefix and protocol/port components and active actions. This check examines the decisive condition for FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix before any unrelated changes are made. The underlying mechanism is: A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation. The confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Incorrect Answers
A:Examine prefix-match length logic, policy order and received route attributes. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP import policy overmatching. Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
C:Inspect the effective group and neighbor policy hierarchy rather than only the neighbor stanza. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP peer group policy inheritance. Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
D:Inspect firewall counters and TCP establishment attempts between the configured BGP endpoints. This is a plausible diagnostic check for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Question 367
During a metro aggregation incident, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A newly distributed FlowSpec rule drops legitimate customer traffic because its destination match covers an entire customer aggregate instead of one attacked host. Which routing or service mechanism best explains the reported behavior?
- Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement.
- Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy.
- A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation.
- BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages.
Explanation
Correct Answer
C:A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation. This is the causal rule that fits the observed state, not just a correlated symptom. To distinguish it from other failures, look for: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action. The targeted correction is: Narrow the destination and other flow components before advertising the mitigation.
Incorrect Answers
A:Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP import policy overmatching. Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
B:Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP peer group policy inheritance. Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
D:BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. This is a plausible protocol explanation for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP TCP filtering. BGP relies on a permitted TCP session to exchange OPEN, KEEPALIVE and UPDATE messages. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Question 368
During a managed service audit, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A newly distributed FlowSpec rule drops legitimate customer traffic because its destination match covers an entire customer aggregate instead of one attacked host. After the appropriate response, which observation would best confirm that the stated service condition is handled correctly?
- The prohibited route is hidden or rejected while the specifically approved routes remain installed.
- The reflector advertises the client's eligible route to other configured clients as designed.
- The new neighbor's advertised prefixes and tags match an explicitly reviewed effective configuration.
- Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Explanation
Correct Answer
D:Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action. This observation directly tests the fault hypothesis rather than simply showing that a session or interface exists. The underlying reason is: A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation.
Incorrect Answers
A:The prohibited route is hidden or rejected while the specifically approved routes remain installed. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP import policy overmatching. Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
B:The reflector advertises the client's eligible route to other configured clients as designed. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically Route-reflector client reflection rule. Route-reflection rules distinguish routes received from clients and nonclients; misclassified clients may prevent intended redistribution. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
C:The new neighbor's advertised prefixes and tags match an explicitly reviewed effective configuration. This is a plausible observed evidence for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP peer group policy inheritance. Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Question 369
During a network architecture troubleshooting workshop, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A newly distributed FlowSpec rule drops legitimate customer traffic because its destination match covers an entire customer aggregate instead of one attacked host. Which response or focused corrective action best addresses this situation without changing unrelated components?
- Narrow the destination and other flow components before advertising the mitigation.
- Constrain the prefix list or route-filter match semantics to the intended prefix lengths.
- Correct route-reflector-client relationships and keep route selection policy consistent.
- Move the peer to the intended group or override supported policy at the appropriate scope.
Explanation
Correct Answer
A:Narrow the destination and other flow components before advertising the mitigation. The change addresses the root behavior described here: A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation. Verify success with: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Incorrect Answers
B:Constrain the prefix list or route-filter match semantics to the intended prefix lengths. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP import policy overmatching. Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
C:Correct route-reflector-client relationships and keep route selection policy consistent. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically Route-reflector client reflection rule. Route-reflection rules distinguish routes received from clients and nonclients; misclassified clients may prevent intended redistribution. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
D:Move the peer to the intended group or override supported policy at the appropriate scope. This is a plausible configuration or operational fix for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP peer group policy inheritance. Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Question 370
During an inter-POP failover test, an HPE Juniper Networking engineer investigates this situation: A newly distributed FlowSpec rule drops legitimate customer traffic because its destination match covers an entire customer aggregate instead of one attacked host. Which operational control would best prevent a recurrence of this exact failure mode?
- Run policy tests against boundary subnet lengths before installing route filters.
- Test each rule against harmless nonmatching flows and maintain a rapid withdraw procedure.
- Validate client-to-client route propagation in route-reflector regression tests.
- Review inherited policy on a per-neighbor basis before moving BGP sessions.
Explanation
Correct Answer
B:Test each rule against harmless nonmatching flows and maintain a rapid withdraw procedure. The control limits repetition of the described root condition: A FlowSpec rule's match components directly determine which packets receive the advertised mitigation. During audits, confirm: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Incorrect Answers
A:Run policy tests against boundary subnet lengths before installing route filters. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP import policy overmatching. Prefix matching can include unintended more-specifics when the term is broader than the intended exact route requirement. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
C:Validate client-to-client route propagation in route-reflector regression tests. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically Route-reflector client reflection rule. Route-reflection rules distinguish routes received from clients and nonclients; misclassified clients may prevent intended redistribution. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
D:Review inherited policy on a per-neighbor basis before moving BGP sessions. This is a plausible preventive practice for a different BGP condition, specifically BGP peer group policy inheritance. Junos BGP peers inherit group-level settings unless correctly overridden, so peer placement changes effective policy. In this scenario, however, the distinguishing issue is FlowSpec overbroad destination prefix and the confirming observation is: Test traffic to unaffected hosts remains forwarded while traffic to the attacked destination matches the intended action.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-SP) (JN0-664) Practice Tests