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Providing a router or routed switch interface for each subnet with appropriate policy would not publish the application behind a hardened reverse proxy and block direct origin reachability.

Using a suitably tuned inline intrusion prevention function for the attack path would not publish the application behind a hardened reverse proxy and block direct origin reachability.

Configuring application-relevant health checks and removing failed targets automatically would not publish the application behind a hardened reverse proxy and block direct origin reachability.

A blocked test packet proves enforcement, not merely detection. That check cannot demonstrate the authorized proxy forwarding path.

A working Layer 3 path establishes correct routed connectivity. That check cannot demonstrate the authorized proxy forwarding path.

Try an approved site and a blocked destination with a test user. That check cannot demonstrate the authorized proxy forwarding path.

The missing control is a forward proxy enforcing client egress policy before browsing reaches internet destinations.

No Layer 3 device forwards between the distinct IP networks. That does not establish the authorized proxy forwarding path.

Unhealthy backends remain eligible for traffic distribution. The missing change involves origin servers are unnecessarily exposed to direct internet access.

Installing an appropriately managed access switch and connecting it to the existing uplink would not meet the need for a NAS file service with appropriate SMB or NFS access controls.

Using a suitably tuned inline intrusion prevention function for the attack path would not meet the need for a NAS file service with appropriate SMB or NFS access controls.

Deploying stateful filtering allowing approved inbound sessions and their return traffic would not meet the need for a NAS file service with appropriate SMB or NFS access controls.

Learning multiple hosts proves the local switching function. That check cannot demonstrate mount the shared directory from two authorized clients and test permissions.

A blocked test packet proves enforcement, not merely detection. That check cannot demonstrate mount the shared directory from two authorized clients and test permissions.

Try an approved site and a blocked destination with a test user. That check cannot demonstrate mount the shared directory from two authorized clients and test permissions.

The office lacks sufficient local Layer 2 access ports. That does not establish consistent application text encoding and decoding.

Passive detection does not interrupt malicious flows. That does not establish consistent application text encoding and decoding.

The missing control is a forward proxy enforcing client egress policy before browsing reaches internet destinations. That does not establish consistent application text encoding and decoding.

Adding scoped reciprocal traffic rules for the actual return direction and ports would not remove unintended public ingress and constrain cloud network policy to approved peers.

Establishing a managed site-to-site IPsec VPN with correct selectors and routing would not remove unintended public ingress and constrain cloud network policy to approved peers.

Using the provider's supported dedicated connectivity service with redundant paths would not remove unintended public ingress and constrain cloud network policy to approved peers.

SYN-ACK propagation proves reciprocal stateless rules are correct. It does not test public reachability denial while internal allowed connections succeed.

Encrypted packet and end-to-end evidence validate the tunnel. It does not test public reachability denial while internal allowed connections succeed.

Link and failover measurements demonstrate the design objective. It does not test public reachability denial while internal allowed connections succeed.

Stateful firewalls can distinguish permitted connection initiation from return traffic. That does not establish network exposure contradicts the private subnet requirement.

Private network traffic crosses an untrusted transport. That does not establish network exposure contradicts the private subnet requirement.

NAT rewrites connection addresses or ports according to an explicit translation rule. That does not establish network exposure contradicts the private subnet requirement.

Routing outbound internet traffic through an approved NAT gateway while preserving private ingress restrictions would not apply only needed session-initiation rules in the stateful security group.

Establishing a managed site-to-site IPsec VPN with correct selectors and routing would not apply only needed session-initiation rules in the stateful security group.

Using the provider's supported dedicated connectivity service with redundant paths would not apply only needed session-initiation rules in the stateful security group.

Outbound success with inbound denial validates translation boundaries. That check cannot demonstrate initiate an allowed outbound connection without a separate return inbound rule.

Link and failover measurements demonstrate the design objective. That check cannot demonstrate initiate an allowed outbound connection without a separate return inbound rule.

Encrypted packet and end-to-end evidence validate the tunnel. That check cannot demonstrate initiate an allowed outbound connection without a separate return inbound rule.