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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The blocked connection succeeds while a reverse-direction counter increases on an unrelated rule. Here the recorded observation is: client SYN leaves successfully but response packets are denied at the inbound enforcement point. The applicable cause is: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A new application fails because no permit exists for its destination in the applied ACL. Here the recorded observation is: client SYN leaves successfully but response packets are denied at the inbound enforcement point. The applicable cause is: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The hostile subnet still reaches the SVI because the ACL was applied outbound toward users. Here the recorded observation is: client SYN leaves successfully but response packets are denied at the inbound enforcement point. The applicable cause is: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state.

That control reduces a separate risk: ACL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state. The specific required safeguard is: validate bidirectional flows and avoid assuming a stateless ACL is an application firewall.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ACL rule is written for response traffic rather than the initiating packet direction. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state. The specific required safeguard is: validate bidirectional flows and avoid assuming a stateless ACL is an application firewall.

That control reduces a separate risk: The implicit `deny ip any any` at the end blocks unmatched traffic. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the stateless ACL has no matching permit for return packets and does not track connection state. The specific required safeguard is: validate bidirectional flows and avoid assuming a stateless ACL is an application firewall.

Configuring a supported IPv6 ACL with required IPv6 matches and attaching it using the correct IPv6 interface direction would not attach the ACL at an actual routed interface carrying the traffic in the intended direction.

Applying an IPv4 ACL with appropriate source/destination matching on the ingress SVI for the documented flow direction would not attach the ACL at an actual routed interface carrying the traffic in the intended direction.

The needed correction is to attach the ACL at an actual routed interface carrying the traffic in the intended direction.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect inbound ACL counters and successful permitted traffic in the unaffected direction. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run interface counters and a controlled deny test on the true forwarding path.

This test measures a different behavior: Check IPv6 ACL counters and SSH reachability from allowed and denied IPv6 sources. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run interface counters and a controlled deny test on the true forwarding path.

This test measures a different behavior: Trace a single TCP SYN and verify the intended ACL entry increments on the correct interface. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: run interface counters and a controlled deny test on the true forwarding path.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: IPv6 management traffic remains open even though an IPv4 `ip access-group` exists. Here the recorded observation is: disallowed traffic continues through the active VLAN interface without any ACL hits. The applicable cause is: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The hostile subnet still reaches the SVI because the ACL was applied outbound toward users. Here the recorded observation is: disallowed traffic continues through the active VLAN interface without any ACL hits. The applicable cause is: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The blocked connection succeeds while a reverse-direction counter increases on an unrelated rule. Here the recorded observation is: disallowed traffic continues through the active VLAN interface without any ACL hits. The applicable cause is: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ACL rule is written for response traffic rather than the initiating packet direction. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path. The specific required safeguard is: verify real interface forwarding membership after VLAN and gateway migrations.

That control reduces a separate risk: The IPv4 ACL does not independently filter IPv6 traffic. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path. The specific required safeguard is: verify real interface forwarding membership after VLAN and gateway migrations.

That control reduces a separate risk: ACL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path. The specific required safeguard is: verify real interface forwarding membership after VLAN and gateway migrations.

Management traffic is processed in the CPU and lacks suitable control-plane rate controls. The control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

Legitimate routing-control packets are mistakenly classified into a low-rate drop class. The control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

Data-plane interface ACL enforcement was mistaken for explicit control-plane policing. The control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

This test measures a different behavior: Generate controlled packets to router-local addresses and inspect control-plane class counters. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check CoPP class counters and routing adjacency stability during controlled punt-rate tests.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect CoPP drop counters for OSPF and verify neighbor adjacency recovers. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check CoPP class counters and routing adjacency stability during controlled punt-rate tests.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare CPU load, CoPP counters and authorized monitoring success before and after tuning. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: check CoPP class counters and routing adjacency stability during controlled punt-rate tests.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Traffic destined to the router CPU remains unpoliced although a transit-forwarding ACL exists. Here the recorded observation is: the CPU becomes saturated because excessive punted packets reach the routing process. The applicable cause is: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Healthy physical links show OSPF neighbors flapping only after CoPP activation. Here the recorded observation is: the CPU becomes saturated because excessive punted packets reach the routing process. The applicable cause is: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A small volume of repeated SNMP requests causes control-plane slowdown without link saturation. Here the recorded observation is: the CPU becomes saturated because excessive punted packets reach the routing process. The applicable cause is: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class.

That control reduces a separate risk: Management traffic is processed in the CPU and lacks suitable control-plane rate controls. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class. The specific required safeguard is: capacity-test control-plane policy exemptions before deploying tighter police rates.

That control reduces a separate risk: Legitimate routing-control packets are mistakenly classified into a low-rate drop class. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class. The specific required safeguard is: capacity-test control-plane policy exemptions before deploying tighter police rates.

That control reduces a separate risk: Data-plane interface ACL enforcement was mistaken for explicit control-plane policing. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the control plane lacks an effective policing policy for the abusive punt class. The specific required safeguard is: capacity-test control-plane policy exemptions before deploying tighter police rates.

Rate-limit or classify SNMP management-plane traffic through appropriate CoPP/management controls would not correct the CoPP class and policing rate for authorized OSPF control traffic rather than opening all packets.

Tune control-plane policing rates and traffic classes for real platform traffic levels and route-scale demands would not correct the CoPP class and policing rate for authorized OSPF control traffic rather than opening all packets.

The needed correction is to correct the CoPP class and policing rate for authorized OSPF control traffic rather than opening all packets.