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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Hosts in the adjacent half of 198.51.100.0/24 are unexpectedly permitted. Here the recorded observation is: a general permit line above the intended deny lets every source use the server HTTPS service. The applicable cause is: aCL first-match evaluation encounters the overly broad permit before restrictive entries.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The blocked connection succeeds while a reverse-direction counter increases on an unrelated rule. Here the recorded observation is: a general permit line above the intended deny lets every source use the server HTTPS service. The applicable cause is: aCL first-match evaluation encounters the overly broad permit before restrictive entries.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The broad standard ACL blocks all protocols from a source instead of only HTTPS. Here the recorded observation is: a general permit line above the intended deny lets every source use the server HTTPS service. The applicable cause is: aCL first-match evaluation encounters the overly broad permit before restrictive entries.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect ACL syntax and test the intended port-specific application path. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test allowed and denied host-to-server TCP443 connections and inspect ACL counters.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ACL rule is written for response traffic rather than the initiating packet direction. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aCL first-match evaluation encounters the overly broad permit before restrictive entries. The specific required safeguard is: review ACL top-down order and explicit control tests before applying to production interfaces.

The needed correction is to apply an ordered extended ACL permitting the specified TCP443 tuple and deny unintended matching flows at the correct interface/direction.

Attaching the ACL at an actual routed interface carrying the traffic in the intended direction would not apply an IPv4 ACL with appropriate source/destination matching on the ingress SVI for the documented flow direction.

Configuring a supported IPv6 ACL with required IPv6 matches and attaching it using the correct IPv6 interface direction would not apply an IPv4 ACL with appropriate source/destination matching on the ingress SVI for the documented flow direction.

Write explicit permitted return-flow conditions or use a supported stateful security feature where required would not apply an IPv4 ACL with appropriate source/destination matching on the ingress SVI for the documented flow direction.

This test measures a different behavior: Check IPv6 ACL counters and SSH reachability from allowed and denied IPv6 sources. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect inbound ACL counters and successful permitted traffic in the unaffected direction.

This test measures a different behavior: Run interface counters and a controlled deny test on the true forwarding path. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect inbound ACL counters and successful permitted traffic in the unaffected direction.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect ACL syntax and test the intended port-specific application path. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect inbound ACL counters and successful permitted traffic in the unaffected direction.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The broad standard ACL blocks all protocols from a source instead of only HTTPS. Here the recorded observation is: the hostile subnet still reaches the SVI because the ACL was applied outbound toward users. The applicable cause is: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: IPv6 management traffic remains open even though an IPv4 `ip access-group` exists. Here the recorded observation is: the hostile subnet still reaches the SVI because the ACL was applied outbound toward users. The applicable cause is: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Disallowed traffic continues through the active VLAN interface without any ACL hits. Here the recorded observation is: the hostile subnet still reaches the SVI because the ACL was applied outbound toward users. The applicable cause is: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets.

That control reduces a separate risk: Standard IPv4 ACLs do not express the destination/port tuple needed for this policy. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets. The specific required safeguard is: document direction using source-to-destination packet diagrams in ACL reviews.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ACL was applied on a logical interface outside the flow's forwarding path. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets. The specific required safeguard is: document direction using source-to-destination packet diagrams in ACL reviews.

That control reduces a separate risk: The IPv4 ACL does not independently filter IPv6 traffic. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: aCL interface direction was reversed relative to arriving attack packets. The specific required safeguard is: document direction using source-to-destination packet diagrams in ACL reviews.

Order specific management permits would not address the need for DNS configuration. The ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow.

The needed correction is to account for both required UDP and TCP DNS flows with scoped service entries for approved peers.

Applying an ordered extended ACL permitting the specified TCP443 tuple and deny unintended matching flows at the correct interface/direction would not address the need for DNS configuration.

This test measures a different behavior: Trace a single TCP SYN and verify the intended ACL entry increments on the correct interface. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test UDP queries and an authorized TCP zone transfer, checking ACL hit counts.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect ordered ACL entries and hit counts for allowed management and blocked user hosts. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test UDP queries and an authorized TCP zone transfer, checking ACL hit counts.

This test measures a different behavior: Test allowed and denied host-to-server TCP443 connections and inspect ACL counters. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: test UDP queries and an authorized TCP zone transfer, checking ACL hit counts.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: The blocked connection succeeds while a reverse-direction counter increases on an unrelated rule. Here the recorded observation is: ordinary DNS queries work but secondary DNS zone transfers fail. The applicable cause is: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: SSH from an approved jump box is denied despite a permit statement lower in the list. Here the recorded observation is: ordinary DNS queries work but secondary DNS zone transfers fail. The applicable cause is: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A general permit line above the intended deny lets every source use the server HTTPS service. Here the recorded observation is: ordinary DNS queries work but secondary DNS zone transfers fail. The applicable cause is: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow.

That control reduces a separate risk: ACL processing stops at the earlier matching deny line and never reaches the later permit. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow. The specific required safeguard is: review protocol requirements and allowed DNS peer scope before applying service ACLs.

That control reduces a separate risk: ACL first-match evaluation encounters the overly broad permit before restrictive entries. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow. The specific required safeguard is: review protocol requirements and allowed DNS peer scope before applying service ACLs.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ACL rule is written for response traffic rather than the initiating packet direction. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the ACL permits UDP53 but omits the required TCP53 flow. The specific required safeguard is: review protocol requirements and allowed DNS peer scope before applying service ACLs.

Applying an ordered extended ACL permitting the specified TCP443 tuple and deny unintended matching flows at the correct interface/direction would not add required explicit permits.

Order specific management permits would not add required explicit permits. The implicit `deny ip any any` at the end blocks unmatched traffic.

Attaching the ACL at an actual routed interface carrying the traffic in the intended direction would not add required explicit permits. The implicit `deny ip any any` at the end blocks unmatched traffic.