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That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Untrusted LAN hosts receive OSPF Hellos and can attempt to form adjacencies. Here the recorded observation is: external prefixes still appear in OSPF despite a changed inter-area summary range. The applicable cause is: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Area0 contains dozens of separate intra-area destinations from area10 with no consolidated summary. Here the recorded observation is: external prefixes still appear in OSPF despite a changed inter-area summary range. The applicable cause is: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: External routes are absent inside the stub despite a working internal adjacency. Here the recorded observation is: external prefixes still appear in OSPF despite a changed inter-area summary range. The applicable cause is: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set.

That control reduces a separate risk: The user-facing interface is active for OSPF neighbor discovery instead of passive. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set. The specific required safeguard is: review external redistribution policy separately from ABR inter-area ranges.

That control reduces a separate risk: Stub areas suppress Type 5 external LSAs; the expectation of normal external flooding was wrong. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set. The specific required safeguard is: review external redistribution policy separately from ABR inter-area ranges.

That control reduces a separate risk: The ABR has no correctly scoped inter-area summary range for the advertised prefixes. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the area range controls inter-area summarization, not the ASBR's redistributed external LSA set. The specific required safeguard is: review external redistribution policy separately from ABR inter-area ranges.

Correcting the neighbor IP to the reachable remote interface address and validating local source selection would not configure the neighbor address with the correct remote autonomous-system number and reachable interface source.

Originate only the intended present RIB prefixes using valid BGP network or controlled redistribution policy would not configure the neighbor address with the correct remote autonomous-system number and reachable interface source.

Applying an explicit outbound BGP prefix list or route-map advertising only approved public networks would not configure the neighbor address with the correct remote autonomous-system number and reachable interface source.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect the AS_PATH actually advertised to backup and primary providers. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify TCP179 and BGP Established state plus exchanged prefixes on both routers.

This test measures a different behavior: Compare BGP locally originated and advertised routes with the underlying RIB for the subnet. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify TCP179 and BGP Established state plus exchanged prefixes on both routers.

This test measures a different behavior: Check advertised-routes from the local neighbor and confirm private RFC1918 entries are absent. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: verify TCP179 and BGP Established state plus exchanged prefixes on both routers.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Internal 10.0.0.0/8 summaries appear in a third-party eBGP peer's received table. Here the recorded observation is: the eBGP peer remains in Active because the remote-as is configured as the same local AS. The applicable cause is: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: BGP Established appears healthy but the neighbor learns zero intended customer routes. Here the recorded observation is: the eBGP peer remains in Active because the remote-as is configured as the same local AS. The applicable cause is: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Neighbor stays Idle/Active while an IP ping to a different remote address succeeds. Here the recorded observation is: the eBGP peer remains in Active because the remote-as is configured as the same local AS. The applicable cause is: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN.

That control reduces a separate risk: The BGP outbound advertisement policy does not restrict routes to the approved customer prefix set. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN. The specific required safeguard is: audit local/remote ASNs and interface addresses before deploying peering.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configured BGP neighbor destination is not the address actually used by the peer. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN. The specific required safeguard is: audit local/remote ASNs and interface addresses before deploying peering.

That control reduces a separate risk: The required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the neighbor AS setting does not match the actual external peer ASN. The specific required safeguard is: audit local/remote ASNs and interface addresses before deploying peering.

Comparing valid BGP AS path lengths at the appropriate decision stage and selecting shorter path when higher priorities tie would not address the need for originate only the intended present RIB prefixes using valid BGP network or controlled redistribution policy.

Restoring next-hop reachability through appropriate IGP/static routing or supported next-hop-self policy where required would not address the need for originate only the intended present RIB prefixes using valid BGP network or controlled redistribution policy.

Correcting the neighbor IP to the reachable remote interface address and validating local source selection would not address the need for originate only the intended present RIB prefixes using valid BGP network or controlled redistribution policy.

This test measures a different behavior: Ping the peer interface and verify TCP179 opens and the BGP FSM reaches Established. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare BGP locally originated and advertised routes with the underlying RIB for the subnet.

This test measures a different behavior: Check BGP next-hop resolution and RIB installation of the previously ineligible prefix. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare BGP locally originated and advertised routes with the underlying RIB for the subnet.

This test measures a different behavior: Read BGP path attributes and best-path result for the two alternatives. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: compare BGP locally originated and advertised routes with the underlying RIB for the subnet.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Neighbor stays Idle/Active while an IP ping to a different remote address succeeds. Here the recorded observation is: bGP Established appears healthy but the neighbor learns zero intended customer routes. The applicable cause is: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Traffic chooses the longer provider path although all higher-priority attributes tie and the shorter path is eligible. Here the recorded observation is: bGP Established appears healthy but the neighbor learns zero intended customer routes. The applicable cause is: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: `show bgp` displays a received network but no usable installed route due to inaccessible next hop. Here the recorded observation is: bGP Established appears healthy but the neighbor learns zero intended customer routes. The applicable cause is: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session.

That control reduces a separate risk: The BGP NEXT_HOP attribute has no resolvable path in the routing table. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session. The specific required safeguard is: verify advertised prefixes and exact RIB match as part of peering acceptance.

That control reduces a separate risk: An intentional AS-path prepend on the shorter provider made it appear longer to the receiver. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session. The specific required safeguard is: verify advertised prefixes and exact RIB match as part of peering acceptance.

That control reduces a separate risk: The configured BGP neighbor destination is not the address actually used by the peer. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the required prefix was not originated into BGP despite a working peer session. The specific required safeguard is: verify advertised prefixes and exact RIB match as part of peering acceptance.

Prepend the customer's own ASN on advertisements sent through the backup eBGP peer as appropriate would not apply the intended inbound/local BGP local preference policy consistently within the receiving AS.

Comparing valid BGP AS path lengths at the appropriate decision stage and selecting shorter path when higher priorities tie would not apply the intended inbound/local BGP local preference policy consistently within the receiving AS.

Applying an appropriate Cisco-local BGP weight policy on the chosen router without expecting it to propagate to peers would not apply the intended inbound/local BGP local preference policy consistently within the receiving AS.