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This test measures a different behavior: Check that each access block reaches both distribution peers and an uplink failure preserves upstream reachability. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect physical device and slot assignments and disable one forwarding component to check whether a second path survives.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect standby readiness and verify routes and interfaces remain operational through a supported switchover test. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect physical device and slot assignments and disable one forwarding component to check whether a second path survives.

This test measures a different behavior: Observe the virtual gateway ownership move and successful client traffic when the active gateway loses LAN reachability. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect physical device and slot assignments and disable one forwarding component to check whether a second path survives.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A supervisor switchover causes a full reboot and routing reconvergence rather than a stateful transition. Here the recorded observation is: both logical uplinks fail when a single supervisor/line-card component is removed. The applicable cause is: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: An access block loses all campus connectivity after one distribution switch fails. Here the recorded observation is: both logical uplinks fail when a single supervisor/line-card component is removed. The applicable cause is: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Clients retain a reachable physical switch but cannot reach their default gateway after the active router fails. Here the recorded observation is: both logical uplinks fail when a single supervisor/line-card component is removed. The applicable cause is: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain.

That control reduces a separate risk: The access block has a single active upstream dependency despite the intended redundant collapsed core. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain. The specific required safeguard is: audit port maps and rack power diversity, not just the number of interface descriptions marked backup.

That control reduces a separate risk: The LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain. The specific required safeguard is: audit port maps and rack power diversity, not just the number of interface descriptions marked backup.

That control reduces a separate risk: The standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain. The specific required safeguard is: audit port maps and rack power diversity, not just the number of interface descriptions marked backup.

Using platform-supported stateful switchover with synchronized standby-supervisor state and compatible software would not deploy a supported FHRP virtual gateway with correctly coordinated member roles and interface reachability.

Planning dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 addressing would not deploy a supported FHRP virtual gateway with correctly coordinated member roles and interface reachability.

Placing uplinks across independent forwarding or chassis failure domains would not deploy a supported FHRP virtual gateway with correctly coordinated member roles and interface reachability.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect physical device and slot assignments and disable one forwarding component to check whether a second path survives. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: observe the virtual gateway ownership move and successful client traffic when the active gateway loses LAN reachability.

This test measures a different behavior: Test the legacy IPv4-only client against the cloud IPv4 listener and a dual-stack peer against the application IPv6 listener. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: observe the virtual gateway ownership move and successful client traffic when the active gateway loses LAN reachability.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect standby readiness and verify routes and interfaces remain operational through a supported switchover test. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: observe the virtual gateway ownership move and successful client traffic when the active gateway loses LAN reachability.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: IPv4-only clients work, but IPv6-capable hosts fail to reach the dual-stack cloud service over IPv6. Here the recorded observation is: clients retain a reachable physical switch but cannot reach their default gateway after the active router fails. The applicable cause is: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Both logical uplinks fail when a single supervisor/line-card component is removed. Here the recorded observation is: clients retain a reachable physical switch but cannot reach their default gateway after the active router fails. The applicable cause is: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A supervisor switchover causes a full reboot and routing reconvergence rather than a stateful transition. Here the recorded observation is: clients retain a reachable physical switch but cannot reach their default gateway after the active router fails. The applicable cause is: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway.

That control reduces a separate risk: IPv6 addresses or routes are missing on at least one required hop; IPv4 reachability does not automatically deliver IPv6 traffic. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway. The specific required safeguard is: test gateway failure and restore events, tracking preemption and uplink reachability separately.

That control reduces a separate risk: The standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway. The specific required safeguard is: test gateway failure and restore events, tracking preemption and uplink reachability separately.

That control reduces a separate risk: The redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway. The specific required safeguard is: test gateway failure and restore events, tracking preemption and uplink reachability separately.

Placing uplinks across independent forwarding or chassis failure domains would not meet the need for platform-supported stateful switchover with synchronized standby-supervisor state and compatible software.

Deploying a supported FHRP virtual gateway with correctly coordinated member roles and interface reachability would not meet the need for platform-supported stateful switchover with synchronized standby-supervisor state and compatible software.

Using a three-tier access, distribution and core architecture to separate campus aggregation from backbone transit would not meet the need for platform-supported stateful switchover with synchronized standby-supervisor state and compatible software.

This test measures a different behavior: Inspect physical device and slot assignments and disable one forwarding component to check whether a second path survives. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect standby readiness and verify routes and interfaces remain operational through a supported switchover test.

This test measures a different behavior: Observe the virtual gateway ownership move and successful client traffic when the active gateway loses LAN reachability. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect standby readiness and verify routes and interfaces remain operational through a supported switchover test.

This test measures a different behavior: Trace a packet from an access VLAN through its distribution block to a redundant core path without crossing an unrelated access switch. It does not establish the target outcome. For the documented fault, the direct acceptance test is: inspect standby readiness and verify routes and interfaces remain operational through a supported switchover test.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Both logical uplinks fail when a single supervisor/line-card component is removed. Here the recorded observation is: a supervisor switchover causes a full reboot and routing reconvergence rather than a stateful transition. The applicable cause is: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: Clients retain a reachable physical switch but cannot reach their default gateway after the active router fails. Here the recorded observation is: a supervisor switchover causes a full reboot and routing reconvergence rather than a stateful transition. The applicable cause is: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO.

That diagnosis is supported by a different symptom: A new distribution block must transit another distribution switch to reach remote buildings. Here the recorded observation is: a supervisor switchover causes a full reboot and routing reconvergence rather than a stateful transition. The applicable cause is: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO.

That control reduces a separate risk: The LAN uses the failed router's physical gateway address instead of a protected FHRP virtual gateway. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO. The specific required safeguard is: monitor supervisor redundancy state and software version compatibility before maintenance.

That control reduces a separate risk: The intended core transit tier was omitted, producing accidental distribution-to-distribution dependence. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO. The specific required safeguard is: monitor supervisor redundancy state and software version compatibility before maintenance.

That control reduces a separate risk: The redundant cabling did not remove the common upstream hardware failure domain. For the described design, the recurring risk arises from: the standby supervisor is not in the required ready/synchronized state for SSO. The specific required safeguard is: monitor supervisor redundancy state and software version compatibility before maintenance.