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An allowed prefix list for a Transit Gateway is not merely filtering VPC advertisement as in VGW associations. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; physical layer availability does not prove that the layer-three routing adjacency is correctly configured.

Public VIF traffic uses public AWS addresses even when the physical transport is dedicated. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; physical layer availability does not prove that the layer-three routing adjacency is correctly configured.

The virtual interface type determines whether connectivity targets private VPC addresses or public AWS endpoints. For the stated conditions, physical layer availability does not prove that the layer-three routing adjacency is correctly configured. The more specific mechanism is Direct Connect routing depends on matching BGP peer ASN, addresses and VLAN-level configuration.

GWLB is designed for appliance insertion rather than content-based ALB routing or general TCP endpoints alone. The reported evidence instead concerns network Load Balancers support UDP or TCP layer-four traffic forwarding for eligible target groups: a layer-seven ALB cannot be substituted for a workload whose transport is UDP datagrams.

Layer-seven request properties are available to an ALB but not to a pure layer-four listener. The decisive technical distinction is network Load Balancers support UDP or TCP layer-four traffic forwarding for eligible target groups; a layer-seven ALB cannot be substituted for a workload whose transport is UDP datagrams.

The ALB can terminate viewer TLS and route decrypted HTTP requests using application conditions. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; a layer-seven ALB cannot be substituted for a workload whose transport is UDP datagrams.

A nonzero configured minimum TTL may cause caching even when an origin asks not to cache. That adjustment does not address the controlling condition: subnet boundaries are a unit for route and ACL policy in addition to IP address capacity. Verify the application tiers use distinct expected route and NACL controls after migration.

Central segment policy can simplify management at scale compared with many unrelated regional route tables. In this situation, subnet boundaries are a unit for route and ACL policy in addition to IP address capacity. The proposed change does not ensure the application tiers use distinct expected route and NACL controls after migration.

Keeping outbound traffic in the same AZ can reduce cross-zone forwarding and improve failure isolation. That adjustment does not address the controlling condition: subnet boundaries are a unit for route and ACL policy in addition to IP address capacity. Verify the application tiers use distinct expected route and NACL controls after migration.

The gateway cannot advertise a nonmatching narrow prefix solely because it was placed in an allowed list. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; a healthy IKE parent SA does not guarantee that the data-plane child SA is successfully negotiated.

A TGW attachment can be connected yet lack a path under its new routing-domain membership. The decisive technical distinction is IPsec Phase 2 child security association settings must match agreed proposal and lifetimes; a healthy IKE parent SA does not guarantee that the data-plane child SA is successfully negotiated.

A new attachment ID is not automatically equivalent to an old one for route visibility. The decisive technical distinction is IPsec Phase 2 child security association settings must match agreed proposal and lifetimes; a healthy IKE parent SA does not guarantee that the data-plane child SA is successfully negotiated.

Generating records does not guarantee they remain accessible for regulatory evidence duration. For the stated conditions, summing repeated one-valued state datapoints can fabricate a number of healthy tunnels over time. The more specific mechanism is a state-like CloudWatch metric needs appropriate statistics and period interpretation, not arbitrary summation.

Mirroring session configuration alone cannot overcome an unsupported source interface class. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; summing repeated one-valued state datapoints can fabricate a number of healthy tunnels over time.

Permitted packets can still fail at TLS identity verification before application data is exchanged. The reported evidence instead concerns a state-like CloudWatch metric needs appropriate statistics and period interpretation, not arbitrary summation: summing repeated one-valued state datapoints can fabricate a number of healthy tunnels over time.

Network-flow metadata can indicate volume and routing context without revealing encrypted payload contents. That adjustment does not address the controlling condition: traffic logs cannot identify the API principal responsible for a policy change by themselves. Verify the report links the named rule modification to the subsequent blocked flow events.

Flow logs need aggregation into a metric before CloudWatch can evaluate counts as an alarm condition. In this situation, traffic logs cannot identify the API principal responsible for a policy change by themselves. The proposed change does not ensure the report links the named rule modification to the subsequent blocked flow events.

Lack of a log record is not definitive proof of absence of every packet event. That adjustment does not address the controlling condition: traffic logs cannot identify the API principal responsible for a policy change by themselves. Verify the report links the named rule modification to the subsequent blocked flow events.

A single DNS endpoint address can become an availability bottleneck and may violate service requirements. In this situation, a publicly executed health check cannot reach a private-only IP endpoint without an approved observable proxy. The proposed change does not ensure the health check changes state according to a valid private service health metric.

Inbound and outbound endpoint directions describe where queries enter or leave the VPC DNS service. In this situation, a publicly executed health check cannot reach a private-only IP endpoint without an approved observable proxy. The proposed change does not ensure the health check changes state according to a valid private service health metric.

Creating a rule on a shared outbound endpoint does not cause every VPC to use it automatically. It does not directly achieve the required result: the health check changes state according to a valid private service health metric. The constraint is that a publicly executed health check cannot reach a private-only IP endpoint without an approved observable proxy.

A gateway endpoint's route works only for route tables explicitly associated with it. For the stated conditions, segment isolation remains the default until explicit policy controls permit communication. The more specific mechanism is cloud WAN core network policy governs which segments share or leak routes under approved actions.

An interface endpoint can be healthy yet unreachable if its ENI security policy drops the client connection. For the stated conditions, segment isolation remains the default until explicit policy controls permit communication. The more specific mechanism is cloud WAN core network policy governs which segments share or leak routes under approved actions.

Service scoping reduces blast radius compared with unrestricted full VPC network connectivity. For the stated conditions, segment isolation remains the default until explicit policy controls permit communication. The more specific mechanism is cloud WAN core network policy governs which segments share or leak routes under approved actions.

Encrypted application sessions are distinct from DNS queries that may expose query-name exfiltration patterns. The needed control instead targets traffic Mirroring can copy supported network packet streams for deep security inspection; it succeeds when investigators reconstruct relevant protocol exchanges from captured packets.

Comprehensive request logging can expose sensitive headers or query strings beyond the audit's legitimate need. In this situation, packet mirroring provides payload visibility where allowed, while flow logs provide summarized metadata. The proposed change does not ensure investigators reconstruct relevant protocol exchanges from captured packets.

Edge delivery requests can bypass origin logs on cache hits, so origin-only auditing is incomplete. The needed control instead targets traffic Mirroring can copy supported network packet streams for deep security inspection; it succeeds when investigators reconstruct relevant protocol exchanges from captured packets.

Resource ownership and spoke VPC ownership can remain separate while attachments are governed centrally. The reported evidence instead concerns Transit Gateway supports central hub-and-spoke routing for many VPC attachments under controlled route tables: mesh peering grows rapidly in connection and route-management complexity compared with centralized transit routing.

Connecting attachments to the same Transit Gateway does not by itself permit every attachment to reach every other. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; mesh peering grows rapidly in connection and route-management complexity compared with centralized transit routing.

PrivateLink service access is narrower than full VPC peering and can work across overlapping address spaces. The reported evidence instead concerns Transit Gateway supports central hub-and-spoke routing for many VPC attachments under controlled route tables: mesh peering grows rapidly in connection and route-management complexity compared with centralized transit routing.

Domain matching depends on visible protocol metadata and may not identify all encrypted application destinations. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; account-by-account manual security policy edits cannot reliably preserve enterprise-wide coverage.

Volumetric layer-three/four floods require upstream DDoS mitigation beyond individual HTTP pattern rules. That property alone cannot account for the reported symptom; account-by-account manual security policy edits cannot reliably preserve enterprise-wide coverage.

Stateful inspection tracks connection context rather than evaluating packets entirely independently. The decisive technical distinction is AWS Firewall Manager can centrally govern supported network and WAF policies across organization resources; account-by-account manual security policy edits cannot reliably preserve enterprise-wide coverage.